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公 法 评 论 惟愿公平如大水滚滚，使公义如江河滔滔！ |
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
BEIJING 2001
政治哲学国际学术研讨会
北京 2001
I
APRIL 27-29，2001
2001年4月27-29日
BEIJING, CHINA
中国 ? 北京
Sponsoring & Organizing Bodies:
主办单位：
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
中国社会科学院哲学研究所
Philosophy Summer School in China: China Britain Australia
中英澳暑期哲学学院
Co-sponsoring & Organizing Bodies:
协办单位：
School of Public Administration, Soochow University
苏州大学公共管理学院
School of Public Administration, Yunnan University
云南大学公共管理学院
Funding Body:
资助单位：
The Ford Foundation
福特基金会
Honorary President 会议名誉主席：
RU Xin 汝 信
President 会议主席：
XING Bensi 邢贲思
Chair, International Advisory Committee 国际顾问委员主席：
Sir Marrack GOULDING
Chair, Programme Committee 学术委员会主席:
Nicholas BUNNIN
Chair, Organizing Committee 组织委员会主席:
QIU Renzong 邱仁宗
General Secretary 秘书长：
JIANG Yi 江 怡
SUN Jing 孙 晶
CONTENTS
目 录
Programme -------------------------------------------------------------------（5）会议日程--
Abstracts---------------------------------------------------------------------（16）
论文摘要
List of Participants----------------------------------------------------------(115)
与会者名单
PROGRAMME
会议日程
PROGRAMME
会议日程
Thursday 26 April 2001
09:00 – 20:00
Registration
注册
Lobby, Jianguo Gardens Hotel
好苑建国酒店
Friday 27 April 2001
08:30 – 12:00
Registration
注册
Front Hall, Conference Room
会议室前厅
Friday 27 April 2001
09:00 – 09:30
Opening Ceremony
开幕式
Chair: Li Deshun
主持人：李德顺
09:00 – 09:12
Xing Bensi
邢贲思
President, Philosophy Summer School in China: China Britain Australia (PSSCCBA)
中英澳暑期哲学学院院长
09:12 – 09:18
Andrew Watson
Representative, The Ford Foundation in Beijing
福特基金会北京代办处主任
09:18 – 09:24
Li Pengcheng
李鹏程
Deputy Director, Institute of Philosophy, CASS
中国社会科学院哲学研究所副所长
09:24 – 09:30
Nicholas Bunnin
Chair, British Committee, PSSCCBA
中英澳暑期哲学学院英方委员会主席
Friday 27 April 2001
09:30 – 10:30
Plenary Session I: Keynote Speeches
第一次全体会议：基调报告
Chair主持人: Nicholas Bunnin
09:30 – 09:50
Philip Pettit
Democracy as a Two-dimensional, Republican Ideal
作为二元的、共和理想的民主政体
09:50 – 10:10
Li Pengcheng李鹏程
An Outline of Philosophy of the Oriental Neo-Communitarianism
“东方新社群”理念哲学论纲
10:10 – 10:30
Discussion
讨论
10:30 – 10:40
Tea Break
休息
Friday 27 April 2001
10:40 – 12:00
Plenary Session II: Justice & the Rule of Law
第二次全体会议：公正和法治
Chair: Julia Tao
主持人：陶黎宝华
10:40 – 11:00
Thomas Pogge
Economic Justice, National and Global
经济正义：国家的与全球的
11:00 – 11:20
Li Qiang 李 强
Issues of Social Justice in Economic Transition
经济转型中的社会正义问题
11:20 – 11:40
Gu Su 顾 肃
On Fundamental Principles and Factors of the Rule of Law
论法治的基本特征和要素
11:40 – 12:00
Discussion
讨论
12:00 – 14:00
Taking Picture & Lunch Break
照相和午餐
Friday 27 April 2001
14:00 – 17:15
Group Session A：Justice
分组会A：公正
Chair: Zhang Xiaoming Chen Youhong
主持人: 张晓明 陈幽泓
14:00 - 14:15
Dong-jin Jang
In Searching of Justice for Global Society: A Comparison of Political Liberalism and Confucianism.
寻求全球社会的正义：政治自由主义和儒家思想的比较
14:15 – 14:30
Byron Kaldis
Justice and Democracy across National Borders: Ethics or Politics?
跨越民族国家疆域的正义与民主制：伦理还是政治？
14:30 – 14:45
Hon-Lam Li
Marx, Justice, and Capitalism
马克思，正义和资本主义
14:45 – 15:30
Discussion
讨论
15:30 – 15:45
Tea Break
休息
15:45 – 16:00
Catriona McKinnon
Social Justice: Rights, Obligations, and Self-Respect.
社会正义：权利、义务和自尊
16:00 – 16:15
Gao Quanxi 高全喜
Constitutional Justice and Transcendental Justice--Two Kinds of Justices and their Paradox
宪政正义与超验正义——两种正义及其悖论
16:15 – 16:30
Wang Shouchang 王守昌
The Conception of Justice and History of Justice’s Doctrine
正义概念及正义学说的历史
16:30 – 17:15
Discussion
讨论
Friday 27 April 2001
14:00 – 17:30
Group Session B：(1) Public Reason & the Rule of Law
(2) Equality
分组会B：(1)公共理性与法治
(2)平等
Chair: Li He Cheng Lian
主持人: 李 河 程 炼
14:00 - 14:15
Lu Feng卢 风
Public Reason And Democracy
公共理性与民主
14:15 – 14:30
Ahmet Kara
A Paradox of Rationality in a Liberal Pluralist Democracy
在自由的多元民主政治中的理性悖论
14:30 – 14:45
Sheng Chin-lai 盛庆琜
Some Moral Arguments against Unrestricted Capitalism
反对无限制资本主义之若干道德论证
14:45 – 15:00
Kang Phee Seng江丕盛
The Limits of Public Reason
公共理性的界限
15:00 – 15:15
Melissa S. Lane
On What Can't Be Replaced: Compensation, Security, and the Rule of Law
论那些不能替代的因素：赔偿、安全保障和法治
15:15 – 16:00
Discussion
讨论
16:00 – 16:15
Tea Break
休息
16:15 – 16:30
Susan Hurley
Why the Aim to Neutralize Luck Cannot Provide a Basis for Egalitarianism
为何使机会均等的努力不能为平均主义奠定基础
16:30 – 16:45
Jeremy Moss
Equality and Enablement
平等与能力授予
16:45 – 17:00
Alois Nugroho
Quality and Equality: the Role of Statesmanship in a Democratic State
品质与平等：民主制国家中政治家的作用
17:00 – 17:30
Discussion
讨论
Saturday 28 April 2001
08:30 – 10:20
Plenary Session III: Rights
第三次全体会议：权利
Chair 主持人：Alan Montefiore
08:30 – 08:50
James Griffin
First Steps in an Account of Human Rights
人权的基本问题
08:50 – 09:10
Lin Yu-sheng 林毓生
A Dialogue between Kant and Confucius and Mencius Concerning Human Rights
康德与孔孟之间关于人权的对话
09:10 – 09:30
Will Kymlicka
Nation-Building and Minority Rights
民族国家建制与少数民族的权利
09:30 – 09:50
Han Zhen韩 震
On Historicity and Ideality of Human Rights with Comments on A. J. M. Milne’s Philosophy of Human Rights
论人权的历史性和理想性—兼评米尔恩的《人权哲学》
09:50 – 10:20
Discussion
讨论
10:20 – 10:35
Tea Break
休息
Saturday 28 April 2001
10:35 – 12:00
Plenary Session IV: (1) Equality
(2) Confucianism & Constitutionalism
第四次全体会议：(1) 平等
(2) 儒家与宪政
Chair: Chien Yung-hsiang
主持人：钱永祥
10:35 – 10:55
Xu Youyu 徐友渔
A Review of Several Arguments of Equality
关于平等的当代思考
10:55 – 11:15
Zhang Qianfan 张千帆
Confucianism and Constitutionalism: On the Social and Political Functions of Li
儒学与宪政：论礼治的政治与社会功能
11:15 – 11:35
Qian Xun 钱 逊
The Idea of Democracy in Ancient China
关于中国古代民主思想
11:35 – 12:00
Discussion
讨论
12:00 – 14:00
Lunch Break
午餐
Saturday 28 April 2001
14:00 – 17:00
Group Session C：(1) Rights
(2) Governance
分组会C：(1) 权利
(2) 治理
Chair: Liao Shenbai Wang Yanguang
主持人: 廖申白 王延光
14:00 - 14:15
Michael Freeman
Culture, Sovereignty and Human Rights
文化、主权和人权
14:15 – 14:30
Stephen Angel
Toward a Cross-Cultural Dialogue on Rights and Interests
关于权利和利益的跨文化对话
14:30 – 14:45
Jens Hinkmann
Philosophical Justifications of Human Rights
人权的哲学辩护
14:45 – 15:30
Discussion
讨论
15:30 – 15:45
Tea Break
休息
15:45 – 16:00
Mollindo Charabarti
Democracy and Autonomy: Does Property Rights Regime Matter?
民主制和自治：产权体制是否紧要？
16:00 – 16:15
Dudley R. Knowles
Legitimacy
合法性
16:15 – 17:00
Discussion
讨论
Saturday 28 April 2001
14:00 – 17:15
Group Session D：(1) Liberty
(2) Truth
分组会D：(1) 自由
(2) 真理
Chair: Jiang Yi Liu Xin
主持人: 江 怡 刘 莘
14:00 - 14:15
Jiwei Ci 慈纪伟
Freedom as a Subjective Condition of Justice
自由：作为正义的主观条件
14:15 – 14:30
Zheng Yujian 郑宇健
Negative Liberty and Limits of Reason -- a Critical Comment on the Agonistic Interpretation of Berlin’s Liberalism
消极自由和理性的局限—对伯林自由主义的规避主义诠释的批评性评论
14:30 – 14:45
Chen Wentong陈闻桐
Freedom and Equality in Modern Western Political Philosophy
近现代西方政治哲学中的自由和平等
14:45 – 15:00
Gong Qun龚 群
On Ideas of Liberty in Rawls’ Theory of Justice
论罗尔斯的自由理念
15:00 – 15:45
Discussion
讨论
15:15 – 16:00
Tea Break
休息
16:00 – 16:15
Allan Montefiore
The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals
知识分子的政治责任
16:15 – 16:30
Juha Raikka
Freedom of Expression and the Argument from Truth
言论自由和真理论证
16:30 – 17:15
Discussion
讨论
19:00 – 20:30
Workshop for Participants Speaking Chinese: Political Philosophy and China
研讨会(工作语言为中文)：政治哲学与中国
Chair: Qiu Renzong
主持人：邱仁宗
Sunday 29 April 2001
08:30 – 12:00
Group Session E：Community & Diversity
分组会E：社区与多样性
Chair: Hu Xinhe Zhai Xiaomei
主持人: 胡新和 翟晓梅
08:30 - 08:45
David Archard
Community and Political Good Order
共同体和良好的政治秩序
08:45 – 09:00
David Kahane
Democratic Deliberation in Diverse Societies
多元社会间的民主商议
09:00 – 09:15
Daniel Kofman
Sovereignty, Cosmopolitanism, and Their Limits
主权、世界主义以及它们的限度
09:15 – 09:30
Kwan Kai-man
A Critical Evaluation of the Debate between Michael Sandel & the Later John Rawls
论桑德尔与后期罗尔斯的争辩
09:30 – 10:15
Discussion
讨论
10:15 – 10:30
Tea Break
休息
10:30 – 10:45
Dietmar von der Pfordten
Normative Individualism and Normative Collectivism in Political Philosophy and International Ethics
政治哲学和全球伦理中规范的个人主义和规范的集体主义
10:45 – 11:00
Tan Sor Hoon
Liberty vs. Community - A Confucian Perspective on Democracy's Dilemma
自由与共同体：从儒家思想视角审视民主制的两难困境
11:00 – 11:15
Daniel Weinstock
The "Reasonable" as a Limit on Pluralism in Liberal Democracies
在自由主义的民主政治中“理性的”作为多元主义的限度
11:15 – 12:00
Discussion
讨论
Sunday 29 April 2001
08:30 – 12:00
Group Session F：(1) Citizenship
(2) Perspective on Political Philosophy
分组会F：(1) 公民
(2) 政治哲学
Chair: Wang Xiaosheng Lu Feng
主持人: 王晓升 卢 风
08:30 - 08:45
Catherine Audard
Citizenship and Moral Individuality
公民和道德个体
08:45 – 09:00
Chen Youhong陈幽泓
Self-Governance and Political Order: the Role of Citizens
自主治理与政治秩序――公民的角色
09:00 – 09:30
Discussion
讨论
09:30 – 09:45
Tea Break
休息
09:45 – 10:00
Discussion
讨论
10:00 – 10:15
Tea Break
休息
10:15 – 10:30
Cressida Heyes
Criticism from Within and Without: Wittgensteinian Reflections
内部批评和外部批评：维特根斯坦主义的思考
10:45 – 11:00
Katia Vanhemelryck
Pragmatism and Politics
实用主义与政治
11:00 – 11:15
Zhang Boshu张博树
Dramaturgical Action: An Analysis from the Perspective of Political Philosophy
剧场行为：从政治哲学的观点看
11:15 – 11:30
Vincent Shen 沈清松
11:30 – 12:00
Discussion
讨论
Sunday 29 April 2001
14:00 – 15:00
Plenary Session V: Perfectionism & Virtue
第五次全体会议：至善与德性
Chair 主持人：Dietmar von der Pfordten
14:00 – 14:20
Joseph Chan
Political Perfectionism: Ancient and Modern
政治至善论：古典的和现代的
14:20 – 14:40
Julia Tao陶黎宝华
Beyond Proceduralism: The Chinese Perspective on Sincerity as Political Virtue
超越程序主义：中国人对诚实即政治德性的观点
14:40 – 15:00
Discussion
讨论
Sunday 29 April 2001
15:00 – 16:00
Plenary Session VI: People & Citizens
第六次全体会议：人民与公民
Chair 主持人：Thomas Pogge
15:00 – 15:20
Yung-hsiang Chien钱永祥
Some Critical Reflections on the Concept of ‘the People’ in Political Discourse
关于“人民”概念的一些哲学反思
15:20 – 15:40
Ren Jiantao 任剑涛
From People, Citizens to Voters
从人民、公民到选民—政治活动主体定位与社会政治格局的关联性
15:40 – 16:00
Discussion
讨论
16:00 – 16:10
Tea Break
休息
Sunday 29 April 2001
16:10 – 17:10
Plenary Session VII: Institutions
第七次全体会议：体制
Chair: Ni Huifang
主持人：倪慧芳
16:10 – 16:30
Keping俞可平
Toward An Incremental Democracy and Governance: Chinese Theories and Assessment Criteria
增量民主与善治―中国人对民主与治理的一种看法
16:30 – 16:50
Mao Shoulong 毛寿龙
An Institutional Analysis of the Relationship between Knowledge and Practice in the process of Political Development in China
从中国政治发展的进程透视知识与实践的制度基础
16:50 – 17:10
Discussion
讨论
Sunday 29 April 2001
17:10 – 17:30
Closing Ceremony
闭幕式
Chair: Qiu Renzong
主持人：邱仁宗
17:10 – 17:25
Nicholas Bunnin
Conclusions & Reflections
结论与反思
17:25 – 17:40
Li Pengcheng
李鹏程
19:00 – 20:30
Farewell Party
告别宴会
ABSTRACTS
论文摘要
Toward a Cross-Cultural Dialogue on Rights and Interests
Stephen Angel
Wesleyan University, USA
In a ground-breaking article, the American philosopher and legal scholar Randall Peerenboom has argued that contemporary Chinese human rights theorists understand rights as a kind of interest. He contrasts this with the view of many American philosophers that rights are deontological, rather than utilitarian. As Peerenboom would no doubt acknowledge, though, rights and interests may have more complex inter-relations than his simple framework suggests. Spelling out these different possible relations will help us to understand what Chinese rights theorists may be saying when they link rights and interests. I show that Chinese theories can be understood along lines similar to Joseph Raz's rights theory which, I argue, is in certain ways superior to the Western theories on which Peerenboom focuses. I also suggest that Raz's alternative Western theory is vulnerable to the objection that it obfuscates the point of talking about rights at all; it can seem that talk of interests and duties may be sufficient. I conclude by urging that Chinese theorists can help Raz to respond to this objection, even while themselves learning from other aspects of Raz's view.
关于权利和利益的跨文化对话
斯蒂芬·安格尔
美国卫斯理大学
在一篇开创性的文章中，美国哲学家和法学家兰迪·帕伦勃（Randall Peerenboom）论证说，当代中国的人权理论家把权利理解为利益的一种类型。他以许多美国哲学家的观点来反驳这种见解，那些观点认为权利属于义务，而不属于功利。当然，帕伦勃坦率地承认，比起他简略的结构所表明的，权利与利益之间可能存在更复杂的内在关联。详细解释这些可能的关联将有助于我们理解中国权利学者把权利与利益联在一起的意思。我试图表明的是，中国人的理论可以理解为类似约瑟夫·罗兹（Joseph Raz）的权利理论，而在我看来，后者在某种意义上是优越于帕伦勃所强调的那些西方理论的。我也指出，罗兹的替代西方理论在下述批评面前是很脆弱的，这种批评认为罗兹的理论使得对权利的谈论在意义上显得含混不清，似乎只需讨论利益和义务就足够了。我的结论是：中国的理论家可以帮助罗兹回应这些批评，当然中国的理论家自己可以学习罗兹理论的另外一些方面。
Community and Political Good Order
David Archard
University of St Andrews, Scotland
The most plausible communitarian criticism of Rawlsian liberalism - versions of which can be found in Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, and Michael Sandel - holds that liberalism is unable to supply the principle of political community which is needed if the liberal political order is to be, in Rawls's phrase, well-ordered, that is regulated by principles of justice which all citizens know to apply, accept, and are motivated to comply with. The liberal response is that there cannot, given the fact of pluralism, be a political community if this means 'a society governed by a shared comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine' (Rawls, 1993, 42). There can however be a common aim, namely that of promoting and protecting just institutions. To many critics such an account is inadequate and the idea (to adopt Habermas's phrase) of mere 'constitutional patriotism' motivating political good order seems insufficient.
Two alternatives suggest themselves. One is the use of existing salient communities, such as nationalities, to supply the necessary civic 'fellow-feeling'. Such is the approach of David Miller and Yael Tamir. The other is to offer a plausible account of how citizens might acquire a sense of justice sufficient to underpin the required good liberal order. The paper reviews both possibilities and the problems attendant on each. In particular, in the case of the first the major problem is the extent to which those facts which do unite some body of citizens can themselves be subject to regulation by liberal principles. In the case of the second alternative the major problem is the extent to which the acquisition of a sense of justice would require a particular kind of education and a regulation of the private, especially familial, sphere of social life – in ways seemingly inconsistent with liberal principles of neutrality and legal minimalism.
共同体和良好的政治秩序
大卫·阿查德
苏格兰圣安德鲁斯大学
对罗尔斯自由主义的来自社群主义最有力的批评形式可以在米歇尔·瓦尔茨（Michael Walzer）、查理士·泰勒（Charles Taylor）和米歇尔·桑德尔（Michael Sandel）那里找到，这些批评认为自由主义不能提供政治共同体的原则，而如果自由主义的政治秩序是“秩序良好的”（这是罗尔斯的术语，自由主义的政治秩序即由被公民所接受，应用和倾向于服从的正义原则所控制的政治秩序），则政治共同体的原则是必需的。自由主义的回应就是，在多元主义的背景下，不可能存在政治共同体，如果政治共同体意指“一个由广泛分享的宗教的、哲学的或道德的信条所统治的社会”（罗尔斯，1993，42）的话。不过，仍然可能存在共同的目标，也就是促进和保护公正的公共机构。对许多批评者来说，罗尔斯这种论述是不充分的，并且，按照哈贝马斯的术语，单单是“宪政爱国主义”这个理念来促进良好政治秩序是不够的。
两种替代方案被提出来。其中一种是利用现存的主要的共同体，如民族，来提供必要的公民的共同意识。这是大卫·米勒（David Miller）和耶勒·塔米尔（Yael Tamir）的途径。另一种方法是为公民如何获得正义感提供一种可靠的叙述，而这种正义感足够为所期待的良好的自由秩序提供基础。本论文评论了这两种可能选择和它们各自的问题。第一种方案的主要问题是，这些实际上整合公民的因素在何种限度内是遵循自由主义原则的控制的。第二种方案的主要问题是，正义感的获得在何种程度上需要一种特殊的教育和对社会生活的私人领域尤其是家庭领域方面的干预——而这看来与自由主义的中性原则和有限法治主义是不一致的。
Citizenship and Moral Individuality
Catherine Audard
Department of Philosophy, London School of Economics, UK
This paper aims at examining and discussing the relations between citizenship and moral individuality in contemporary liberal and Republican traditions, in particular French and British. Very few political theories would deny the link existing between citizenship and the individual's moral needs, beliefs and dispositions that make up her moral individuality, the personal virtues that individuals normally develop among family and friends. Most would recognise that the virtues of the citizen proceed from or interact with the ideals of a moral individuality and the corresponding dialogical competences (Habermas, Scanlon) that are fashioned within the non-political sphere, but still colour the political realm. Most will insist, as John Rawls does, on the necessity of a 'political' conception of the person as an element of a theory of democracy and, more importantly, of its stability. Indeed, there exist many possible links: citizenship can be seen as a protection for the flourishing of moral individuality and of moral development in the sense of John Stuart Mill, or as a constraint on individual freedom which should be kept as limited as possible, as in the libertarian view of the minimal state. It can, differently, be contrasted with the lower 'private' virtues and interests and be seen as the ultimate expression of moral excellence in a long tradition starting with Aristotle and ending up with the Rousseauist conceptions of civic virtues or with Hegel's conception of 'objective morality'.
However I will show that, on the whole, most current representations tend to separate 'public' and 'private' moral spheres in ways that jeopardize any sense of the unity of the Self and the citizen. The poverty of current conceptions of the moral individual in political philosophy makes it difficult to ground any kind of serious commitment to democracy. What is required, by contrast, is a notion of self-identity, such as narrative identity in the sense of Ricoeur, that is rich enough to explain commitments and responsibilities towards the good polity in the long term. This might lead, of course, to supporting new specific rights, such as cultural rights, minority rights, collective rights, allowing for moral diversity and pluralism, but on grounds different from the communitarian claims.
The paper will (1) explain the moral content of citizenship both for the liberal and the Republican representations, and criticize both conceptions. (2) insist on the value of cultural membership and moral traditions for the flourishing of moral individuality, especially for the constitution of a narrative identity, and discuss ways to bridge the divide between 'private' and 'public' spheres. (3) detail the dimensions of moral individuality concerned with citizenship: the connections between self-interest or partiality and the common good, the role of civic recognition for self-identity, self-respect and self-esteem (A.Honneth, A.Margalit, C.Taylor), the conflict between pluralism and solidarity, etc. (4) suggest new conceptions of rights and duties connected with these aspects of moral individuality, and a new enriched conception of
citizenship and civil society.
公民和道德个体
凯瑟林·奥达特
英国伦敦经济学院哲学系
本论文试图考察当代自由主义和共和传统中（尤其是在法国和英国范围内）公民和道德个体的关系。很少有理论否认在公民资格和个体的道德需要、道德信念和道德倾向之间存在的关系，而后者构成道德上的个性，即个体一般在家庭和朋友中发展出来的个人德性。绝大多数理论承认公民德性是道德个体的观念以及相应的辩证法能力（哈贝马斯、斯坎伦(Scanlon)）的延续或与之相互影响，而后者虽然主要是表现在非政治领域，却仍然将其色彩投射在政治领域中。如约翰·罗尔斯一样，多数人试图坚持政治上的个体概念的必要性，以作为民主制度理论尤其是其稳定性的基础。的确，许多可能的关系是存在的：在约翰·斯图亚特·穆勒的意义上，公民资格可以看作是对道德个体成长或道德发展的一种保护；对主张有限国家的自由主义者来说，公民资格是个体自由的一种限制，因而应当尽可能的予以限定。相反地，公民资格也可以与较低的私人德性和利益的相对照，而被看成是道德完善的最终实现，这表现在以亚里士多德开始而以卢梭的公民德性或黑格尔的客观道德概念告终的漫长传统中。
然而，我想表明的是，从总体上讲，绝大多数当前的理论倾向区分“公共的”和“私人的”道德领域，而这种区分是以一种会威胁到自我和公民的统一性的方式进行的。在政治哲学中流行的道德个体概念的贫乏使得很难为任何一种对民主制度的严肃的忠诚奠定基础。与之相对照，所要求的是自我统一性的概念，如利科意义上的描述的统一性概念，这种概念在长远意义上内涵丰富，可以解释对良好的政体的忠诚和义务。
这篇论文将（１）解释自由主义和共和主义理论的公民概念的道德内容，并对之提出批评。（２）坚持文化和道德传统对道德个体成长的价值，尤其是对描述的统一性的价值并论述沟通在“私人的”和“公共的”领域之间的鸿沟的方法。（３）详细论述道德个体对公民资格的重要性：自我利益或排他性与共同福利的关系，公民认同对自我统一性，自尊的作用（A.哈里斯(A.Honneth),A.玛格利特（A.Margalit）,C.泰勒），多元主义和社会连带主义之间的冲突，等等。（４）提出与道德个体这些上述方面相连的权利和义务的新概念，以及公民和市民社会的新的更丰富的概念。
A Confucian Democracy for the Twenty-First Century
Daniel Bell
Department of Social & Public Administration
City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
In the eyes of Singapore elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew, a "Confucianist view of order between subject and ruler helps in the rapid transformation of society ... in other words, you fit yourself into society -- the exact opposite of the American rights of the individual." A modern Confucian society, that is, can provide the benefits of rapid economic growth, but it must sacrifice the democratic political rights which make government so difficult in the West. For a society reflecting on its political future, the possibilities seem to come down to two options:
Either Western democracy or Confucian authoritarianism.
Let us instead imagine that Western and Confucian political values need not be undamentally incompatible. It is rather tempting, in fact, to conceive of the possibility of reconciling the Confucian emphasis of rule by a wise and uncorrupted political elite with the democratic values of popular participation, accountability, and transparency. But this is easier said than done. What are the political institutions of a modern Confucian democracy? Either elected politicians rule, or an educated elite rules, but how can both rule in the same society? This essay proposes an answer to this dilemma: a bicameral legislature with a democratically elected lower house and an upper house composed of representatives selected on the basis of competitive examinations.
Part I develops the argument that modern democratic regimes have an interest in accommodating the value of rule by an educated elite. Part II considers and rejects alternative proposals for combining democracy with rule by an intellectual elite such as plural voting schemes and functional constituencies. Drawing upon the ideas of radical seventeenth-century Confucian political thinker Huang Zongxi, Part III sketches out the proposal for a bicameral legislature with a democratically elected lower house and an upper house composed of representatives selected on the basis of competitive examinations.
二十一世纪的儒家民主政体
丹尼尔·贝尔
香港城市大学社会与公共管理系
在新加坡政界元老李光耀眼中，“关于臣民和治理者之间的秩序的一种儒家的观念在急遽的社会转型中很有助益…换句话说，能帮助你适应社会——社会即美国式的个体权利的对立面”。也就是说，现代儒家社会能够提供快速经济增长所带来的好处，但却必须牺牲民主的政治权利，而这些权利在西方也使得治理极为困难。对于一个思考着自己政治前景的社会而言，似乎存在着两种可能的选择： 要么是西方的民主政体要么是儒家的权威主义。
然而让我们设想一下，或许西方的和儒家的政治价值观并非完全不可协调的。事实上，设想这种可能性是很有诱惑的：调和儒家的和民主的政治价值，前者强调由智睿而清廉的政治精英统治，后者则注重普遍的参与、责任和透明性。当然这个说来容易做起来难。现代儒家民主政体的政治机构是怎样的呢？要么是选举产生的政治家治理，要么是由受过良好教养的精英统治，然而在同一个社会中由两者共同治理，这是如何可能的？本文为此困境提供一种答案：一种两院制的立法机构，包括由民主选举产生的下院和由竞争式考核基础上选择的代表构成的上院。 第一部分进一步论述下述观点：现代民主政体倾向于容纳精英治理这种价值观。第二部分考察和驳斥另外的选择，即通过多元选举机制和功能选区等方式来调和民主制和精英治理的做法。通过利用十七世纪激进的儒家政治思想家黄宗羲的思想，第三部分会勾画出两院制立法机构的建议，即由民主选举产生的下院和由竞争式考核基础上选择的代表构成的上院。
Republican Citizenship: A Qualified Critique
Daniel Bell
Department of Social & Public Administration
City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Philosophers such as Aristotle and Rousseau argued that ordinary citizens should be active participants in the political life of their community, and that they should be motivated by the common good, not by their own particular interests. This classical ideal of republican citizenship assumes (a) that the state can control the community's own destiny and (b) that people strongly identify with their own political community.
In the modern world, however, both these assumptions can be questioned. Regarding (a), the problem is that "the state is too small for the big things and too big for the small things." On the one hand, environmental disasters, regional economic upheavals, humanitarian crises, and major security threats often seem to require transnational solutions. On the other hand, welfare aid and development projects often seem to require decentralized political arrangements that give local communities and ethnic groups more political control over their own affairs.
Regarding (b), competing allegiances also seem to pull away from the state in opposite directions. On the one hand, highly educated professionals, successful entrepreneurs, and internet surfers often feel more at home among foreigners with similar interests than with their own co-nationals. On the other hand, modern states seem to be breaking up into competing centers of identity focused on ethnicity and race.
In short, the ideal of republican citizenship might seem obsolete. In his recent book, Citizenship and National Identity (Polity, 2000), David Miller courageously argues otherwise. This essay will critically evaluate Miller's defense of republicanism for contemporary liberal-democratic states. I will present arguments from three different perspectives -- liberalism, socialism, and communitarianism -- against Miller's conception of republican citizenship. Liberals will raise doubts about the feasibility of republican citizenship in the modern state, and socialists and communitarians will raise (different) questions concerning the desirability of this ideal. I will conclude by sketching a qualified ideal of republican citizenship that meets objections from all three perspectives.
共和政体的公民：一种有限度的批评
丹尼尔·贝尔
香港城市大学社会与公共管理系
亚里士多德和卢梭等哲学家认为普通公民应当是他们所在的共同体的政治生活的积极参与者，并且这样做的动机应当是出于共同福利，而不是出于私利。这种共和政体的古典概念预设了（a）国家能够控制共同体自身的命运，（b）人们非常认同他们所在的政治共同体。
然而在现代世界，这两个假定都是能够被质疑的。因为（a）问题在于“国家对许多大问题显得力不从心，而对许多小问题则又显得冗余”。一方面，环境灾难、地区经济动荡、人道主义危机和主要的安全威胁常常需要超国家的解决方法。另一方面，福利援助和发展规划等经常需要非集权式的政治安排，而这需要给予区域共同体或民族团体对其自身事务更多的政治控制。
（b）替代性的忠诚也由对立的方向从国家中分离开来。一方面，受过良好教养的专业人士、成功的企业家以及互联网冲浪者经常在有共同兴趣的外国人而不是本国同胞那里找到更多的认同感。另一方面，现代国家似乎倾向于分裂为以种族和民族认同为核心的竞争单元。
总之，共和政体的公民这种理念似乎是过时的。在他最近的著作《公民与国家认同》中（政体，2000），大卫·弥勒（David Miller）却坚定地持相反意见。本文将批判地评估弥勒对现代自由民主国家中共和主义的辩护。我将从三种视角提出论点来反对弥勒的共和政体的公民这种概念——自由主义，社会主义和社群主义。自由主义者质疑在现代国家中共和政体的公民的可行性，而社会主义者和社群主义者则怀疑这种理念是否值得追求。我将勾勒出一种有限度的共和政体公民的概念以回应从三种视角提出的批评。
Is Republican Citizenship Appropriate for the Modern World?
Daniel Bell
Department of Social & Public Administration
City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Philosophers such as Aristotle and Rousseau argued that ordinary citizens should be active participants in the political life of their community, and that they should be motivated by the common good, not by their own particular interests. However, this classical ideal of republican citizenship assumes the context of small face-to-face communities where citizens treat each other as friends, not as strangers with potentially conflicting interests. In the modern world, it does not seem realistic to expect that strangers from different classes and ethnic groups will care enough about each other's fate to allow for this kind of friendly interchange in the political realm.
Contra these doubts, the influential political theorist David Miller argues that nationality can provide the sense of mutual trust and common identity for the ideal of republican citizenship to be realized in contemporary states. This essay, however, will present arguments from three different perspectives -- liberalism, socialism, and Confucian communitarianism -- against Miller's conception of republican citizenship. Liberals will raise doubts about the feasibility of republican citizenship, and socialists and Confucian communitarians will raise (different) questions regarding the desirability of this ideal. I will conclude by sketching a qualified ideal of republican citizenship that meets objections from all three perspectives.
Democracy and Autonomy: Does Property Rights Regime Matter?
Mollindo Charabarti
Centre for Studies in Rural Economy, Appropriate Technology and Environment
Department of Economics, St. Joseph's College, India
Sustainable management of resources in general and natural resources in particular cannot be ensured in an institutional vacuum. One of such institutional requirements is a properly defined property rights regime over the concerned resource. Available literature suggests that private property rights regime can ensure optimum use of resources in the presence of 'complete set of perfect markets'. Unfortunately in countries like India, markets are neither complete, nor are they perfect. Such arguments have come in handy to prescribe a 'State' managed forestry sector in the country. Continuing the legacy of the colonial times, the Forest Department has been managing the forestry resources of the country single-handedly. The recent experimentations with Joint Forest Management (JFM) in most of the states notwithstanding, one is apprehensive of the approach's ability to bring in the people into the fold of management. Such apprehensions result from the absence of a democratic decision making mechanism regarding the use of forestry resources. The absence of such mechanism has resulted in the failure to develop a well-defined property rights regime on the forests in India. Incidentally, the demands for right to self-determination have been observed in parts of the country that are rich in forests. The present paper is an attempt to show that these regions have remained backward because of a faulty developmental policy followed in this country that subsidized the resource poor regions at the cost of the resource rich regions. Such subsidization occurred due to lack of 'democratic' institutions, which if existent, could have been effective in channeling people's aspirations in the desired directions. The experiences out of the agitation for a separate state of 'Gorkhaland' in the eastern Himalayan region have been analyzed to develop a tentative functional relationship between the management practices vis-a-vis forests and the escalation of tensions in this region in demand for right to self-determination.
民主制和自治：产权体制是否紧要？
莫林多·恰拉巴蒂
印度圣约瑟学院经济学系
农业经济特种技术和环境研究中心
资源尤其是自然资源的可持续性管理不能在制度真空中得到确保。所要求的制度之一就是对所关涉到的资源的一种恰当的产权体制。可资利用的著述认为，在“一个完全而又完善的市场体系”中，私有产权体制能确保资源的最佳配置。然而，不幸的是，在像印度这样的国家中，市场体系既不是完全的，也不是完善的。因此，这方面的争议有助于规定一个由各邦管理的林业领域。作为殖民时代的遗产和延续，林业部独自管理着这个国家的林业资源。然而，在大多数邦所进行的“联合林业管理”（JFM）实验却对各邦将民众纳入统一管理的能力表示忧虑。这种忧虑源于在林业资源的利用方面缺乏一个民主的决策程序。这种程序的缺乏使得印度没有发展出一种清晰的林业产权体制。偶尔地，林业资源丰富的地区会提出拥有自主权利的要求。本文就是试图表明，这些地区由于这个国家实行的错误的发展政策而处于落后状态，而这些政策就是以牺牲资源丰富的地区来补贴资源贫乏的地区。这种补贴政策之所以发生，是因为缺乏民主的机构，而如果存在这些民主的机构，就能沿着恰当的方向引导民众的抱负。本文分析了东喜马拉雅地区夹可哈兰邦（Gorkhaland）的骚乱过程，以在这个地区的林业管理实践和因为要求自主权利而导致的紧张局势的加剧之间建立一种实验性的机能关系。
On Taylor's Argument for an Unforced World Consensus on Human Rights--
A Critical Review from the Perspective of Confucianism
Jonathan Chan
Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong
In a recent article, Charles Taylor has proposed a framework that makes the following tripartite distinction: norms of conduct, legal forms and background justifications. On the basis of this framework, Taylor tried to argue for "a genuine, unforced international consensus on human rights." On Taylor's view, an unforced world consensus on human rights would be something like the following: "[D]ifferent groups, countries, religious communities, and civilizations, although holding incompatible fundamental views on theology, metaphysics, human nature, and so on, would come to an agreement on certain norms that ought to govern human behavior. Each would have its own way of justifying this from out of its profound background conception. We would agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they were the right norms, and we would be content to live in this consensus, undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying belief."
In other words, the consensus in question would be something like a convergence on the norms of human rights from out of very different philosophical and spiritual backgrounds. What we need to do is to distinguish between the norms of human rights and their underlying justification. Only a convergence on the norms is necessary. Their background justifications can be very different. That is to say, these convergent norms may be justified in very different underlying spiritual and philosophical outlooks. Furthermore, these norm, according to Taylor, have to be distinguished and analytically separated not just from the background justifications, but also from the legal forms that give them force.
In the above, I have sketched briefly Taylor's argument for "a genuine, unforced international consensus on human rights." If that argument were to succeed, it could provide a strong reason for grounding political theory in the norms of human rights. However, I am skeptical about that argument. In this paper, I shall raise some objections to Taylor’s argument. It is, nonetheless, instructive to note that I do not mean that the notion of "overlapping consensus" is problematic. I am skeptical only about its application to human rights. My main reason for this skepticism is that the norm of human rights is not philosophically neutral and therefore cannot be entirely separate from its philosophical background. It will be argued that it implies a certain moral outlook that is inconsistent with the moral outlooks of other traditions such as that of the Confucian tradition.
论泰勒的非强制性普世人权一致性的论证
——从儒家视角的批评
乔纳森·陈
香港浸会大学宗教与哲学系
在最近的一篇文章中，查理士·泰勒（Charles Taylor）在其提出的思想中作出了三元划分：行为规范、合法的表现形式以及作为背景的正当性。在这种构架的基础上，泰勒试图论证“在人权上的一种诚实的、非强制性的普世一致性”。在泰勒看来，一种非强制性的人权普世一致性应当是这样的：“不同的群体、国家、宗教共同体和文明尽管在神学、形而上学、人性等问题上有根本上不可调和的种种观点，但仍然能在人类行为应当遵循的某些规范方面达成一致意见。当然不同的群体会以不同的方式从自身复杂的背景观念中给予这些规范以正当性。我们可以在这些规范上取得一致意见而在为什么这些规范是正当的这一问题上保留各自的观点；我们应当满足于在这种限度的一致性内生存，而不至于被其背后复杂的信念的差异弄得烦乱不安。” 换句话说，泰勒的一致性就是各种极为不同的哲学或精神背景在人权规范上的趋于一致。我们所需要做的就是区分人权规范和作为其基础的正当性。只有规范上的一致性是必需的，它们作为背景的正当性可以是完全不同的。也就是说，这些一致的规范可以在极其不同的哲学或精神观念中获得正当性。并且，按泰勒的观点，这些规范不但应该与正当性问题区分开来，而且也应当与给予其强制性的合法表现形式区分开来。 上面我简要勾勒了泰勒关于“在人权上的一种诚实的、非强制性的普世一致性”的论点。如果泰勒的论述是成功的话，那么它将为把政治理论奠基于人权规范这种做法提供强有力的理由。然而我怀疑这种论点，在本文中我将对泰勒的论述提出一些反对意见。注意到这一点可能是有用的：我并不是说“（在行为规范上）重叠的一致性”这个概念是成问题的。我只是怀疑这种一致性对人权的实际应用。我怀疑的理由是：人权规范在哲学上并非中立的，因此不能完全从其哲学背景中分离开来。本文将论述的是：人权规范这个概念意味着特定的道德观念，而这种特定的道德观念与象儒家那样的其它传统的道德观念是不一致的。
Political Perfectionism: Ancient and Modern
Joseph Chan
Department of Politics and Public Administration
The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
In this paper, I discuss the similarities and differences between ancient and modern theories of political perfectionism. I'll focus on Aristotle's and classical Confucian theories to illustrate the ancient theories. I argue that while the ancient theories may be vulnerable to modern liberal critiques of perfectionism, modern theories of perfectionism may not. But there are insights in the ancient theories that can, and ought to be, preserved and developed in a modern theory. I describe the outline of what I believe to be a defensible modern theory.
政治至善论：古典的和现代的
约瑟夫·陈
香港大学社会与公共管理系
在本文里，我讨论了古典的政治至善论和现代的政治至善论的异同。在古典政治至善论部分，我强调了亚里士多德的理论和古典的儒家理论。我认为：虽然古典政治至善论在现代自由主义的批判面前显得脆弱，其现代理论则未必如此。然而在古典理论中有一些洞见能够也应该被现代政治至善论所继承和发展。我描述了一种现代政治至善论的轮廓，而这种理论我认为是能够得到辩护的。
Freedom and Equality in Modern Western Political Philosophy
Chen Wentong
Department of Philosophy, Anhui University, Anqing, China
1. The main focus of political philosophy is to study values and their theoretical basis of one society’s political life from the angle of philosophy. General concepts include freedom, equality, democracy and rule of law, etc. Among them, freedom, equality and their relationship have become hot issues in the research of modern western political philosophy.
2. John Locke first gave a detailed demonstration of value of freedom in modern history and therefore is considered Father of western traditional liberalism. Locke argued that freedom was a concept of human rights and individual freedom was the basis of the relation between freedom and order although freedom could not break out from order. J. J. Rousseau thought freedom and equality were both essential human rights, but others’ equality would be in danger with uncontrolled freedom. Consequently, Rousseau held that equality should enjoy priority to freedom. This idea destroyed traditional concept that freedom and equality should be given the same priority, and this idea has a deep influence on later political science.
3. In the 20th century, this issue is still under critical arguments. J. Deway presented that the freedom one actually enjoyed depended on the equality one enjoyed in political and economical life. Accordingly, he was inclined to build a harmonious order between freedom and equality. F. A. Von Hayek argued that freedom should be higher than equality and the relation between equality and individual liberty could not be in harmony. J. Rawls on the contrary thought there was no conflict between individual liberty and fair distribution of wealth, therefore in the justice of distribution freedom and equality was conformable.
近现代西方政治哲学中的自由和平等
陈闻桐
安徽大学哲学系
一，政治哲学主要是从哲学上研究社会政治生活的价值规范及其理论基础。常见的政治价值范畴有自由、平等、民主、权力、权利、法治等，其中自由、平等等及其关系是近现代西方政治哲学探讨的热点之一。
二，在近代，洛克（J. Locke）是详尽阐述自由价值的第一人，奠定了西方传统自由主义的基础。他提出自由是一个人权概念，即自由是人的基本权利，自由虽不能脱离秩序，但个人自由是自由与秩序关系的基础。卢梭（J. J. Rousseau）认为自由与平等虽同为基本人权，但入对自由不加限制，必定侵犯人的平等权利。据此他提出，自由从属于平等，平等优于自由。这一思想突破了自由与平等等值的传统观念，对后世影响深远。
三，进入20世纪，自由与平等何者优先问题再次受到关注。杜威（J. Dwey）认为人世纪享受的自由权利依赖他在政治经济上的平等权，因而他主张建立自由与平等的和谐秩序。哈耶克（F. A. von Hayek）主张自由至上，断定提升平等与个人自由不相容。罗尔斯（J. Rawls）认为，个人自由与平等分配财富并不冲突，因而在分配正义上，自由与平等是相容的。
Self-Governance and Political Order: the Role of Citizens
Chen Youhong
Department of Public Administration
Chinese Renmin University, Beijing, China
1.The paradox of centralization and decentralization. China's reform process has been actually a history of decentralization efforts. Though decentralization efforts have injected energy into the society, they also leave the society lost of control. In order to recontrol the society, the government has to initiate re-centralization effort. The cost was so high for the reiteration of two different ways. The dilemma of centralization and decentralization originates from the highly-centralized political order that is inefficient to cope with originates from the highly-centralized political order that is inefficient to cope with the diverse problems of various interests because the rigid system is governed by hierarchical commands without relevant rules to deal with those problems. In order to resolve the problem of centralization system, it is necessary to carry on decentralization efforts that inspire society actively. But the undesirable chaos will occur after centralized decentralization efforts because people in over-centralized system not only lack experiences and abilities to self-govern, but also are encouraged to take opportunistic actions when they have some chances.
2.Self-governance and political order. Lack of self-governance results in unsuccessful decentralization reform. Self-governing institutional arrangements must be developed if China wants to cope Self-governing institutional arrangements must be developed if China wants to cope with the dilemma of centralization and decentralization. Successful decentralization reform and institutional transformation depend on the development of various self-governing organizations that could implement self-reform to fit with social changes. The political order based on self-governance can encourage people's creativity to initiate various institutional innovations to self-govern specific public affairs so that individual not only has his right of diverse choices but takes on his responsibility for his choice. To foster self-governing institutions is a proper way to cope with the dilemma of centralization and decentralization.
3. How to develop self-governance in a centralized society. How to develop self-governance in a centralized society? According to the logic of collective action, it would be possible to have an order of spontaneous generation among people of small groups, but it couldn't occur in large groups because free-riding problems would be very serious. So self-governance should be developed from basic community first. Successful decentralization effort should be initiated at grass root level. The success of grass root self-governance is the basic condition of successful decentralization reform efforts in the society with a strong over-centralized tradition.
4.The role of citizens in self-governing political order. Citizens play an important role in a self-governing political order since any institutional innovation must come from individual's doing for benefit-seeking. Citizens play an important role in a self-governing political order since any institutional innovation must come from individual's doing for benefit-seeking. When people are not only concerned with their own benefits but also do the same for the rules of benefit-seeking among the people, individuals start to have an attribute of citizen. And when the virtues that come from personal self-interest possess the public character, it would be possible to construct political order of self-governance. Therefore, it is well reasonable to expect citizens to initiate primary rule for civilian organizations of grass roots and interest groups. And that is considered to be the real opportunities of citizen in political activities. Furthermore, on a basis of daily human life, and as the model of elementary constructions of society, to govern human relation, primary rule develop the various mechanisms to deal with conflicts, and foster positive mutually-productive human mechanisms to deal with conflicts, and foster positive mutually-productive human relationships. So, being so called "social infrastructure" or "social capital", it has the power to countervail "the realpolitik capital of bureaucracy", and it is a main force to make a breakthrough in a rigid centralized system. However, though the virtues that occur due to individual self-interest possess public character, it doesn't mean that could be consequentially to construct political order of self-governance. But citizens' consciousnesses of their rights and responsibilities have been evolved. Therefore, they would set foot in such actions as protecting property right, solving conflicts, coming to agreements, and they would finally appeal to participate to construct the frameworks of rules and institutions of higher levels, and then citizens would give crucial impetus to democratic development. Undoubtedly, not individual citizen but civil society has such power, so it is needed to probe into the course of fostering civil society. In China, civil society must be established in the background of civilian society of traditional institutions and culture, and on a theoretical basis of democratic and constitutional government.
5 To explore a new political theory based on self-governance. A new political order needs a new political theory that is based on self-governance of citizens. Human nature determines that no system could take effect and well continue if without associating with individual benefits, rights, and responsibilities.
A new political theory needs (1) to study how to develop a new political theory based on an analysis of individual citizen. It needs to clarify the relationship between individual and community, and to endow individual with an independent moral status;
(2) to study a new political theory of political order based on self-governance, which make the most use of intellectual resources and practical experiences of human civilization.
自主治理与政治秩序――公民的角色
陈幽泓
中国人民大学行政管理系
一、集权与分权的悖论。中国的改革过程，实际上就是下放权力的过程。权力下放，激发了整个社会的活力，但是也出现了各种各样的混乱的问题。为了解决这些问题，不得不求助于重新集权。而重新集权又面临着新的集权问题。人们不得不在两者之间徘徊，付出了许多不必要的代价。这一悖论的根源在于集权的政治秩序。集权的政治秩序，是一种僵化的、缺乏规则的等级命令秩序体系，在处理物质环境和社会生活都呈多样性的人们的复杂利益结构时力不从心。要解决集权僵化的问题，就需要分权，但是一旦分权，虽然能够激活社会，但由于人们在自主治理方面缺乏经验，缺乏能力，却有集权制度下长期积累的投机能力，就产生了集权体制下一分权就乱的弊病。 二、自主治理与政治秩序。缺乏自主治理，是集权社会难以成功实施分权改革的制度原因。要成功地实现分权改革，摆脱集权与分权悖论，需要培养自主治理的制度安排，允许多类型的自治组织的发展，鼓励实施自主改革以适应变化，从而顺利实施制度变迁。自主治理的政治秩序鼓励人们在公共事务治理中创造各种各样的制度安排以使个人不仅有多样化选择的权利，而且承担其选择的责任，以互利的原则解决冲突以保障多样化的利益格局，从而使个人利益在互动关系格局中成为保障公共利益的动力。培养自主治理的制度，是集权社会摆脱集权与分权两难困境的重要出路。 三、集权社会的自主治理发展。如何在集权社会培养自主治理的制度？集体行动的逻辑表明，在小群体中有自发产生秩序的可能，而在大群体中人的选择倾向于搭便车。因此，自主治理首先要从基层社会开始实施，分权改可能，而在大群体中人的选择倾向于搭便车。因此，自主治理首先要从基层社会开始实施，分权改革首先提条件。在以自主治理为基础的政治秩序中，公民的角色非常重要。因为真正的制度创新均需发端于个人的利益诉求，当个人不仅关心私利，而且关心人们之间的利益关系秩序时，个人也就发生了向公民的转化。当个人私利的诉求所产生的美德开始具有了公共性格时，才有可能产生自主治理基础上的良好政治秩序。因此，公民在政治生活中的位置与作用首先是在基层组织和利益群体内构造初级秩序，其意义在于，这是在基础结构层次上的秩序，它是基于日常生活的人类互动关系模式，它能促进，其意义在于，这是在基础结构层次上的秩序，它是基于日常生活的人类互动关系模式，它能促进发展解决利益冲突的机制，激励利益的互利共存的良性互动。它是人类社会�"社会基础设?会资本）"，它是在社会的发展中对抗"官僚权力资本"、打破集权僵化体制的主要力量。尽由自私性引发出来的德性――公共性格"的演化过程会使公民的责任权利意识在捍卫产权、解决?冲突、建立契约关系的层次领域方面逐渐成长，进而寻求更高层次的规则和制度框架的建设。
四、公民在自主治理的政治秩序中的角色，成为民主的直接推动力量。但是，并不意味着必然会通向建立自主治理的政治秩序。公民作为个人的力量仍不足以抵制、限制和打破集权政府体制。对此需要探讨公民社会发育的进程。近年来中国政治发展中推行的基层自治应立足于民间社会的传统制度和传统文化的土壤，汲取民主、宪政思想理论基础，为公民社会的形成提供动力。
五、发展一种以自主治理为基础的政治理论。新的政治秩序需要一种新的政治理论，以公民自主治理为基础的政治秩序理论。人的本性决定任何秩序如果不与个人的利益与责任权利紧密相关，就不可能发生实际效用和长治久安。
本文的着眼点是：发展以公民个人为分析基点的政治理论，对于中国传统思想而言，需要厘清作为公民的个人与社会、国家的关系，赋予公民自主道德地位；研究社会秩序构造的规则与制度方面的思想成果，促进多样化的人类社会秩序和组织发展类型与对策选择，这需要研究民主立宪的思想如何与民间社会制度和传统文化相契合，促进中国公民社会的成长。
Some Critical Reflections on the Concept of ‘the People’ in Political Discourse
Yung-hsiang Chien
Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy
Academia Sinica, Taiwan
The concept of the people is one of the most frequently used, but least examined, concept in political discourse. Given its importance in the articulation of democracy, the neglect is surprising. I want to provide a general characterization of ‘the people’ in the western political traditions. Then I will try to show, following the lead of James Tully and Habermas, that in keeping with the variety of traditions in political thinking there are diverse understandings of the term. A critical examination of some of these understandings shows, finally, that we need to take the Habermasian proceduralist notion of the people seriously if we want to honor the promise of democracy in a ‘disenchanted’ and pluralist age.
关于“人民”概念的一些哲学反思
钱永祥
台湾中央研究院孙中山社会科学和哲学研究所
“人民”这个概念在政治脉络里时常使用，却也最少有人对它做正面的思考检讨。有鉴于它在民主理论里的根本地位，这种疏忽尤其令人意外。我将先对人民这个概念在西方政治思想里的地位略做描述。然后，跟着James Tully与Habermas的启发，我将列出几种政治传统关于“人民”的不同理解。最后，我想指出，如果民主在这个“除魅”而多元的时代还要有其意义，我们应该正视Habermas有关人民的“程序”式理解。
Freedom as a Subjective Condition of Justice
Jiwei Ci
Department of Philosophy
University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Members of a society become just persons largely through identification with their society's conception of justice. I will bracket the normative question of what conditions such a conception has to satisfy in order to properly count as a conception of justice. My focus is on the moral-psychological (or explanatory) question of what conditions have to obtain if members of a society are to effectively identify with what in their society counts as a conception of justice. Chief among such conditions, I will argue, is that they must be able to relate to their society's conception of justice on the understanding that they have freely decided to adopt this conception as their own. For this to happen, it is not sufficient that they enjoy a certain degree of de facto freedom; it is even more important that they understand their relationship to their society's conception of justice through the concept or interpretation of freedom. But the concept of freedom as used in this context is by no means unproblematic. Liberal thinkers sometimes take such freedom at face value and equate freedom with autonomy, whereas Marxists such as Louis Althusser point out the illusory character of such freedom and treat freedom as nothing more than misrecognition of unforced external determination as self-determination. Two questions arise: (1) under what conditions such misrecognition is possible, or how the concept of freedom and the fact of external determination can combine to produce a more or less conformist individual consciousness that nevertheless understands itself as the agent of its values, including its conception of justice; (2) whether such misrecognition is an unavoidable feature of the exercise of freedom. I will attempt to answer these questions and relate the answers to justice.
自由：作为正义的主观条件
慈纪伟
香港大学哲学系
一个社会的成员主要通过对该社会的正义观的认同和支持而成为公正的个体。我将不考虑这样一个规范性问题：一个概念之所以能被称为正义必需满足什么样的条件。我关注的是这样一个道德-心理学问题（或解释性的问题）：社会成员有效地认同和支持该社会的正义观是以什么为条件的？我的观点是：在这些条件中，主要的是，社会成员接受社会的正义观必须是基于自由的抉择。而为了使社会成员自由地接受社会的正义观，仅仅使他们事实上享有某种程度的自由是不够的，更重要的是，社会成员要通过自由这种观念或体现来理解自身同社会正义观的关系。然而本文中使用的自由概念并非没有问题的。自由主义思想家有时仅仅根据该词的字面涵义，将自由等同于自主；与此同时，象路易斯·阿尔图塞（Louis Althusser）等马克思主义者则指出这种自由概念的虚幻性质，而认为自由实际上仅仅是将非强制性的外在规定误解为自我决定。这儿便出现了两个问题：（1）这种误解在什么条件下是可能的，或者说，自由概念和非强制习惯内的外在规定这种事实是如何结合在一起以产生一种或多或少倾向于遵循规范的个体意识，而这种意识将自身看作社会价值及其正义观念的源泉？（2）是否这种误解是自由实践的一个无可避免的特性？我将试图回答这两个问题并将之与正义观念联系起来。
Culture, Sovereignty and Human Rights
Michael Freeman
Department of Government, University of Essex, UK
In this paper I seek to advance our thinking about two of the most commonly discussed philosophical problems raised by the idea of human rights. The first is how the idea should be related to that of state sovereignty. The second is that of the relation between the supposed universality of human rights and the diverse cultural traditions of the world. Although much has been written about both these problems, the relation between the two problems has been largely ignored. I shall argue that clarification of this last relation is an important philosophical task. I shall argue, in support of this general conclusion, that objections to the universal applicability of human-rights standards on the ground of state sovereignty are often confused with objections on the ground of cultural diversity. I shall argue that these two objections not only have quite different logic, but also that they are mutually inconsistent, for the principle of state sovereignty is as universalist as that of human rights, and either both principles are vulnerable to objections on the ground of cultural diversity or neither are.
The next step in the argument is to clarify what is valuable in the idea of state sovereignty and what is valuable in the idea of human rights in order to reach a reasonable view of how the two ideas should be interrelated. In this section I shall argue that critics of both ideas have often failed to understand adequately the values that the ideas are intended to defend. If this is clearly analyzed, the ground may be laid for reconciling the two ideas in a way that preserves what is valuable in each.
Then a similar analysis is made of culture and human rights. Particular attention will be paid to two view of the relation between culture and human rights that have been proposed recently by philosophers. The first begins with the presumption of the universality of human rights and then seeks to incorporate into that view what is valuable in the diverse cultures of the world. The second treats culture as fundamental and investigates how human rights may be incorporated into particular cultural perspectives. These two approaches are illustrated with particular reference to Confucianism and Islam. I argue that reflection on these two approaches raises the most fundamental questions about the grounds of ethical and political thought. However, even some of the best philosophical thinking on this subject has confused philosophical with strategic political questions. This confusion is tempting insofar as philosophers are concerned with practical policies as well as pure philosophical analysis. However, a strictly philosophical analysis can clarify policy options, although it is doubtful whether it can endorse a particular solution as absolutely the best.
In conclusion, I offer an answer to the question as to whether philosophical analysis can offer solutions to questions about culture, sovereignty and human rights that could be accepted by reasonable persons in different cultural and ideological traditions, and in societies at different levels of development and placed differently in the global political system. I suggest that there are philosophical reasons for believing that there are always likely to be tensions among these principles, but that philosophy can clarify the relevant issues, advance agreement to some extent, and thereby contribute to the management within tolerable limits of practical political disputes.
文化、主权和人权
迈克尔·弗里曼
英国艾塞克斯大学政府系
在本文中我将进一步思考由于人权思想导致的两个最受关注的哲学问题。第一个问题是人权思想如何与国家主权思想相联的。第二个是所谓的人权的普世性与世界上不同的文化传统之间的关系问题。虽然在这两个问题上已经有许多论述，但这两个问题的关系却在很大程度上被忽略了。我想表明的是，澄清这种关系是一个重要的哲学任务。为了支持这种一般观点，我将证明：站在国家主权立场上反对人权标准的普世适用的意见常常与出于文化多样性立场的反对意见混淆在一起。我认为这两种反对意见不仅有完全不同的逻辑，而且他们之间也彼此不一致，因为国家主权原则同人权原则一样是普遍的，面对着文化多样性立场上的反对意见，这两个原则要么同样脆弱，要么都可免于攻击。 在接下来的论述中我将澄清在国家主权观念和人权观念中有价值的思想，以合理地说明两者是如何紧密相联的。在这一部分我会证明这两者的批评者经常没有恰当地理解他们所批评的观念所试图捍卫的价值。如果这一点能够得到很清晰的分析，就能够为调和这两个观念奠定基础并保留两者中各自有价值的成分。 然后对文化和人权会进行类似的分析。最近哲学家们提出的关于文化与人权关系上的两种观点将会受到特别的关注。第一种观点预定了人权的普世性，进而将在各种文化中有价值的成分纳入这种普世性中；第二种观点认为文化是根本的，并试图将人权包含在特殊文化的视角中。特别是在关涉到儒家思想和伊斯兰教时这两种方式得到阐释。我会表明，对这两种方式的反思将对伦理和政治思想的基础提出最基本的问题。然而，就是在这方面的一些最出色的哲学思想也把哲学问题与策略性的政治问题混淆在一起了。只要哲学家像关心纯粹哲学分析一样关心实践政策，这种混淆的危险就会存在。当然，严格的哲学分析是能够澄清政策选择的，不过在它能否确证特定方案的最优性上则是值得怀疑的。 最后，我会为下述问题给出一种答案：关于文化、主权和人权问题上，哲学分析能否为在全球政治系统中处于不同发展阶段和不同地位的社会中具有不同文化和意识形态传统的理性人提供都可接受的解决方法？我将表明，从哲学上讲，有理由相信，这些原则间可能会总是存在张力，但哲学能澄清有关的因素并在某种程度上达成一致，从而有助于在可容忍限度内管理和控制实际政治争端。
Constitutional Justice and Transcendental Justice
--------Two Kinds of Justices and their Paradox
Gao Quanxi
The Graduate School, Chinese Academy of Social Sciecnes
The article focuses on the the two kinds of justices, constitutional Justice and Transcendental Justice and their tensile relation, suggesting that the negative value of constitutional justice, as the social institutional justice, takes on the legal protection of human right, especially of the low-lined human right. The constitutionalism is based on a public sphere with negative law as rule, so that it transforms the allocation of the modern political value logically, i.e. traditionally ,only the reasonable value is legitimate, whereas in the constitutionalism, only the legitimate value is reasonable. In other words, it has changed the standard of value from the former positive logic, based on the moralization of human nature, to the negative one, based on the legalization of human nature. Rawls and Hayek demonstrate this logic conversion from different ways separately. Although constitutionalism could resist all the powerful political logic, it appeals for another transcendental value fundamentally. The article analyses the spiritual law, which has been very important in the history of western political thoughts, and points that the justice of law is human right, and the justice of god is holy love. Conclusively, the article suggests, we could find not only the paradox and the conflict of the two justices, but also their uniform linkage to guard against the political power. This paradox linkage full of tension will bring a dual foundation to the social politics in the future.
宪政正义与超验正义——两种正义及其悖论
高全喜
中国社会科学院研究生院
本文着重考察了宪政正义与超验正义两种正义及其张力性关系。指出宪政正义作为社会性的制度正义，它的否定性价值呈现出对于人权，尤其是底限人权的合法性保障的意义。由于宪政的法律制度预设的乃是一个否定性的以法律为尺规的公共领域，因此就把近现代有关政治价值的定位从逻辑上进行了一番改造，即传统政治价值形态那里所表述的是，只有合理的价值才是合法的，而宪政的法律制度则反过来表述为，只有合法的价值才是合理的，或者说，它把价值标准从过去那种以人的本性的道义化为基础的肯定性逻辑，转变为以人的本性的合法性为基础的否定性逻辑。罗尔斯和哈耶克这两个不同类型的自由主义思想家分别从不同的进路展现了这种逻辑的转换。宪政正义虽然可以抗拒各种强势的政治逻辑，但从根基上需要吁请另外一种超验的价值，本文通过对在西方政治思想史占据突出地位的神法的分析，指出法律的正义是人权，上帝的正义是圣爱。文章最后认为，我们可能从两种正义中不仅看到了它们的悖论，以及相互间的对立与冲突，而且还将看到它们在抵御政治强权方面的一致性关联，正是这种充满张力的悖论式关联将为人类未来的社会政治提供一种双重的正义根基。
On Ideas of Liberty in Rawls’ Theory of Justice
Gong Qun
Department of Philosophy, Renmin University of China
The Conception of liberty plays a very important role in Rawls’ political philosophy, as we know, it is the cornerstone of Rawls’ theory. The conception of liberty is political one by Rawls, and we can get the idea of liberty by negative way because Rawls defines it from such way that he says “this or that person (persons) is free (or not free) from this or that constraint (or set of constraints) to do (or not to do) so and so”. The idea of liberty in Rawls’ political philosophy inherited the liberalist tradition of Constant and Isaiah Berlin. Meanwhile, Rawls emphasizes one kind of positive meaning. He says: “thus persons are at liberty to do something when they are free from certain constrains either to do it or not to do it ”. Liberty is our action which we can do by my will and perform the decision made by ourselves and it is protected from interference by other persons, and from this meaning, liberty is individual rights which include all kind of human rights, such as the right of life, of speech, of political election, of property and so on, and which are equal and natural rights for all persons of mankind. Therefore, the subject of liberty becomes one of equal rights. Rawls argues that, first of all, equal Liberty of conscience is predominant important one, second is political election. I think that there is no question about them. However, Rawls meets problems when he deals with the right of property. Equal rights of property develop in two directions in 200 –300 years. One is that equally right of property in theory gets its legitimate status, and permits unequal possession in legality. Another is that there seeks for equality of real possession in social life. The direction origins from Jacques Rousseau, through Karl Marx and passes on communist movement. However, social practice proves that it is unsuccessful. The choice by Rawls is neither John Locke’s one and nor Jacques Rousseau’s one, which on the essential presupposition that economic inequality that gives the greatest benefit of the last advantaged, second distribution by state is necessary. However, the second distribution must interfere in individual rights of property. Therefore, the tendency of equality in Rawls’ new liberalism can not extricate oneself from a predicament of freedom and equality, both have a kind of inter-contradiction.
论罗尔斯的自由理念
龚 群
中国人民大学
“自由”这一概念在罗尔斯的政治哲学中占有一个突出重要的地位，它是罗尔斯的理论基石。罗尔斯的“自由”概念是一个政治概念，它的意义首先是从消极意义上给出的，即它是免以强制而能自由地做什么。罗尔斯的这一概念定义反映了它对贡斯当和伯林等自由主义传统的思想继承。同时，罗尔斯的自由概念强调了不受强制前提下的自我作主的行动，在这个意义上，自由就是一种权利。这种自由权利，包括生命权、思想权、言论权、政治参与权以及财产权，从契约论的观点看，它是一种平等的天赋权。在这个意义上，自由问题也就演变为平等权利的问题。罗尔斯认为，它首先是体现消极自由的良心自由权的问题，其次是体现在政治权利的平等上。如人人都有平等的选举权、受教育权等。然而，在财产权方面，罗尔斯则持有一种新的态度。近代以来，平等权问题朝两个方向发展，一是承认理念上的财产权为人人平等享有，但却允许存在经济上的不平等。这个方向为洛克所开创，二是追求实际财产占有上的平等。这个方面为卢梭所开创，其间经过马克思，为共产主义运动所追求。但苏联东欧解体以及中国的经济体制改革证明，以取消私有财产权为制度基础的计划体制，在现代物质生产条件下没有生命力。一百多年的社会实践证明，这种追求并不成功。但是，罗尔斯的新自由主义既不是洛克式传统的自由主义，同时也不是卢梭式平等主义，而是在承认经济不平等能够给最少受惠者带来最大利益的前提下，强调国家对于最少受惠者给予补偿的原则。然而，这种再分配必然侵犯到个人持有的自由权利。罗尔斯的平等主义倾向摆脱不了这种自由与平等的内在困境。
First Steps in an Account of Human Rights
James Griffin
Centre for Philosophy and Public Affairs, Department of Moral Philosophy
University of St Andrews, Scotland
1. The very idea of human rights
2. Different approaches to explaining rights
3. The rights tradition
4. A proposal of a substantive account
5. One ground for human rights: personhood
6. A second ground: practicalities
7. Is there a third ground?: equality
8. How we should understand ‘agency’
9. A desirable consequence: the narrowing of rights
10. Utilitarianism?
人权的基本问题
詹姆士·格利芬
苏格兰圣安德鲁大学道德哲学系哲学与公共事务中心
1、 人权概念一般
2、 解释权利的不同方式
3、 权利的传统
4、 关于实质性论述的一种建议
5、 人权的基础之一：人格
6、 人权的基础之二：务实或实践性
7、 第三个基础：平等？
8、 我们该如何理解“代表制”
9、 一种想望的后果：对权利的限定
10、功利主义？
On Fundamental Principles and Factors of the Rule of Law
Gu Su
Department of Philosophy
Nanjing University, Nanjing, China
Although the rule of law is not an unified model, and historical conditions and cultural traditions of various countries are quite different, its basic principles and institutions are generally consistent, i.e. law is superior to administrative power, the constitution has the highest authority, and person or group should not outmatch the law; democratic legislation requires that the legislative body should be born of universal and periodic elections and its main tasks include setting up laws and supervising the administration; judicial branch is independent and has high position and authority, also practises judicial review to prevent arbitrary violation of the constitution; check and balance institutions among different branches of the government to prevent that a single branch has too much or monopolistic power.
论法治的基本特征和要素
顾 肃
南京大学哲学系
现代法治虽无划一的模式，各国历史条件和文化传统也存在诸多差别，但所采取的基本原则和制度大体一致，主要是法律大于行政权力，宪法具有至高无上的权威，任何人和团体不得凌驾于法律之上；立法民主，由拥有广泛代表性和定期选举阐述的立法机构制定法律、监督行政；司法独立、拥有崇高地位和权威，并且实行防止随意违宪的司法审查制度；政府各权力机构间实行牵制与平衡，以防止单个机构权力过大。
On Historicity and Ideality of Human Rights with Comments on A. J. M. Milne’s Philosophy of Human Rights
Han Zhen
Department of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
In fact, rights have been the historical production instead of the permanent entity a priori. The rights in the Western society, which have rooted in the Western social and cultural system, are reflecting the social ideas and views of value in the Western society. The Western ideas of human rights can only be applied to Western society. As Karl Marx points out, rights can never go beyond the economic structure of the society and the cultural development of the society that has been limited by the economic structure. Even the starting and ending of life has been a controversial issue among scholars. On the issues such as abortion and euthanasia there are different ideas. We think that A. J. M. Milne misunderstood the relations between real foundation of human rights and ideal function of human rights in his dividing the standards of human rights into ideal and the lowest. Since, from the aspect of historical development, any standard of human rights is both lowest and ideal. How can we say that the standard of Western human rights is ideal and that the standard in the third world is non-ideal? The scope of the human rights will be widened, the contents of human rights will be enriched as the progress of the society. Although the basic rights are still facing various threats by now, we cannot ignore the fact that the human rights have got more protections.
论人权的历史性和理想性—兼评米尔恩的《人权哲学》
韩 震
北京师范大学哲学系
实际上，权利并不是一种先验的永恒本质，它们是历史的产物。西方世界所说的权利反映的是西方社会的社会理念和价值观，植根于西方社会的历史和文化系统中。西方人权观只能适用于西方社会，正像马克思分析的那样，“权利永远不能超出社会的经济结构以及由经济结构所制约的社会的文化发展。”即使在生命的起点和终点上，人们的意见也很难统一。对流产和安乐死等问题，人们有着极其矛盾的观点。我们认为，A.J.M米尔恩把人权标准分为理想的和最低的，错误地理解了人权的现实基础与理想功能之间的关系。因为，从历史发展的角度看，任何人权标准都是最低的，也是理想的。怎能说西方的权利标准是理想的，而第三世界的标准就无理想性？随着社会的进步，个人权利的范围会越来越广，权利的内容也会增加。尽管直到目前为止，人的基本权利仍旧受到各种各样的威胁，但人的权利变得越来越有保障也是不容否认的事实。
Criticism from Within and Without: Wittgensteinian Reflections
Cressida Heyes
Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, Canada
What are the limits of criticising culturally and politically different others? Some analysts say abuses of power within a society are best criticised from without, and claim this prerogative. Defenders of the practices in question say that only from within a domestic context can the practices be understood, and their legitimacy appreciated. Are the foreign critics mistakenly assuming the commensurability of worldviews—some alcultural standpoint from which to assess the justice or legitimacy of human practices? Are the defenders being overly relativistic? Does relativism obviate critique altogether?
Renewed interest in these debates among political philosophers has emerged from a literature that stresses the constructedness of political meaning. For example, Wittgenstein famously argued that following a rule is not a private, individual matter. What it means to follow a rule correctly is rather a social practice; taken together, such practices are constitutive of a "form of life." Political theorists such as Charles Taylor, Susan Hekman, and Richard Shusterman have taken up this model, showing how it might illuminate problems of contemporary democracy. This work raises two particularly pressing further questions: first, how should we theorise the coexistence and mutual (un)intelligibility of the plurality of forms of life in, for example, multicultural political societies? Second, how, given the epistemic necessity of working from within the practices that make up a form of life, can new practices be imagined and gain currency?
In this paper I argue briefly that a Wittgensteinian model provides an answer to the first question through the notion of family resemblances. No political concept has a single monolithic meaning within a form of life; rather, it consists of a series of interrelated and politically contested meanings. For example, what counts as "democracy" for some will be the simple matter of the existence of an institution for electing representatives to a legislature. For others, however, "democracy" carries much more weighty connotations of citizen equality and political participation. Clearly these are related concepts, making it possible for their respective proponents to be mutually intelligible. However, they are also sufficiently distant to make debate around this essentially contested concept more than a matter of simple clarification.
The answer to the first question also provides guidance in answering the second, a particularly pressing one in theorising political conversation among radically different nation states. Some critics have taken the intractability of this problem to provide an implicit defence of relativism (and even conservatism): if existing social practices are the only basis intractability of this problem to provide an implicit defence of relativism (and even conservatism): if existing social practices are the only basis for social criticism, then the scope of that criticism will be necessarily constrained by the very form of life it seeks to alter. Consequently, intercultural communication cannot rely on any acontextual criteria of rationality (such as a Habermasian ideal speech situation) and political concepts become at best approximate translations across difference, and at worst incommensurable.
This position, however, assumes a uniformity to forms of life that the family resemblance approach to political concepts shows to be misguided. Both within and among forms of life, controversial political views are intelligible because they tap into marginal practices not closely related to those in the mainstream. An important consequence of this argument is that central to effective political dissent is the process of building communities of meaning. There is a tradition in the west of viewing political dissent as made possible simply by the right to free speech, and writers since Mill have tended to stress the individual as the locus of political resistance. Instead, I argue, we should see conditions that foster resistant communities as most central. Thus, finally, I suggest that this approach can evade the false dichotomy between universalism and relativism in the contexts I pointed towards initially.
内部批评和外部批评：维特根斯坦主义的思考
克雷西达·海耶斯
加拿大阿尔贝塔大学哲学系
对文化和政治上持不同意见者的批判的限度是什么？一些分析家认为最好是从外部批评一个社会内对权力的滥用，并称之为特权。而该习俗（特权）的辩护者则认为，只有从内部处境出发，这些习俗才能得到理解，其合法性才能得到较高评价。是否外部批评者错误地假定了世界观的可通约性——一种估价人类习俗的正当性或合法性的超文化的视域？或者那些习俗的辩护者全然是相对主义的？是否相对主义完全排除了批判呢？ 由于强调政治意义的构造性的文本的出现，在政治哲学家中对上述争论的问题又出现了新的兴趣。举例来说，维特根斯坦曾非常有名地论证说：对规则的遵循不是一个私人的、个体的事件。恰当地说，对规则的遵循是一种社会惯例；这些社会惯例共同构成“生活形式”。象查理士·泰勒（Charles Tayler）、苏珊·赫克曼（Susan Hekman）、理查德·舒茨曼（Richard Shusterman）等政治理论家继承了这种模式，以之来解释当代民主政治的问题。这种努力进一步提出了两个紧迫的问题：首先，我们该如何解释在多文化的政治社会中多元的生活形式之间的共存和相互可理解性（或不可理解性）问题？其次，假定构成生活形式的惯例从认识论上是必要的，那么新的惯例是如何被设想并获得普遍承认的？
在本文中，我会简要地证明，通过家族相似的观念，维特根斯坦主义的模式为第一个问题提供了一种答案。在某种生活形式内，没有一个政治概念具有单一的、固定不变的意义；相反，它包含一个相互关联、在政治上彼此争议的意义系列。举一个例子，对有的人来说，民主政体就是这样一个简单的事实：立法机构的代表的选举这样一种机制的存在。而对另一些人来说，民主政体还包含着更重要的内涵：公民的平等和公民的政治参与。明显地，这是一些相互关联的观念，从而各自的支持者彼此间的相互理解是可能的。然而，这些观念也彼此保持了足够的距离，使得围绕这个本质上有争议的概念产生种种争论，而不仅仅是对概念的澄清。 第一个问题的答案也为回答第二个问题提供了指导，而后一个问题对于解释极为不同的民族国家之间的政治对话显得尤为紧迫。一些批评家利用这个难以处理的问题为相对主义（甚至是保守主义）作出含蓄的辩护：如果现存的社会惯例是社会批判的唯一基础，那么这种批判的范围就必然被它试图改变的生活形式所限定。因而，文化间的对话不能依赖任何跨文化的理性标准（就如哈贝马斯的话语处境概念），而在不同文化间的政治概念至多只是一种近似的翻译，甚至是不可互译的。 然而，这种立场假定了生活形式本身的齐一性，而政治概念的家族相似的方法将表明这一点是容易误导的。无论是在生活形式内部还是在生活形式之间，相互争议的政治论点之间是可理解的，因为这些论点都涉及到与主流惯例关系松散的边缘惯例。这一论证的一个重要的结果就是：意义共同体的构成过程对于实际的政治异议是至关重要的。西方的一种传统认为仅仅是由于言论自由的权利政治异议才变得可能的，从穆勒之后的著述家倾向于强调将个体作为政治抵制的场所。而我所要论证的是：我们应当将促成抵制团体的条件看作最重要的因素。最后我会表明，这种方法能够避免本文开头我所论及的那种在普世主义和相对主义之间的错误的二分法。
Philosophical Justifications of Human Rights
Jens Hinkmann
Institute for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
University of Erfurt, Germany
The debate on human rights is extremely confusing and dazzling. Mixing political, philosophical, juridicial and many other aspects stemming from a broad variety of academic disciplines the participants of the discourse are often discussing different topics with diverging methodologies. Clarification is necessary and should be the first step. Therefore, a strictly philosophical analysis (within the analytic philosophy of law) should provide a common framework or set-up for the discussion. Using ideas from Hohfeld, Thomson and some own suggestions a net of terms with precise meanings for the debate on human rights is developed and applied on the three generations of human rights.
The second step is the discussion whether there is a normative justification for human rights as universal norms. This means that they should be justified as valid claims independent of cultural or historical conditions having corresponding obligations for political communities. This debate is at the heart of every theory of political justice. By showing the illegitimacy of natural law on the one hand and some communitarian approaches on the other hand, I attempt to develop a theory justifying human rights. It is based on the idea of normative individualism and justified by means of an analysis of the rule of law concerning the individual members of a society or a state. To challenge these ideas, I then introduce the concept of descriptive holism aiming at an explanation of the difficulties typically arising in the normative and political discourse on human rights. With the simple analytic but basic matrix of normativism versus descriptivism and individualism versus holism this theory is enriching and pushing forward ideas and concepts of H?ffe, Gert, Gewirth and Rawls.
A final application on the complex of human rights and human development discussing the possible interdependence of political and economic issues within the philosophical framework (!) will argue for a reasonable link between the political and the economic sphere of human rights to enable lasting progress in both areas.
人权的哲学辩护
延斯·欣克曼
德国艾尔福特大学法哲学和社会哲学研究所
在人权方面的辩论是极其难以理解而又令人眼花缭乱的。由于混合了政治学的、哲学的、法学的以及其它来自范围广泛的学科的诸多领域，这些论述的参与者们常常是在用不同的方法论讨论不同的主题。因此，对问题的澄清是必要的，也应当是首要的。一种严格的哲学分析（在分析的法哲学范围内）应当为讨论提供一个共同的框架。通过霍夫菲尔德（Hohfeld）、汤姆森（Thomson）的一些思想和自己的考虑，我为人权上的争论建立了一个有确切定义的术语体系，并将之应用于人权的三个发展阶段。
第二步是讨论人权是否存在一种作为普遍规范的正当性。这意味着人权将证明自己作为一种正当的权利拥有相应的对政治共同体的责任，而这种正当的权利是独立于文化和历史条件的。这一争论将是任何一种政治正义理论的核心。在指出自然法理论和一些社群主义方法的不合理之后，我将提出一种理论来为人权提供正当性依据。它将奠基于规范性的个人主义上；这种论证是通过对关涉到社会或国家的个体成员的法律规则的分析进行的。为了检验这些思想，我将引入一种描述性的整体论概念以解释由于在人权上的规范性的和政治的争论所导致的困难。通过规范主义-描述主义和个人主义-整体论这种简要然而基本的分析结构，该理论将丰富和推进霍夫（Hoffe）、吉尔特（Gert）、格威尔特（Gewirth）和罗尔斯等人的思想。
最后在人权和人类发展的复合体之应用上将在哲学框架内讨论政治和经济因素之间可能的相互依赖，并论证人权的政治领域和经济领域间的一种合理的关联，而这将使得它们各自的持续进步成为可能。
'Citizen' Participation and Global Warming
Barry Holden
Department of Politics, University of Reading, UK
This paper will take as its starting point the question of what opportunities people should have to participate in making political decisions. It wiil, however, be concerned with what can be called 'political decisions' in an extended sense. Normally, political decisions are thought of as decisions about state policy. And such decisions are democratic when, or to the extent that, they are made by the people of the state in question. However, in an era of globalisation and interdependence a state is increasingly unable to control matters that affect the people within its territory. Many such matters, to the extent that they are controllable at all, are subject to decisions taken elsewhere - for example, by other states or by international bodies. In such circumstances the ideas of citizenship and democratic decision making must be re-thought and perhaps only some kind of 'global democracy' can now give real opportunities for people to participate in many of the most important decisions that affect them.
With the work of David Held and others the idea of global democracy is becoming of increasing importance. This paper will explore the relevance this idea might have for the problem of combating global warming. It will argue that, apart from anything else, a form of global democracy would help to overcome global collective action problems and would give necessary legitimacy - and perhaps be a spur - to difficult decisions that would entail short-term material sacrifices. It would also help to
deal with problems of international social justice concerning the relative contributions to be expected by the North and the South to efforts to combat global warming.
公民参与和全球变暖问题
巴里·霍尔敦
英国雷丁大学政治学系
本文将从下述问题开始：人们应当有什么样的机会参与政治决策。然而，此处关注的“政治决策”是在较广泛的意义上理解的。一般而言，政治决策被认为是关于国家政策的决定过程；如果这些决定是由国家的人民作出的，则该政治决策就是民主的。然而，在一个全球化和相互依赖的时代，单个国家越来越无法控制一些对其管辖范围内人民产生影响的问题。在其可控制的范围内，许多问题都必须由其它的单位来决定，如其它的国家集团或国际社会。在这种情况下，公民和民主决策概念必须重新考虑，并且，或许现在只有某种“全球民主制”才能为人民参与一些最重要的决策提供真正的机会，而这些决策是会对他们产生影响的。 由于大卫·希尔德（David Held）和其他人的努力，全球民主制的观念正变得越来越重要。本文将考察这种观念对遏制全球变暖问题的现实意义。本文将证明：除了其它因素之外，某种形式的全球民主制将为全球性集体行动问题找到解决办法，并为之提供必要的合法性，并且它或许将为某些困难决策提供动力，而这些困难决策将会牵涉到牺牲短期的物质利益。全球民主制也会有助于解决国际社会公正的问题，即在遏制全球变暖问题的努力上北方和南方所应该作出的贡献问题。
Why the Aim to Neutralize Luck Cannot Provide a Basis for Egalitarianism
Susan Hurley
University of Warwick, UK
1. Introduction
Cohen (1989): fundamental egalitarian aim is to neutralize influence of luck on distribution. Luck/responsibility cut. Luck-egalitarianism as developed by Cohen, Roemer, Arneson claims to make explicit key assumption implicit in egalitarian theorizing.
My claim: while this assumption may well have been thus implicit, nevertheless the aim to neutralize luck cannot provide a basis for egalitarianism, either in the sense of specification or of justification.
Minimal constraint: to count as egalitarian, a doctrine must, for some X, favor relatively more equal patterns of distribution of X over relatively less equal distributions of X, other things equal.
Preview: Distinguish what is redistributed from how it is redistributed: the currency from the pattern of distributive justice. Cannot derive how from what, or pattern from currency. Luck/responsibility can play currency role, but this does not entail an egalitarian pattern. Indeed, luck/responsibility cannot play patterning role.
2. Currency vs. pattern: the limits of the currency role of responsibility in justice and the egalitarian fallacy.
Currency role: responsibility as filter, yielding equalisandum. We only aim to redistribute what is a matter of luck, not what people are responsible for.
Limits: 1) need independent specification of good to which filter is applied, eg. resources, welfare, both. 2) Knowing what to redistribute does not tell us how to redistribute.
Parfit: equality (concerned with interpersonal relations) vs. priority, eg maximin (concerned with relation between someone’s actual state and other possible states he might have been in). Distinction in space of patterns, not currencies.
Aim to redistribute only what is a matter of luck: does not favor equality over maximin, even if maximin countenances differences that are a matter of luck. Equality may equally countenance samenesses that are a matter of luck. Nonresponsibility for difference does not entail responsibility for nondifference. Responsibility neither specifies nor justifies taking equality as default.
Egalitarian fallacy:
(1) It is a matter of luck that a and b are unequal does not entail
(2) It would not be a matter of luck if a and b were equal
Equality default view: equality does not need to be justified; responsibility can be used to justify departures from equality. Not guilty of egalitarian fallacy. But not a counterexample to my claim. Even if it is conceded that responsibility plays a patterning role here, it does not do so in relation to aspect of the view that is egalitarian: the assumption of equality as a default position. It plays a similar role in the inequality default view, which only permits equalities for which people are responsible and defaults to inequality.
To suggest responsibility play only currency role, no patterning role, is to concede that it does not provide basis for egalitarianism. Consistent with redistributing the currency in favor of inequality.
3. Can responsibility play a patterning role? The luck-neutralizer’s dilemma.
Aim to neutralize bad or good luck provides no reason to favor equality as a pattern of distribution. Bad luck ambiguous, interpersonal vs. counterfactual senses.
The luck neutralizer’s dilemma:
Interpersonal bad luck: my situation is worse than others’, in respect of aspects of my situation for which I am not responsible. Neutralizing interpersonal bad luck specifies an equal pattern of distribution of whatever is a matter of luck. But trivial, since inequality used to identify bad luck. No independent specification; no independent justification for favoring or defaulting to equality, for countenancing equalities that are a matter of luck but not inequalities that are a matter of luck.
Counterfactual bad luck: as a matter of luck I am worse off than I might have been. Suppose it is determinate what I would be responsible for under counterfactual conditions in which factors for which I am not responsible are eliminated, and similarly what you would be responsible for. There’s no reason to suppose these positions would tend to be equal.
It doesn’t help if no one is responsible for anything because responsibility is impossible: if so, equality is no less a matter of luck than inequality.
4. Can responsibility play a patterning role? Problems of interpersonal and counterfactual responsibility.
Specification, if not justification? No: counterfactual horn of dilemma leads to deeper problems: 1) the boring problem with responsibility for relations between people’s positions; 2) the indeterminacy problem about would not be a matter of luck when actual situation is a matter of luck.
1) Distinguish: S’s responsibility for her goods position (e.g. as a result of her choices) vs. S’s responsibility for the relation of her goods position to that of others.
Responsibility does not specify pattern of relations across people. What would it be for a pattern of distribution of goods not to be a matter of luck? Even when 2 people are both responsible for their respective levels of goods, whether unequal or equal, the relation between them is still partly a matter of luck for each of them, since neither is responsible for the other’s position. Point generalizes from actual to counterfactual relations.
2) If people are not responsible for their respective levels of goods: what would they be responsible for instead, if factors for which they are not responsible were eliminated? Luck-neutralizing aim does not tell us to move from one distribution that is a matter of luck to another that is also a matter of luck. Not just that there’s no reason to think we’d all be responsible for the same thing, but that what we’d be responsible for, counterfactually, is in many cases simply indeterminate: no general, nonarbitrary basis for saying what would not be a matter of luck under counterfactual conditions. Not merely an epistemological problem; the very concept of responsibility does not extend determinately this far in many cases.
5. Related issues.
Defects of hypothetical choice accounts of responsibility: causal costlessness, indeterminacy. Cf. actual choice or control.
Aim to neutralize the effects of luck makes operational the regression principle, that responsibility for something requires responsibility for its causes. Under plausible assumptions, this principle makes responsibility impossible. But that would not provide a basis for egalitarianism either.
Roemer’s account of what it would be to neutralize luck does not provide a basis for egalitarianism either. Rather, it shows how we can reward people for efforts to behave in ways we regard as meritorious; this may or may not favor egalitarian patterns, depending on what we regard as meritorious.
为何使机会均等的努力不能为平均主义奠定基础
苏珊·赫尔雷
英国瓦里克大学哲学系
1、引言。
科恩（Cohen）(1989):平均主义的基本宗旨是在分配上均衡机会的影响；机会份额与责任份额；由科恩、罗莫尔（Roemer）、阿勒森（Arneson）发展起来的机会平均主义要求在平均主义的理论中应使原本明确的基本公设不那么直接。
我的观点：公设会因此变得含蓄起来，然而，无论在描述性的意义上还是在规范性的意义上，使机会均等的宗旨仍然不能为平均主义提供基础。
最低的限定：对于某物X的分配，作为平均主义理论，其信条必须倾向于那些更平均的分配模式而不是那些相对较不平均的分配模式，这对于其它事物的分配也适用。
预先评论：应区分再分配的物资和该物资再分配的模式：使物资同分配的公正模式区分开来。不能从“什么”中推导出“如何”，也不能从物资中推导出结构模式。机会与责任可以承担物资的功能，但这并不牵涉到一个平均主义的模式。事实上，机会与责任不能扮演结构模式的角色。
2、物资-结构：在正义中责任的物资功能的限度以及平均主义的谬论。
物资功能：责任作为过滤器要求平等。我们的目标仅仅是分配机会，而不是分配义务。
限度：1）需要对过滤器被应用的物资如资源、福利等进行独立的描述。2）知道分配什么并没有告诉我们应该如何分配。
帕菲特（Parfit）:机会平等（ 关涉到人际间关系）与最优值等优先权（关涉到某人的实际状况和其它可能状况的之间的关系）。结构模式的区分而不是物资的区分。
目标仅仅是再分配机会：纵使最优值支持机会非均等，在最优值和平等中，也不更倾向于机会均等。平等可能同样地支持机会上的等同。对非均等的无责任并不牵涉到对均等的责任。责任既不能描述将平等看作失责这种情况，也不能证明其正当性。
平均主义的谬论：
（1） 平均是一个机会问题，“a和b不是平均的”并不牵涉在内。
（2） 如果a和b是平均的，平均就不是个机会问题。
平均即失责的观点：平均并不需要获得正当性；责任能够被用来论证偏离平均的合法性。平均主义的谬误并非罪过，然而也不能反驳我的论点。纵使容许责任承担结构或模式的功能，这也不是在与平均主义观点相关的意义上如此，因为这儿的公设是：平均即失责。责任在另一种观点中（不平均即失责）扮演类似的角色：在这种观点中，人们对平均负有责任，相反则是失责的。
认为责任只承担物资的功能而非结构的功能，这等于是支持下述观点：责任并不能为平均主义奠定基础。责任是与在分配中倾向于非平均主义的立场一致的。
3、 责任是否能承担结构或模式的功能？机会均等主义者的两难困境。
使好的或坏的机会均等的努力不能为倾向于机会均等的分配模式提供理由。坏的机会在“人际间的”和“逆事实的”之间的含混的含义。
机会均等主义者的两难：
人际的坏机会：就那些我不应当负责的方面，“我的处境比别人的差”。使人际间的坏机会均等也描述了一种机会分配上的平均模式，然而，因为非平均被用来定义坏机会，这是一种不太有价值的模式。对于支持机会平等或谴责机会平等是失责两种情况来说，都不存在本身有效的描述，也不存在本身有效的合法性论证，因为它们仅仅支持作为机会的平均而不支持作为机会的不平均这种情况。
逆事实的坏机会：就机遇而言，我比本来可能的处境糟多了。在逆事实的条件下（那些我不能为之负责的因素被清除了），设想那些我应当为之负责的处境是确定的；同样，你所应当负责的处境也是确定的。没有理由认为这些处境会是倾向于平等的。
认为责任是不可能的，并进而认为没有人应当为任何事情负责，这种观点一点都不解决问题；因为如果是这样，平均将和不平均一样都是个机会问题。
4、责任是否能够承担结构或模式的功能？人际间的责任问题和逆事实的责任问题。
如果不能论证其正当性，可否给予其描述呢？不能：逆事实的两难困境导致更深的问题：1）为人们的处境间的关系负责任这一乏味的问题。2）当实际处境是一个机会因素时，那些非机会因素是不可确定的。
1） 区分：某人为她的良好处境所负的责任（如，作为她选择的结果）和某人对她的良好处境与别人的处境的关系所负的责任。
责任并不描述人们之间的关系模式。物质分配的模式如果不是一个机会问题那又是什么呢？纵使两个人都为他们各自的物资水准负责而不管这水准是否平等，他们之间的关系在某种程度上仍然是一个机会问题，因为他们都不必为对方的处境负责。论点从实际关系延及到逆事实的关系。 2）如果人们不当为他们各自的物资水准负责：如果那些他们所不当承担责任的因素被清除了，他们当为什么负责呢？机会均衡的目标并没有告诉我们从一种作为机会的分配相另一种作为机会的分配的转移。并不仅仅因为没有理由认为我们都为同样的事情负责，而且因为，就可能性而言，那些我们应为之负责的因素在许多情况下是不可确定的：认为某种因素在逆事实的条件下并非机会因素这种观点是缺乏普遍的、非独断的基础的。这不仅是一个认识论问题，责任概念本身在许多情况下并不能很确定地延伸这么远。
5、相关的问题
对责任的假设性选择描述的缺陷：因果关系的无成本性，非确定性。（与实际选择或控制相比较而言）。 使机会的影响均衡化的目标适用于回归原理，对某事负责要求对该事的原因负责。沿着合理的假定，回归原理使得任何责任都不可能。但这也不能为平均主义奠定基础。
罗莫尔对机会均等所作的描述也不能为平均主义提供一个基础。相反地，这种描述表明 ：对于那些为值得赞赏的生活方式作出了努力的人，我们可以如何回报他们；而我们是否赞同平均主义结构或模式，这取决于我们将什么看作值得赞赏的。
Feminism and the Objects of Justice
Alison Jaggar
Department of Philosophy
University of Colorado at Boulder, USA
Central to justice is the notion of moral balance, which philosophers often
express in terms of giving each her due. By this, they typically mean that
goods and evils should be distributed in quantities and qualities proportionate
to the desert of the recipients. Contemporary theories of social justice are
usually presented as proposing rival answers to the question:
1. What should count as just deserts? That is to say, according to what principle
should goods and evils be distributed in a just social system? In discussions
of so-called distributive justice, this question is generally interpreted
as asking for moral grounds capable of justifying state intervention to redistribute
material goods; in the context of corrective justice, the question is often
interpreted as one about which principles should determine the kinds of behavior
that deserve to be punished by law and the kinds of legal penalties that are
appropriate fitting. Feminists have proposed a variety of answers to the question
of what should count as just deserts but they have also raised an additional
questions, namely:
2. What are kinds or categories of things that should be distributed in a
just manner? I call this the question of the proper objects of justice and,
in the present paper, I show how recent work by feminist philosophers has
disclosed objects of justice ignored by most other mainstream philosophers.
I consider this disclosure to be one of the most significant contributions
made by feminism to Western understandings of social justice.
女权主义与正义之对象
艾莉森·迦格尔
美国科罗拉多大学哲学系
正义的核心是道德平衡的概念，哲学家常常用“将某人应得的给予某人”来表述这一概念。这一概念尤其意味着：善和恶的分配应当与接受者的功过相称。当代的正义理论一般表现为对下述问题提出竞争性的答案。
1）什么能被认作公正的功过标准？也就是说，在一个正义的社会系统中，善和恶的分布应当遵循什么原则？在讨论所谓分配的正义时，这一问题通常被解释为寻求一种道德根基，从而为国家对物质资源的再分配提供合法性；而在矫正性正义的背景中，这一问题又常常被解释为：应当由哪一种原则来确定该被法律惩罚的行为类型以及相适应的法律惩戒形式。在什么是公正的功过标准的问题上，女权主义者已经提出了范围广泛的答案，然而，他们还提出了一个特殊的问题，也就是： 2）那些应当被公正分配的事物类型是什么？我将之称为正义的恰当对象问题，并表明：女权主义哲学家最近的工作如何提出了正义的对象问题，而这一问题是被大多数其它主流哲学家所忽视的。我认为此问题的提出是女权主义者对理解西方社会正义观念最重要的贡献之一。
In Searching of Justice for Global Society:
A Comparison of Political Liberalism and Confucianism.
Dong-Jin Jang
Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea
This paper is primarily concerned with whether liberalism and Confucianism have overlapping ideas to be the ground of justice for global society. By comparing Rawls' Political Liberalism with Confucianism, which may be a decent doctrine in Rawls' term, this paper attempts to defend that the two political philosophies can agree on certain principles of justice for global decent doctrine in Rawls' term, this paper attempts to defend that the two political philosophies can agree on certain principles of justice for global society, despite their differences.
Confucianism is said to be the shared cultural background in the countries in East Asia. It is still a part of life unconsciously or consciously in this region. With the surprising economic growth and the recent economic crisis in East Asia, the active debates on Confucianism began to capture prudential attention from theorists. It is seriously reviewed to be a very persuasive factor to explain the economic crisis as well as the economic growth in the East Asian countries. While Confucianism has attraction in East Asia, liberalism is the most influential ideology worldwide. It greatly influences the new order of the world, and most countries response it positively or negatively. In this situation, it is worth comparing Rawls' political liberalism, which is specified running through his books, 'A Theory of Justice', 'Political Liberalism', and 'The Law of Peoples', with Confucian conception of justice.
In order to find the overlapping ideas to be grounds for global society, this paper tries to compare the two philosophies with following points.
First, I am going to analyze comparatively Rawls' political constructivism and Confucian intuitionism. Rawls uses political constructivism to construct the just principles for the basic structure of society. Confucian political philosophy stands upon an intuitionism that there is an objective reality of moral standards or values and that we can take a grasp of them through our reflections. In spite of difference, I am going to argue that these philosophical approaches to justice should be complementarily considered in producing the grounds for the global justice. I contend that even constructivism cannot avoid intuitionism to pave the basic bedrocks for just principles.
Second, I will compare the conceptions of the person. Rawls' political conception of the person is specified by two moral powers, one to form and revise one's own conception of the good and the other, the sense of justice, to live in fair terms of cooperation with others. Confucian conception of the person is represented by the perfect person, 'chun-tzu'(or the noble person). A person can become good through the cultivation of the innate four moral virtues, humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. In Confucianism, it is argued that this morally good person can make good politics. With all the different conceptions, I contend that the underlying ideas running underneath the two share the fundamental respect of persons which may provide the starting point for the just principles for global society.
Third, I am going to compare the conceptions of society. Rawls' conception of society is characterized by its ethical conflicts among the comprehensive philosophical, moral, and religious doctrines. Confucian conception of society is distinguished by its constant conflicts between powers without moral standards. These different conceptions of society lead to take opposite routes to the relationship between ethics and politics. In addition, it is important to compare Rawls' well-ordered democratic society with Confucian conception of an ideal society. Although these two conceptions of society are different, it is notable that both conceptions share one common goal to establish a good society by positing proper relations among the persons. Despite the different routes, this shared goal may be the ground for specifying the just principles for global society.
Noting these shared grounds, I attempt to defend that Confucianism and liberalism can agree on certain principles of justice guiding global society.
寻求全球社会的正义：政治自由主义和儒家思想的比较
Dong-jin Jang
韩国汉城Yonsei大学
本文主要关注的是：自由主义和儒家学说是否有共同的观念以作为全球社会的正义基础。通过比较罗尔斯的政治自由主义（这可以说是应用罗尔斯术语的一种较近的学说）和儒家学说，本文将为下述思想辩护：尽管存在种种差别，这两种政治哲学能在全球社会的某些正义原则上达成一致。
儒家学说被认为是东亚国家共同享有的文化背景。在这个地区，它仍然有意识或无意识地是人们生活的一部分。由于东亚地区惊人的经济增长和最近的经济危机，对儒家学说的热烈争论开始引起学界全面的关注。无论是对于东亚地区的经济增长还是经济危机，儒家思想都被严肃地看作是一种强烈的诱导因素。儒家学说在东亚地区有其吸引力，而自由主义却是全球范围内最有影响的意识形态。它极大地支配着世界的新秩序，绝大多数国家都或积极或消极地对之作出反应。在这种情况下，比较儒家的正义观念和罗尔斯的政治自由主义是有意义的，后者是在罗尔斯的一系列著作《正义论》、《政治自由主义》和《民众的法律》中得到论述的。
为了寻求能作为全球社会基础的共有观念，本文在下列要点上比较两种哲学。
首先，我将比较地分析罗尔斯的政治结构主义和儒家的直觉主义。罗尔斯使用政治结构主义来构成社会基本结构的正义原则。儒家的政治哲学则奠基于一种直觉主义基础上，这种直觉主义认为：道德标准和价值是一种客观的实在，我们能在沉思中直接把握到它。尽管有其区别，我将论证：为了构成全球正义的基础，这两种关于正义的哲学方法应当互补地得到考虑。我主张，如果没有直觉主义的话，结构主义不能为正义原则提供基础。
其次，我会比较人的概念。罗尔斯关于人的政治概念由两种道德能力来规定，一种就是形成和修正自身关于善的观念的道德能力，另一种是对正义的领悟，即对与别人公正相处状态的识别能力。儒家的人的观念由“至人”概念表现出来，即“君子”（或“圣贤”）。一个人能够通过对四种内在道德价值的修养而成为善，这四种内在道德价值即仁、义、礼、智。儒家学说认为：人在道德上的完善能导致政治上的完善。尽管这两个概念不同，我将论述：在人的观念的基础方面上这两个概念有着一致性，而这可以作为全球社会的正义原则的起点。
再次，我将比较社会这一概念。罗尔斯的社会概念关注的是在广泛不同的哲学的、道德的和宗教的信条之间的伦理冲突。而儒家的社会概念则注重的是在不涉及道德准则的权力之间的经常性的冲突。这些不同的社会概念导致在对伦理与政治的关系上不同的路线。此外，比较罗尔斯的“良好的民主社会”观念和儒家的理想社会的观念是很重要的。虽然这两种社会概念是不同的，值得注意的是，这两种概念有共同目标，即通过在人们之间确定一种适宜的关系来建构一个好的社会。尽管路线不同，这一共同分享的目标能作为基础明确规定全球社会的正义
原则。
通过关注上述共同分享的基础，我试图为这种思想辩护：儒家学说和自由主义在指导全球社会的某些正义原则上能达成一致。
Legitimate Foundation of Procedures in the Rule of Law: Justice or Rules?
Jiang Yi
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China
It has been a committed principle by most of Western legists and philosophers of law that procedures in the rule of law should be one of presuppositions for pushing on the rule of law. However, there are different views among them about what should be the foundation for insuring the legitimacy of procedures in the rule of law. There have been various doctrines over the problem in the history of Western political ideas, which could be divided into two kinds: one is that the foundation should be justice and moral norms in the society and thus is justified in accordance with the justice. It was initialed by Plato’s Republic and further signed by different versions of Utopias. Rawls’ On Justice is a representation of the versions in modern time. The other is that all matters in human lives must be conditioned by rules and conventions that have been committed for long time. In this view, states are formed according to agreements that are achieved in order to avoid chaos and to keep harmony in the society; establishment of rule of law is aimed at guaranty to carry out those agreements. Accordingly the foundation of rule of law should be rules instead of justice in general sense. This view was represented by Aristotle’s political ideas at first, Hobbes and Lock’ s ones later. In modern time Heyke’s liberalism is a powerful imagine of the views. This shows a fundamental conflict between the two kinds of view: the legitimate foundation of procedures in rule of law should be justice or rules. Different answers to the question lead to different understandings of law supreme and of validity of law by legists and philosophers.
The significant principle of dealing with the matter is not confusion of the rules of law and democracy, law and morality. Democracy as a political goal is achieved only by the rules of law and not considered as a means for the rules of law. On the first hand democracy is not a means but an ideal way of life illustrating people’s interests. On the other the goal for democracy is different from the means for it and it is wrong to replace the goal with the means or vice versa. In the same sense, law is different from morality. Conventions could not be considered as the same as good laws which are not consist with conventions which could not be come to be good laws.
The crucial key to handle this matter is clarification of the aim of procedures in the rules of law and significance of legitimacy of procedures. The principle of procedures in the rules of law is one of basic demands for liberalism, which is acknowledge of individual uniqueness and autonomy and the criteria of no-violation of others’ behaviors. In the West rightness or legality is an axiomatic principle of procedures in the rules of law. The conception of legitimacy contains, however, space applicable for rules. It means that procedures should be a fundamental principle on which particular cases will be base for establishing rules. Nobody will be supreme over laws.
Procedures in the rules of law is too important a content of establishment of the rules of law in China. It is only on bases of rules that legitimate procedures in the rules of law would be established and the principle that everyone is equal under law would be represented. All we encounter now is not why we should govern our country by the rules of law, but how to make our legal system more perfect. It will be more helpful for our establishment of the rules of law to have more legalities rather than free authorities.
法治程序化的合法性基础：规则还是正义？
江 怡
中国社科院哲学所
法治的程序化是保证法治得以推行和延续的前提，这是西方法学家以及法哲学家基本公认的原则。但在究竟以什么为基础来保证法治程序化的合法性这个问题上，不同的法学家和哲学家就有了不同的看法。在西方两千多年的政治思想史上，提出了千差万别的理论观点，大体上可以分为两类：一种是认为法治的基础应当是人间正义和道德观念，因而法治程序化的合法性基础当然应该是以符合正义为标准。这种观点最初以柏拉图的理想国为代表，随后有各种形式的政治乌托邦，现代政治理论中以罗尔斯的正义论为代表；另一种观点是认为，人类一切事务都是按照人们事先约定的规则或达成的协议为条件的，国家的组成就是各种利益为了维护和谐而不至于陷入混乱所达成的一种约定，法治的建立就是为了使这种约定能够得到贯彻执行，因而使法治程序化的合法性基础就应当是规则，而不是抽象的一般意义上的正义。这种观点最初以亚里士多德的政治思想为代表，随后有霍布斯、洛克等人的国家理想，现代思想中以海耶克的自由主义为代表。这两种观点反映了当代西方政治理论和法哲学思想中的一种根本对立，即法治程序化的合法性基础究竟是规则还是正义？由于对这个基本问题的不同回答，导致了法学家和哲学家们对法律至上和法律正当的不同理解。 处理这个问题的一个重要前提，是决不能把法治与民主、法律与道德混为一谈。民主作为一种政治目的，是要通过法治的手段达到的，但民主本身不能被当作手段来对待：一方面，民主不是手段，而是体现大众利益的理想生活方式；另一方面，实现民主的目的与达到这个目的的手段不同，不能以手段取代目的，更不能用目的代替手段。同样，法律不同于道德：习俗与良法不可一视同仁，良法未必符合习俗，而习俗也不一定成为良法。
处理这个问题的关键，是要认清法治程序化的目的及其合法性的内涵。法治程序化的前提是自由主义的基本要求，即承认个体的唯一性、自主性，并且以不妨碍他人的行为作为标准。因而，在西方，正义性或正当性成为法治程序化“公理性的”前提。而合法性概念则包含规则的可适用空间，即法治的程序化应当是为具体案例设定规则的基本精神：没有人能凌驾于法律之上。
法治的程序化是中国法治建设的重要内容。只有以规则为基础和标准，才能建立合法的法治程序，才能体现“法律面前人人平等”的精神。我们现在面临的问题不是为何进行法治建设，而是应当如何尽快地使我们的法律法规更加完善。更多繁复的条规比更大的自由裁量权，更有利于中国当前的法治建设。
Procedures and Democracy
Jiang Yi
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China
The statue of democracy has been understood differently in both different cultural backgrounds and different ages. It was considered as political deliberation in aristocrats in ancient Greece, as monarchic constitutionalism in modern time and as wills of the majority in contemporary democracy. In ancient Chinese political ideology democracy, if any, was nothing but charity of officers to ordinary people.
Democracy would stay only in ideas when it is used as an ideal to strive for. However, it has been considered as not a simply theoretic problem or political ideal but an urgent issue encountered in practical political life. Only in certain periods of society could the democracy issue be set out as a political program; and only when politics in society has to change in one sense would the issue be more urgent for the society.
However democracy as a political practice is represented in particular political activities. It has been a crucial role in Western political ideology and practices that procedures is the main statue in representing democracy. Democratic procedures here is not a procedures characteristic of democracy. Instead, procedures itself presents democracy, or in other words, procedures is nothing but democracy. Only in establishing and following procedures could democracy be represented; only expressing opinions according to procedures could the will of the majority be guaranteed.
The establishment and following of procedures are not solved alone by democracy. It could not guarantee the legitimacy of the establishment and following of procedures. Thus democracy is not at the same level with legitimacy. There is no legitimate or illegitimate for democracy. In practical politics democracy is represented by the establishment and following of procedures, aiming at agreements among all or most of the majority. Procedures guarantee that democracy could be carried out, while democracy will make the function of procedures more outstanding in contemporary politics.
程序与民主
江 怡
中国社会科学院哲学所
民主的机制不仅在不同的文化传统背景中有着不同的理解，在不同的时代也有着不同认识。古希腊的民主是贵族议政，近代民主是君主立宪，现代民主则是多数人的意志。在传统封建中国的政治思想中，如果说有民主的话，也只是官赐予民的一种施舍。
当民主还只是被作为一种理想去追求的时候，民主就只能停留在认识的水平上。然而，民主从被提出伊始就不是一个纯粹的理论问题或政治理想，而是现实的政治生活中面临的急迫问题。只有当社会发展到一定的阶段，民主问题才会被作为重要的政治纲领提出；只有社会的政治现实在某种程度上需要变化时，民主问题才会显得更为紧迫。
然而，作为政治现实的民主是体现在具体的政治活动之中的。程序作为体现民主的主要机制在西方政治思想和政治实践中始终起着重要作用。民主程序并不是指以民主为特征的程序，相反，程序本身就体现着民主，或者说，程序就是民主：只有制定和遵循程序，民主才得以体现；只有按照程序来表达意见，大多数人的意志才得以保证。
程序的制定和遵守，不是民主本身所能解决的问题。民主并不保障程序制定和遵守的合法性。因而，民主与合法性不是同一层次的概念。民主本身不存在合法或不合法的问题。在现实政治中，民主是通过程序的制定和遵守来体现的，最终目的是要在所有或大多数公民之中达成一致。程序保障了民主精神得以贯彻，民主也使得程序的作用在现代政治中更加突现出来。
Democratic Deliberation in Diverse Societies
David Kahane
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta, Canada
Accounts of democratic deliberation in diverse societies necessarily presuppose
conceptions of culture and cultural membership. I will argue that political
disagreements often represent conflicts of culturally situated perspectives,
construed in a particular way; against this background, democratic deliberation
is best understood as a process of intercultural dialogue. After reviewing
approaches to intercultural dialogue in theories and practices of 'alternative
dispute resolution', I will lay out a set of questions and challenges for
deliberative democratic theory, and consider the sorts of democratic mechanisms
that might be adequate to challenges of cultural pluralism.
多元社会间的民主商议
大卫·卡阿纳
加拿大阿尔贝塔大学哲学系
多元社会间的民主商议这种论述必然预设了文化和文化成员的概念。我要论证的是：政治上的分歧常常是以一种特殊方式解释出来的文化处境和文化视角的冲突；相应于这种背景，民主商议最好被理解为一种文化间的对话过程。我将先评述“替代性争端解决”的理论和实践中解决文化间对话的途径，然后对协商民主制的理论提出一系列问题和挑战，最后我将考虑某些类型的民主机械论（强调一种民主体制的强制性程序？），而这些民主机械论可能很适于应付文化多元主义的挑战。
Pluralism, Nationalism, and Cosmopolitanism: Paradoxes of
Universality in Contemporary Political Philosophy
David Kahane
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta, Canada
“Cosmopolitanism is the same thing as China's theory of world empire two thousand years ago. China once wanted to be sovereign lord of the earth and to stand above every other nation, so she espoused cosmopolitanism." -- Sun Yat Sen
Political philosophers have long been preoccupied with tensions between the normative claims of the 'local' - of family, village, ethnos, nation - and the 'universal' claims of shared humanity. Yet the best of contemporary Western political philosophy shows the inadequacy of the polarities of this spectrum.
On the one hand, the insistent localism of communitarianism and of multiculturalism (when this latter is treated as a 'serial communitarianism') founders on the complexity of group boundaries: appeals to the shared understandings of a given social group -- a class or ethnicity or nation -- tend to collapse in the face of the complex intersections of identities and memberships. This collapse occurs at levels of both justification and the proper scope of moral obligation. At the justificatory level, the complexities of pluralism undermine attempts to ground normative standards in putatively shared understandings (which must either be so abstract as to be politically inert, or specific and thereby controversial within as well as across communities.) The complexities of pluralism also undermine localism applied to the scope of moral obligations: communities are not neatly bounded, and so the boundaries of any given 'we' will be contestable and contingent. As Martha Nussbaum notes in her recent defense of moral cosmopolitanism, it seems troublingly arbitrary that Americans' concern for co-nationals of Chinese ancestry should switch registers when directed at Chinese overseas.
On the other hand, dismissing the claims of the local in favor of universally-founded norms runs into problems of its own. It's not only that moral universalisms -- accounts of common human nature, interests, or goals -- have so often served as alibis for colonialist and imperialist projects (as the quote from Sun Yat Sen avers). The quest for normative foundations that speak to all rational beings faces sustained and compelling criticism from Neo-Aristotelians (MacIntyre, Taylor), Neo-Wittgensteinians (Edwards, Tully), Pragmatists (Rorty), and others. In the light of such critiques, universal accounts of morality come to seem culturally and historically particular.
So while moral localism and moral universalism have no shortage of contemporary philosophical proponents, there would appear to be a complex tension between local and universal; neither approach can be theorized away.
My paper explores this tension as it unfolds in the normative claims of nation, and those proffered on behalf of universal humanity, of cosmopolis. The paper looks, in particular, at justificatory strategies used in the contest between national/cultural sovereignty on the one hand, and campaigns for international standards (of human rights, for example) on the other. Neither simple localisms nor simple universalisms are sustainable here -- neither claims to a monolithic national sovereignty or interest or character (which are cast into doubt by internal dissent and pluralism), nor claims to universally grounded standards (which founder on the plurality of actual worldviews and moral perspectives). Surveying recent debates around cosmopolitanism (e.g. Bohman & Lutz-Bachmann 1997, Cheah & Robbins 1998, Geras 1995, Nussbaum et. al. 1996, Nussbaum & Glover 1995), I argue for a middle way that, by chastening the rhetorics of both localists and universalists, reveals the contingency and contextuality of the range of positions on offer. The contest between 'local' and 'universal' values turns out to be an intercultural negotiation, one that restores a dignity to claims to culturally specific ways, while also confronting these defenses of sovereignty with democratically-based standards of internal and external justification.
多元主义、民族主义和世界主义：当代政治哲学中普世性的悖论
大卫·卡阿纳
加拿大阿尔贝塔大学哲学系
“世界主义与中国两千年前的世界帝国理论是一回事。中国曾经想成为地球的最高统治者高踞他国之上，所以那时中国拥护世界主义。”
——孙中山
长期以来，政治哲学家们主要关注的是地方主义和普世主义之间的张力——前者坚持家庭、村社、民族和国家的规范性权利，后者则宣称共有的人性。然而，最好的当代西方政治哲学表明，这一争议系列的各种倾向并不是没有缺陷的。
一方面，社群主义和文化多元主义（后者被称做“社群主义系列”）等顽固的地方主义因为社群界限的复杂性而失败了——诉求于既定群体（阶层、民族或国家）的共有理性的做法因为身份和成员资格的复杂相交状态而失效了。这一失败发生在正当性层面和道德义务的适用范围层面上。在正当性层面上，多元主义的错综状态摧毁了试图将规范标准奠基于公认的共有理性之上的做法（这些共有理性要么太过抽象而在政治性上并不适用，要么太具体了，以至于无论在社群内部或社群之间都是引起争议的）。多元主义的错综状态也摧毁了地方主义在道德义务范围上的应用：社群并非纯一地被限定，因而任何既定的“我们”的界限将是可质疑的，也是不能确定的。正如玛尔特·卢茨堡（Martha Nussbaum）在她最近为道德世界主义所作的辩护中注意到，如下做法似乎是极为武断的：论及海外华侨，美国人对有中国血统的本国公民应当予以特殊关注。
另一方面，驳斥地方主义而支持普遍规范的做法也遇上自己的问题。不仅仅道德普世主义（共有的人类本性，共同的利益和目标等主张）常常被用作殖民主义和帝国主义事业的借口（正如所引孙中山的话所断言的），而且寻求对所有理性人有效的规范性之努力还遇上了持续的和强有力的批评，这些批评源于新亚里士多德主义（麦金太尔（Macintyre）,泰勒（Taylor）,新维特根斯坦主义（爱德华（Edwards）,托利（Tully）），实用主义（罗蒂（Rorty））和其它。在这些批评面前，道德上的普世主张似乎在文化上和历史上是特殊的。 在这种情况下，虽然道德地方主义和道德普世主义都不缺乏当代哲学上的支持者，它们之间却表现出复杂的张力关系；没有任何一种途径能从理论上被消解掉。
本文将审察这种张力关系，这种张力一方面呈现为民族主义的规范权利主张，另一方面显露为对普遍人性，对世界城邦的认同。本文将特别关注在民族和文化主权与国际化规范运动（如人权）的论争中所使用的正当性策略。在此，单独的地方主义或单独的普世主义都是不能持续的——无论是宣称完整的民族国家主权，国家利益或民族特性（这些会因为内部的异议和内部的多元主义而受到质疑），还是主张奠基于普遍基础的规范（这种主张因为实际的世界观和道德视角的多元性而失败）。通过审视最近围绕世界主义的论争[如勃曼（Bohman）和卢茨-巴什曼（Lutz-Bachmann）1997，切厄(Cheah)和罗宾斯(Robbins)1998，格拉斯(Geras)1995，卢茨堡(Nussbaum et.al.)1996，卢茨堡(Nussbaum)和格罗芬(Glover)1995],我将论述一条中间道路：通过限制地方主义和普世主义者的修辞，揭示所提出立场在范围上的偶然性和具体性。“地方主义的”和“普世主义”之间的价值论争被证明为是一种文化间的商议，这种商议一方面试图给予文化独特性的主张以某种尊严，另一方面又以民主基础上内部和外部的正当性规范来挑战对主权的辩护。
Justice and Democracy across National Borders: Ethics or Politics?
Byron Kaldis
The Economic University of Athens &
the Greek Open University, Athens, Greece
The aim of this paper is to throw some light on a particular area in which the values of justice and democracy meet. Moreover, it deals with the point at which these values meet in international relations. The central thesis (Section IV) puts forward a certain historical and conceptual relationship between ethics and two distinct types of political philosophy. It is argued that the possibility to discern such a (dual) relationship is the combined effect of the problem of moral conflict and the idea of order. The crucial question is whether (and in what specific senses) political philosophy as a theory of just order should assume the role of completing ethics otherwise left incomplete by the inherent conflict of values.
Section I broaches the subject of the two historical types of political philosophy and of the corresponding two notions of 'order' against a broader background shaped by questions about the study of 'order' as a value in general, and of the relation between ethics and politics. The latter issue is taken up more fully in Section II where a number of specific issues are raised (and solutions thereof are indicated) with regard to the problem of the logical separation of ethics from politics, especially as this is linked to the concepts of 'order' and 'conflict'. Section III spells out varieties of conflict of values and the way in which political theory is involved in this, thus paving the way for the central Section IV: there the proposed distinction between the two rival types of political philosophy as these are based on the ideas of 'natural' vs. 'artificial' order is articulated in some detail. It is shown that the two types of political philosophy (order) correspond to two different ways in which they can handle the conflict of incommensurable values as opposed to the conflict of duties. Two exemplifications of the general theme are offered in what follows: Section V examines three different but complementary modern moments in the history of political philosophy which support the general thesis: Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hume. Section VI is a critical look at a fallacy (in terms of values) in Liberalism, viewed as a theory that, purportedly, awards to itself the singular status of transcending the conflict of values. Finally in the Conclusion, I briefly put forward a number of rather general remarks about the connection between ethics and politics throwing into relief the concepts of justice and democracy across national borders brought to the forefront at various points
跨越民族国家疆域的正义与民主制：伦理还是政治？
拜伦·卡尔迪斯
希腊雅典经济大学和希腊开放大学
本文的目的是澄清正义与民主制两种价值相遇的特殊领域，并且是在国际关系的背景下来从事这一任务的。本文的中心论题（第四节）提出了在伦理和两种不同类型的政治哲学之间的一种历史和概念上的关联。本文论证说：辩识这样一种（二元的）关联的可能性是道德冲突问题和秩序观念相混合的结果。关键的问题是：是否（以及在什么意义上）作为正义秩序理论的政治哲学应当预设完善的伦理所扮演的角色，否则自身便会因内在的价值冲突而不完整。 在第一节我将论述两个主题：第一个是政治哲学的两种历史类型以及相应的两种“秩序”观念，这些观念是在更广阔的背景下提出来的，而这些背景则取决于将“秩序”作为一般价值所进行的研究；第二个主题是伦理与政治之间的关系。后一个主题在第二节中会得到更详细的讨论，在此会就伦理与政治之间合逻辑的区分之问题提出一系列议题（相应的解决办法也会被指出来），而这种合逻辑的区分特别是与“秩序”和“冲突”的概念相联的。第三节将解释价值冲突的多样性以及政治理论被牵涉进来的方式，由此为第四节作好准备：在第四节中，两种主要的政治哲学类型之间的区别将会得到详细讨论，而这些区别主要是基于“自然的”秩序观念和“人为的”秩序观念。本节将表明：这两种不同的政治哲学（秩序）类型相应于它们在解决不可通约的价值之间的冲突时所采用的不同途径，而这些价值冲突则与责任分歧形成对照。接下来会提供所论述主题的两个详细例证。第五节考察政治哲学史上支持此一主题（伦理与政治之间的区分）的三种互补的现代发展阶段：马基雅维里，霍布斯和休谟。第六节是对自由主义的一个谬论（价值术语）的批判性考察，这种自由主义作为一种理论，自认为具有超越价值冲突的突出地位。最后在结尾，我将简要地对伦理与政治间的关联提出一系列较一般的评论，在这样做的时候，我将在每一点上都凸现跨越民族国家疆域的正义与民主政治的观念。
The Limits of Public Reason
Kang Phee Seng
Department of Religion & Philosophy
Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong
Political liberals such as Rawls have a vision of an ideal society of civility and mutual respect. This well-ordered society is based upon a set of values and principles endorsed by its reasonable citizens to guide its public discourse dealing with matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. In public political debate, appealing to this set of values and principles is a co-operation on the basis of common reason and thus gives rise to civic friendship and mutual respect. To act otherwise threatens the political goods of the society. The liberal principle of legitimacy for public forum thus is bound up with the idea of "public reason" which is said to be acceptable to all in the society and is to be distinguished from "non-public" or "private" reasons which are acceptable to only some specific groups. Political liberals advocate that the limits of public reason should be observed by all reasonable citizens when engaging in public debate and action concerning fundamental political questions.
Using the recent debate on religion in the public square as a case in point, this paper will examine the concept of public reason and the limits it imposes on public forum in a pluralistic society. It seeks to argue that civility and mutual respect do not necessarily exclude "non-public" reasons in public forum. In spite of their explicit intention to be equally fair to all comprehensive philosophical or religious systems, the limits of public reason which political liberals advocate is unfair to at least some of them. Moreover, a common political basis is not the precondition for convergence in or agreement on political discussions.
公共理性的界限
江丕盛
香港浸会大学宗教及哲学系
政治自由主义者如约翰﹒罗尔斯(John Rawls)等有一个由互相礼待、彼此尊重的公民所组成的理想社会的远象。这良好秩序的社会乃是基于其有理智的公民所认可的价值及原则，并以此作为有关宪政根本要旨(constitutional essentials)及正义基本问题(matters of basic justice)的公共话语(public discourse)指引。在公共政治争议中，诉诸这些共同的价值及原则乃是基于共同理性的一种合作行为，公民性的礼待与尊重亦因而产生。若非如是，则社会的政治善(political goods)会遭受损害。因此，自由主义的公共论域的合法性原则(the liberal principle of legitimacy for public forum)与"公共理性"(public reason)不可分割。这社会所有成员都接受的"公共理性"与只是某些个别团体所接受的"非公共理性"(non-public reason)或"私有理性"(private reason)应有所区分。政治自由主义者倡议所有有理智的公民都应该在公共理性的界限内进行有关基本政治问题的公共辩论及行动。 近年来西方学术界对"公共广场的宗教"(religion in the public square)有诸多争议。本文将由此进而探讨公共理性的概念及其对多元社会中公共论域的局限。本文尝试阐明在公共论域中进行互相尊重且有礼貌的辩论并非必须排斥"非公共理性"。尽管政治自由主义者声称其对所有全整哲学或宗教系统(comprehensive philosophical or religious systems)一视同仁，但其所倡议的公共理性界限对至少一些系统而言是不公平的。尤有进者，一个共同的政治基础也不是政治讨论中缩减歧见或达成协议的先决条件。
A Paradox of Rationality in a Liberal Pluralist Democracy
Ahmet Kara
Department of Economics, Fatih University, Istanbul, Turkey
Rationality has long been a profound source of trade-offs and paradoxes in social and political theory. Some of these trade-offs and paradoxes are inextricably intertwined with two of the foundational pillars of liberal democratic discourse, namely
individual rights and democratic majority decision. Following the insights inspired by A. Sen's theorem, we will, in this paper, uncover a rationality-related perplexity involving individual rights and democratic majority decision in liberal-pluralist democracies. We show that, in a liberal pluralist democracy, there are contexts where non-rational preferences are more instrumental than rational preferences in resolving social irrationality-inducing conflicts between individual rights and democratic majority decision. Though existence of such contexts would not diminish the importance of rationality in understanding and analyzing the nature and functioning of a pluralistic polity, it indicates that the relation between rationality and democratic pluralism is more complex than it is portrayed to be in social theory. It also points out the need to pay greater attention to cases of irrationality in individual and group preferences in resolving the rationality-paradoxes of liberal-pluralist democracies
在自由的多元民主政治中的理性悖论
阿赫梅特·卡拉
土耳其法蒂赫大学经济学系
在社会理论和政治理论中，理性一直是各因素权衡和悖论的复杂源泉。在这些各因素的权衡和悖论中，有的不可避免地与自由民主制的两个基本柱石缠结在一起，那就是个体权利和民主的多数决定原则。沿着A.森（A. Sen）的定理所启发的洞见, 在本文中，我们将揭示在自由的多元民主制中的一种与理性相关的困境，而这一困境牵涉到个体权利和民主的多数决定原则。我们将表明，在一个自由的多元民主政治中，存在一些处境，在这些处境中，对于解决一些由群体无理性促成的在个体权利和民主的多数决定之间的冲突而言，非理性的优先选择比理性的优先选择更为有效。虽然这样的处境之存在并不能贬低在理解和分析多元政体的本质和功能时理性的重要性，它却表明，理性与民主制的多元主义之间的关系可能比社会理论中所描述出来的更为复杂。它也指明了，在解决自由的多元主义民主制的理性悖论时，需要对个体和群体的偏好中的无理性状况给予更多的关注。
Legitimacy
Dudley R. Knowles
Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
In this paper I examine an ancient argument, first rehearsed in Plato's “Crito”,
to the effect that an obligation to obey the state can be derived from the
proposition that citizens ought to feel grateful for the benefits they have
received from the state. This argument has found few friends in recent philosophical
literature. I want to defend it, arguing in the first place that it is cogent
(against those who deem it incoherent or inchoate) and, secondly, I wish to
consider the range of citizens to whom it applies. I don't claim either that
it applies to all citizens in some states or to some citizens in all states.
The conditions of its application must be carefully investigated, but this
does not affect the cogency of the argument.
The argument runs as follows:
1. I distinguish the argument from gratitude from other arguments which share
the initial premise of the citizen's receipt of benefits from the state, in
particular, Hart's Principle of Fairness and what I dub the Argument from
Reciprocity which requires that the receipt of benefits be reciprocated. I
claim that some critics of the argument from gratitude (e.g. A.J. Simmons)
have confused gratitude with reciprocation.
2. I insist that the argument does not establish that citizens have an obligation
to feel grateful which amounts to the obligation to obey the law. I diagnose
a more intricate structure, seeking to show first, that the citizen who receives
benefits ought to feel grateful, secondly that the assumption of an obligation
of service to the state is a proper expression of that feeling. Moral requirements
enter at these two different stages of the argument, underpinning the appropriateness
of feelings of gratitude, and then explaining why the assumption of an obligation
is appropriate. This structure of argument obviates confusing talk of 'debts
of gratitude' and deflects the various objections to which such talk has given
rise.
3. I discuss these claims in turn, tackling objections raised in the literature.
Objections to the first include the claim that gratitude pre-supposes motives
on the part of the benefactor which cannot be imputed to institutions, the
further claim that the metaphysics of the state makes the state an inappropriate
object of gratitude, and the democratic intuition that the state should not
be regarded as Lady Bountiful. My rejection of these objections clarifies
the argument.
4. In defence of the claim that gratitude should ground the assumption of
an obligation, I investigate the concept of political obligation, concluding
that what are at stake are more properly thought of as the traditional duties
of citizenship rather than the 'narrow' notion of an obligation to obey the
law. These duties may even include the duty to break the law. I reject a competing
account (A.D.M. Walker) which identifies the obligation as one not to harm
the state through disobedience.
5. I conclude by considering how widespread might be the obligations thus
incurred. Obviously they cannot be imputed to those who have received no or
meagre benefits. But I claim further that such obligations should be repudiated
by those who, like Cinderella's Ugly Sisters, are the beneficiaries of an
unjust regime. Gratitude is not appropriate in respect of benefits with an
immoral provenance. We should not accept any political obligations towards
the unjust state.
合法性
达特雷 R. 诺尔斯
英国格拉斯哥大学哲学系
在本文中我将考察首先在柏拉图的《克里托篇》（Crito,或译作《论应该做什么》）中得到阐述的一个古典的理论：对国家的服从这个责任可以溯源于这样一个主张而得到说明，即公民应当为他从国家中得到的利益而有感恩之情。这一论点在近来的哲学文献中很少发现支持者。我试图为这一论点辩护。首先我将论证说，这一论点是强有力的（反对那些认为它是不合逻辑的或未曾得到充分发展的的观点）；其次，我希望考察这一论点所适用的公民的范围。我既不认为它适用于某些国家的所有公民，也不主张它适用于所有国家中的某些公民。其适用性的条件必须得到详细考察，但这并不影响该论点令人信服的特性。 我的论述结构如下：
1、我区分了源自感恩的论点和其它的论点，这些其它论点共有如下初始前提：公民从国家中获得利益和哈特（Hart）的公正原则，我将之称为源自互惠的论点，因为它要求获得利益时应当给予回报。我认为，有些对感恩论的批评（如A. J. 西蒙斯（A. J. Simmons ）的批评）实际上混淆了感恩与互惠原则。
2、我坚持主张，感恩论并不证实这样的看法：公民应当有感恩的责任，而这一感恩的责任等同于遵守法律的责任。我判断感恩论有更复杂的结构。简要地说就是，第一，获得利益的公民应当是感恩的；其次，服务于国家这种责任是感恩的一种恰当的表现。在这两个阶段中道德要求被牵涉进来，一方面巩固感恩情感的正当性，另一方面解释为什么对责任的设定是正当的。这种论证结构排除了“感恩债务”那种令人困惑的说法，也扭转了由此导致的种种反对意见。 3、我依次讨论这两个论点，并处理相关的反对意见。针对第一个论点的反对意见包括这样一种看法：感恩预设了施惠者的动机，而这些动机是不能归因于机构的；进一步的反对指出：国家的形而上学性使国家不适于作为感恩的对象，因为显然能直觉的是，国家不应当被看作一位“慷慨的夫人”。我对这些反对意见的拒斥澄清了感恩论本身。
4、为了维护感恩为责任奠基这一论点，我考察了政治责任这一概念，结论是：这一概念中关键的东西应当恰当地被认作是传统的公民义务概念而非遵守法律这种狭窄的观念。这些义务甚至可能包括触犯法律。我拒斥了一种相反的观点（A. D. M. 瓦尔克（A. D. M. Walker）），这种观点将责任等同于避免通过违抗法律来损害国家。
5、在结尾我考察了溯源于互惠原则的责任概念是如何广泛传播的。显然，这样的概念不能归因于那些没有或很少获得利益的人。然而我进一步指出，这样的责任甚至应当被象“灰姑娘阴险的姐妹们”那样的不公正体制的受惠者所拒绝。感恩不适用于具有不道德起源的利益。我们不应当接受非正义国家的任何政治义务。
Sovereignty, Cosmopolitanism, and Their Limits
Daniel Kofman
Lincoln College, Oxford University, Oxford, UK
Critics of ethical cosmopolitanism on the grounds that there are no ethical norms of universal scope are in danger of contradiction if they also object to the imposition of norms (i.e. human rights) by some states on others. For to object to the imposition of such norms, or to denounce it as Western cultural imperialism, implies the recognition of at least one norm of universal scope: the right of self-determination; otherwise there would be no grounds to hold the imposition (however coercive) of external norms as wrong. Self-determination implies the right of groups to live according to their own standards, and that implies correlative duties on others not to interfere with each group's pursuit of its own lifestyle according to its own values.
But a universal right of self-determination must in turn be justified. What are the grounds of asserting such a right? This paper surveys several justifications, rejecting some, and defending those based on the right of individuals to autonomy and respect. The right to autonomy of individuals implies a right of groups of individuals to live according to their shared values. But since the justification is based on individual autonomy and respect, it also implies limits to the right of collective self-determination: it cannot take a form inimical to the interests of its autonomy and individual members in self-determination.
Normative limits on collective forms of self-determination, including sovereign statehood, can thus be derived from very limited or weak assumptions of universal features of human beings; the weaker the assumptions, the stronger the case for those limitations, since one need not deny vast cultural differences among peoples, and duties to respect those differences. Nevertheless, some basic universal properties of humans "thinly described" (enumerated in the paper) coupled with the historical novelty of a universal sovereign state system under which all people live today, is sufficient to imply a need for strong limitations on state power. The latter point also suggests a reply against traditionalist objections to limiting state power. Given the novelty of the modern state ("the most powerful institution ever invented", as John Breuilly called it), there are no cultural traditions in the world predating modernity that specifically endorsed such centralised power; on the contrary, as sociologist Peter Berger observed, the sheer inefficiency of pre-modern states, for instance in China before the twentieth century, created scope in which local traditions could flourish unimpeded by central power, and in which individuals could occasionally manouevre within a plurality of loci of power. In modernity, market economies and "civil society" provide diffusion of power of a sort, sometimes protecting individuals from, say, state attempts to deny them employment, but not always enough to defend individuals against the most serious sorts of abuses by states.
In the absence of robust international mechanisms of enforcement, duties of intervention sometimes fall to other states, as the international law doctrine of jus cogens or peremptory norm implies. The paper concludes, however, with some brief exploration of the possibility of developing international institutions robust enough to assume the main duties of international human rights protection, and of the prospects of advancing the voluntary acceptance of human rights norms by hitherto recalcitrant states.
主权、世界主义以及它们的限度
丹尼尔·卡夫曼
英国牛津大学林肯学院
伦理普世主义的批评者的立场是：没有普世范围内适用的伦理规范；如果他们再反对由别国强加规范（如人权）这种情况，那么这些批评者就处于自相矛盾之中。因为反对规范的强迫接受，或将之称为西方文化的帝国主义，本身就意味着承认至少一种普世适用的规范：民族自决的权利；否则下述说法是站不住脚的：外来规范的强迫接受是错误的。民族自决意味着一个群体依照其自身的标准而生活的权利，也意味着相应的义务：不应该干涉别的群体依据自身的价值观性群自己的生活方式。
但是，民族自决这种普遍权利也必须获得正当性论证。凭什么断言这样一种权利？本文考察了一些正当性论述，拒斥了几种理由，而为那些奠基于个体自律权利和个体尊严的理由作了辩护。个体自律的权利意味着由个体组成的群体有权利依照他们所共有的价值观生活。然而，恰恰因为这种正当性论述是奠基于个体自律和个体尊严的，它也同时就意味着群体的自决权利的限度：自决权利不可能成为损害处于自决状态下的个体成员之自律和利益的一种形式。 因此，群体自决形式（包括主权国家）的规范性限度能够溯源于在人性的普遍特征上非常有限或非常弱的假设；这些假设越弱，规范性限度就越大，因为在此不需要否定民族之间的巨大文化差异以及对这些差异的尊重。然而，伴随着当代的人们都生活于其中的主权国家体系这种普遍的历史新经验的一些“很少得到描述”的人类的某些基本的普遍特性（在本文中会列出来）就足以为限制主权国家的权力提出了要求。这些要求也回应了反对限制国家权力的传统主义者。相对于现代国家这种新的事物（引用约翰·布鲁利（John Breuilly）的话就是“迄今所创造的最有权力的机构”），在现代性以前，没有一种文化传统特别地支持过一种如此中央集权式的权力；相反，正如社会学家彼得·博格尔（Peter Berger）所观察到的，前-现代国家的低效率（如二十世纪前的中国）为不受中央权力阻碍的地方传统的发展提供了空间，并且在这种权力场所的多元系统中，个体可以不时地作出机动的选择。在现代性中，市场经济和“市民社会”导致的权力扩散有时能够保护个体以避免国家剥夺个体的职业权力，但是这并不总能足够地保护个体免于来自国家的最严重的酷待。 正如的国际法信条中的强制性规范（jus cogens）所指明的，由于缺乏健全的国际强制机制，干涉的责任就成了他国的义务。本文结尾简要地考察了一种足以健全地承担国际人权保护的主要责任的国际机制的可能性，以及一种推进迄今仍桀骜不驯的国家对人权规范的自愿接受的前景。
A Critical Evaluation of the Debate between
Michael Sandel & the Later John Rawls
Kwan Kai-man
Department of Religion & Philosophy, Baptist University, Hong Kong
Liberalism has long been the dominant political philosophy in the West. However, since the eighties, it has been challenged by communitarian critics like Michael Sandel (1982), Charles Taylor (1985, 1990), Alasdair MacIntyre (1981, 1988, 1990), and Michael Walzer (1983). One typical example of the liberal-communitarian controversy is the prolonged debate between Michael Sandel, a prominent communitarian, and John Rawls, a leading liberal, which has gone on for nearly thirty years. The earlier Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) attempts to provide a universalist justification of liberalism, and argues for the priority of the right over the good. (Although it is later denied by Rawls, this is certainly how it appears to many scholars.) Sandel, in his Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), argues that Rawls has presupposed a controversial and defective theory of self-identity: a conception of unencumbered self who can choose to attach to any community at will. Sandel argues instead that personal identity is at least partially constituted by his communal ties and the values he is committed to. Later Rawls moves towards a political conception of liberalism which eschews controversial doctrines, tries to be neutral towards different comprehensive theories, and builds the just political order upon the overlapping consensus alone (Rawls 1980, 1985). This culminates in his Political Liberalism (1993).
Sandel once again responded. His critique of Rawls’ political liberalism is summarized in a new chapter in the second edition of his Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1998). His major criticisms are threefold: (i) when we deal with some serious moral issues like abortion and slavery, it is impossible to be completely neutral towards controversial moral or religious doctrines; (ii) a kind of reasonable pluralism also exists in the debate concerning the proper understanding of “justice”; (iii) the restriction of public political discourse to the overlapping consensus will make it impoverished. His Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (1996) is also a response to Rawls, and at the same time a defense of his favoured version of communitarianism, civic republicanism. Rawls now justifies his political liberalism mainly by claiming that it is implicit in the American political culture. Sandel (1996) contains a rich analysis of the history of American politics, the burden of which is to show that the liberal tradition has led to various problems, and that civic republicanism is also a tradition implicit in the American political culture. This book has provoked a lot of responses from liberals and communitarians alike, which are collected in Allen and Regan (1998), together with Sandel’s response.
In this paper, I will look at the debate between Sandel and the later Rawls, and investigate whether Sandel’s criticisms of Rawls’ political liberalism are valid. I also hope to explore the nature and foundation of the liberal society through these discussions.
论桑德尔与后期罗尔斯的争辩
Kwan Kai-man
香港浸会大学宗教和哲学系
在西方，主流的政治哲学可说是自由主义(liberalism)了，它倾向个人主义，维护人权，提倡民主和有限的政府等等。然而近年无论是在理论界或社会人士中，都有很多人对自由主义不满。新保守主义(neo-conservatism)对自由主义的批评最为激烈，但较能有效地挑战自由主义的论述霸权的，则首推近年异军突起的社群主义(communitarianism)。在这问题上，著名自由主义者罗尔斯(John Rawls)与著名社群主义者桑德尔(Michael Sandel)的争辩很有代表性，也横跨近三十年：罗尔斯在1971年出版了《正义论》，可说带动了接十年的讨论和争辩，也更加巩固自由主义作为主流论述的地位。桑德尔在1982年的《自由主义和正义的限制》对罗尔斯的自由主义作出深入的批评，不少自由主义者都奋起响应，罗尔斯对桑德尔的直接响应不是很多，但80年代开始他诠释自由主义的方向已有改变，这重新演绎的成果就是1993年的《政治自由主义》。
早期的罗尔斯较倾向从普遍主义的角度维护一种平均主义的自由主义，因此桑德尔认为罗尔斯已假定了一种“无拘无束的自我观”(unencumbered self)：自我的本质是抽象、普遍的理性主体，可以完全自由选择其目的(包括是否去认同某社群)的。桑德尔指出这是一种富争议性(且有缺陷)的形而上学，和自由主义宣称的中立论(neutralism)背道而驰。今天罗尔斯强调他的自由主义并非一种形而上学，而纯粹是政治的概念。罗尔斯宣称他在《正义论》中不是企图去论证平等权利的存在，而只是将已存在的自由民主制度背后的理念阐释。他提倡要避开任何整全性的理论，而只是透过达成交叠共识(overlapping consensus)，就能建立一个公正的政治体系。很多人认为罗尔斯的政治自由主义可避免了桑德尔早期的批评。
然而桑德尔仍然对罗尔斯穷追猛打，在1996年出版的《民主的不满—美国对公共哲学的追寻》，他从历史角度深入地分析美国的政治传统，指出自由主义的流弊，并正面提倡公民共和主义(civic republicanism)的复苏。自由主义认为自由基本上是指个体能照自己喜好行事，而不受干扰。共和主义则认为自由的精粹在于自我管治(self-government)。在1998年他的《自由主义和正义的限制》发行新版，里面有全新的一章是对罗尔斯的政治自由主义的批判。桑德尔对罗尔斯的政治的自由主义提出三大批评。第一，他认为为了政治的目标而把一些整全的道德和宗教教义的主张放在括号内，并非永远都是合理的。当我们关注的是一些严重的道德问题时(如堕胎和奴隶制度)，在互相竞争的众多道德和宗教教义中，那一个是真的，也是重要的问题。桑德尔的第二个批评是：罗尔斯的政治自由主义的一个基石，就是关于道德和宗教问题，存在合理的多元论这事实。然而关于正义的问题，其实也同样有合理的多元论，那在这方面，对或正义的问题(the right)与善的概念(the good)是一样的，那如何能说对优先于善呢？桑德尔的第三个批评则指出，若在公众的政治论述中，我们只能诉诸所有合理的公民都能接受的政治价值，这只会使政治论述贫乏，及排斥了公众思考的一些重要向度。
桑德尔的《民主的不满—美国对公共哲学的追寻》引起不少回响，这些都收集成书，里面有不少自由主义者对桑德尔的响应，也有桑德尔的回复。本文会集中介绍桑德尔与后期罗尔斯的精采论争，及评论桑德尔对罗尔斯的政治自由主义的批评能否成立。透过这些讨论，我希望可进一步探索自由社会的本质和基础。
Nation-Building and Minority Rights
Will Kymlicka
Department of Philosophy, Queen's Univeristy, Canada
Western states today exhibit a complex pattern of nation-building constrained by minority rights. On the one hand, Western states remain "nation-building" states: all Western states continue to adopt the sorts of nation-building policies to promote a common national language and identity. On the other hand, these policies are increasingly qualified and limited to accommodate the demands of minorities who feel threatened. Minorities have demanded, and increasingly been accorded, various rights which help ensure that nation-building does not exclude or assimilate immigrants, or undermine the self-government of national minorities and indigenous peoples. These rights often take the form of `multiculturalism' for immigrant groups, and of multination federalism or territorial autonomy for national minorities and indigenous peoples. What we see in the West, therefore, is a complex dialectic of state nation-building (state demands on minorities) and minority rights (minority demands on the state). I believe that this emerging dialectic of nation-building and minority rights is morally justifiable in principle, and in many cases is working well in practice. Modest forms of nation-building promote legitimate liberal-democratic values of justice and democracy, but have historically imposed injustices on minority groups. The rights increasingly accorded to immigrants and national minorities serve to protect them from the injustices that would otherwise arise as a result of state nation-building. The resulting package of nation-building and minority rights often represents, I believe, a fair balancing of interests, and is an improvement on earlier ways of regulating diversity in Western societies. I will conclude with some speculations about the possible relevance of this nation-building/minority rights model for other countries around the world.
民族国家建制与少数民族的权利
威尔·基姆利卡
加拿大女王大学哲学系
当代的西方国家表现了一种被少数民族权利限定的复杂的民族国家建制模式。一方面，西方国家仍然是民族建制的国家：所有的西方国家都继续采纳一种鼓励一致的共同民族语言和民族认同的民族国家建制政策。另一方面，这些政策不断地受到限制以容纳感受到威胁的少数民族的要求。少数民族提出了并且被给予了各种权利，这些权利有助于确保民族国家建制不会排除或同化移民群体，也不会从根本上损害少数民族或土著群体的自治。这些权利常常对移民群体表现为“文化多元主义”的形式，而对于少数民族或土著群体则表现为多民族联邦制或地方自治。因此，我们在西方国家所看到的，是在民族国家建制（国家对少数民族提出要求）和少数民族权利（少数民族对国家提出要求）之间的一种复杂的辩证法。我相信，这种在民族国家建制和少数民族权利之间显露的辩证法在原则上是正当的，并且在许多情况下也实践得很好。温和的民族国家建制支持了民主-自由这种合法的正义价值观，也促进了民主政体，但就历史而言确实把不义强加给了少数民族群体。那些被不断给予移民群体和少数民族的权利有助于保护他们免受不义，而如果不是这些权利，不义往往就会作为民族国家建制的结果出现。我确信，民族国家建制和少数民族权利之间的这一揽子交易常常表现了利益之间的一种公正的均衡，也是西方社会调整多元性的较早方式的改进。结尾我将推测对于世界上其它国家而言这种民族国家建制-少数民族权利模式的一些可能的现实意义。
On What Can't Be Replaced: Compensation, Security, and the Rule of Law
Melissa S. Lane
King’s College, Cambridge, UK
The paper begins by constructing an extension of Locke’s argument that individuals would be permitted to punish in the state of nature. Because punishment cannot be expected fully to deter all crime, harm done wrongly to individuals needs also to be addressed outside the framework of punishment. Individuals should therefore also in the state of nature be permitted to exact compensation for injury from one another.
From a consequentialist perspective, the ultimate purpose of both punishment and compensation is the same: the prevention of unwarranted and unnecessary harm. However, both of these state of nature mechanisms are essentially backward-looking: they do nothing to prevent harm (except insofar as they deter). Moreover, both mechanisms rely implicitly on an idea of fungibility: my unwarranted suffering can be redressed by yours (punishment) or compensated for by some good (compensation, typically by money). This means that people can and often will suffer harm in the state of nature the effects of which continue to impair their physical or psychological functioning.
Establishment of a state can and should address both of these features of the state of nature. Unlike an individual, the state may be invested with a forward-looking duty to protect individuals against even compensateable harm; if so, it follows that it must be more than a minimal state in Nozick’s sense, as simply enforcing rights and punishing where necessary will not provide either the resources or the wherewithal to prevent such harm. Such a duty will be even more important in cases of uncompensateable harm, for example, deprivation of adequate education: one can’t fully compensate someone in any meaningful sense for the manifold disadvantages s/he will suffer from such deprivation. In such a case, the fact that something is irreplaceablely valuable supports a duty to provide it. (Contrast the case of irreplaceable value in the case of an Old Master picture, where such value provides a reason not to insure it).
These considerations must shape our understanding of the rule of law. For individuals the primary value of the rule of law lies in the security which it provides: it promises that they will be (objectively) secured against harm and therefore can enjoy the (subjective) feeling of security. But such security cannot be enjoyed with only the promise of retrospective rectification and at best a financial pay-off should it be violated. The rule of law therefore implies the duty to prevent harm, not simply by deterring it, but by (e.g.) providing the good deprivation of which would cause irreplaceable damage. Even on a proto-libertarian account of natural rights, the law must embrace duties which go beyond formal mechanisms to substantive provision.
In the final part of the paper (which might be for publication rather than for reading at the conference) I discuss the question of whether such state duty of compensation should be for only socially caused bad luck (as Thomas Nagel has recently argued) or for naturally caused bad luck (as Hillel Steiner has claimed).
论那些不能替代的因素：赔偿、安全保障和法治
美莉莎·S. 莱恩
英国剑桥大学国王学院
本文开始时会扩充洛克的一个论点：在自然状态中，个体将受到惩罚原则的约束。因为不能指望惩罚能制止一切不法行为，那些个体无辜遭受的伤害还必须在惩罚原则之外得到考虑。因而，在自然状态中的个体应当有权因所受的伤害从别人那里索取赔偿。
从影响的视角来看，惩罚和赔偿的最终目标是相同的：预防和避免不正当的和不必要的损害。然而，这两种自然状态的机制本质上都是滞后性的：他们对预先避免损害是无能为力的（除了在它们可以使不法行为不敢被实践的范围内）。并且，这两种机制都含蓄地依赖于一种替代的思想：我所遭受的不正当的损害可以因你受到的惩罚或因一些物资（赔偿物，尤其是金钱）而得到赔偿。这意味着在自然状态下人们可能经常会遭受伤害，而这些伤害是会造成肉体或精神上的损害的。
国家的建立能够并且应当摈除自然状态下的这些特征。与个体不同的是，国家可以被赋予一些前瞻性的责任来保护个体来避免那些甚至是可补偿的伤害；如果是这样，一个自然的结论就是，国家将不仅仅是洛兹克（Nozick）意义上最低限度的国家，这种国家仅仅确保权利和惩罚的执行，而不能提供避免伤害所需要的资源或金钱。这样一种前瞻性责任对那些不可补偿的损害甚至更为重要，举例来说，对受恰当教育权利的剥夺：对于这种权利的剥夺所遭受的多方面的损害，没有人能在任何实质意义上作出完全的补偿。在这种情况下，有些东西具有不可替代的价值这一事实论证了提供这些东西的责任。（相反，在古代名家的作品中，这些东西具有的不可替代的价值恰恰成为不必提供这些东西的理由）。
上述考虑必然会影响我们对法治的理解。对于个体来说，法治的首要价值在于法治所提供的安全保障：法治承诺说，个体们将客观地受到保护以避免受到损害，因而个体们主观上将具有安全感。然而，如果仅仅承诺一种溯及既往的矫正，或者至多承诺在安全被侵扰时的经济上的补偿，仍然不能使人享受安全。因此，法治意味着不仅仅通过制止不法行为来避免伤害，而且（例如）通过提供某些利益来避免伤害，而对这些利益的剥夺则会导致不可弥补的损害。甚至在原始的意志自由主义者对自然权利的论述中，法律所必须包括的责任应当不仅仅是形式的机制，而且具有实质性的规定。
在本文的最后部分（这一部分，或许较之在会议上宣读而言，更适宜于出版），我将讨论这样一个问题：国家所承担的补偿责任应当是只针对社会原因导致的坏机遇呢（如托马斯·纳格尔Thomas Nagel最近所主张的），还是应当针对自然原因促成的坏机遇呢？（如希尔·斯泰勒Hillel Steiner所宣称的）。
Good Governance and Cultural Pluralism
Leung Man To
Department of Public and Social Administration
City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
In recent years, a common concern among political theorists is to attempt to find out a third way of organizing political, social and economic affairs in modern societies. This papers attempts to contribute to the discussion by exploring the notion of good governance and its relationship with cultural pluralism. The notion of good governance has attracted scholarly attention since it was introduced by the World Bank and other multilateral institutions as a criterion in judging which developing country is eligible for their aid programs. But the way by which the notion of good governance is used by the West is criticized as a form of cultural imperialism. Through the notion of good governance the paper argues from a theoretical point of view that as there is no single best way to govern, what we need to find out is many “third ways” rather than the third way. To acknowledge this is to accept the significance of de facto cultural pluralism.
Section I of the paper examines the concepts of governance and good governance. It explains why these notions may be used in normative study of how to organize modern societies. It identifies different elements in the concept of good governance. By making a distinction between various dimensions of good governance, it points out that compared to human rights and democracy, good governance is a better candidate for building up a basic platform for the dialogue between Western and non-Western worlds. Then it examines in what way the immensurability of values that exists among different cultures determines how different models of good governance may be plausibly maintained in different cultures.
One of the “third ways” is a Chinese way. The second section first explores the potential that Chinese philosophical traditions may contribute to the construction of a theory of good governance in the Chinese context. It then identifies the roles that different kinds of governance agencies play in achieving good governance. It concludes by providing a theoretical framework for further development in theories of citizenship, democracy and justice that draw inspirations from both Western and Chinese traditions.
良好治理与文化多元主义
Leung Man To
香港香港城市大学社会与公共管理系
近年来，政治学者们的一个共同的关注点就是在现代社会寻求组织政治的、社会的和经济事务的第三条道路。本文试图通过考察良好治理的观念以及它同文化多元主义的关系来促进这种讨论。自从世界银行和其它多边组织将良好治理观念引进来作为评价发展中国家是否有资格获得它们的援助项目的一条标准之后，这一观念吸引了学界的关注。但是，西方社会使用良好治理这一观念的方式经常被批评为文化帝国主义的一种形式。通过良好治理这一观念，本文将从学理上论述下述观点：由于没有唯一的最好治理方式，我们需要寻求的与其说是“第三条”道路，不如说是“许多”第三条道路。承认这一点就意味着接受事实上的文化多元主义的重要性。
本文的第一部分将考察治理和良好治理的概念。它将解释为什么在如何组织现代社会的规范研究中使用这些概念。它将鉴别在良好治理概念中的不同因素，也会指明：相比于人权和民主政治而言，良好治理的观念更适合于用作建立西方世界和非西方世界对话的基本平台。然后文章将考察存在于不同文化中的种种价值观之间的不可公度性是以什么方式规定下述情况的：在不同文化中，良好治理的不同模式是有理由维系下去的。
这诸多的第三条道路之一就是中国式的道路。本文第二部分首先考察在中国的特定处境下，中国哲学传统有助于建立一种良好治理理论的可能性。然后文章将鉴别在取得良好治理的过程中不同的治理机构所发挥的作用。本文结尾将为公民理论、民主理论和正义理论的进一步发展提供一个理论框架，而这种进一步的发展将从西方和中国的传统中受惠。
Marx, Justice, and Capitalism:
"Subjective" and "Objective" of Marx and Morality
The Relevance of Thomas Nagel
Hon-Lam Li
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Marx thinks that capitalism is filled with alienation, unfreedom, misery, insecurity, and sickness. Yet, does Marx think that capitalism is an unjust system? The best scholars are evenly divided on this issue. Allen Wood relies on strong textual evidence to argue that Marx regards capitalism as just. Ziyad Husami and G. A. Cohen argues that, for Marx, capitalism is unjust, because Marx describes capitalist exploitation as "theft," "robbery," "snatching" etc. Still, Richard Miller proposes that, for Marx, capitalism is neither just nor unjust because justice, being described as "social phlogiston," does not exist.
I argue that each of these views is only an aspect of Marx's view. Marx has said inconsistent things, which amount to internal inconsistency. But Marx is inconsistent in an illuminating way. Relying on Thomas Nagel's theory that nearly all philosophical problems arise out of the clash between our subjective and objective standpoints, I show that Marx's inconsistency is also due to the clash between his objective and comparatively subjective views. As a historical materialist and an economist, Marx has always considered himself to be a scientist. It is from the detached standpoint of science that Marx views morality as a social product, whose content must be explained functionally in terms of its relation to the economic structure and the development of the productive forces as well as the ruling class interest. On the other hand, with the possible exceptions of a few Taoists or monks for whom nothing matters, perhaps no one else can consistently views moral matters from such as detached viewpoint, least of all a hot-blooded, even angry, revolutionary such as Marx. It is no wonder that Marx regards capitalist exploitation as "robbery," "theft," "snatching," etc. Since capitalist exploitation is lawful in capitalism, Marx must have meant "robbery" in an extra-legal sense. And what other sense could it be but the moral sense. To say that exploitation is robbery in the moral sense is to say that it is unjust, or something very close to injustice. I argue that Nagel's theory of subjective and objective aptly illustrates Marx's inconsistent standpoints.
Finally, I argue that Marx's problem is also our problem. I show that the dispute between the communitarians and the deontological liberals can be cast in terms of viewing morality via different standpoints. The deontological liberals adopt the "impersonal" or moral standpoint, whereas the communitarians take up a more detached standpoint to view the culture, traditions, and social meanings of other types of society.
马克思，正义和资本主义：马克思的“主观的”和“客观的”道德
——托马斯·纳格尔理论的现实意义
Hon-Lam Li
香港香港中文大学
马克思认为资本主义充斥着异化、不自由、悲惨、缺乏安全和疾病。然而，马克思是否认为资本主义是一种非正义的体系呢？在这个问题上，那些最出色的学者间仍存在分歧。茨雅特·胡撒米（Ziyad Husami）和 G. A. 科亨（G. A. Cohen）辩论说，对于马克思而言，资本主义是非正义的，因为马克思将资本主义剥削形容为“偷窃”、“抢夺”、“攫取”等等。然而，理查德·穆勒（Richard Miller）则认为，对马克思来说，资本主义既不是正义的，也不是非正义的，因为被描述为“社会语言”的正义实际上并不存在。
我认为这些看法各自都只是马克思观点的一个方面。马克思的确陈述了前后矛盾的东西，并且是内在地不合逻辑。然而，马克思是以一种启发性的方式这么做的。托马斯·纳格尔（Thomas Nagel）认为：几乎所有的哲学问题都是因为我们的主观的和客观的立场之间的冲突而产生的。依赖于托马斯·纳格尔的理论，我将表明，马克思观点的不一致也归因于他自己主观的和相对客观的立场之间的冲突。作为一个历史唯物主义者和经济学家，马克思一直将自己看作一个科学家。正是从科学的客观立场，马克思将道德看作一种社会产物，道德的内容必须在其与经济结构、生产力的发展和统治阶级的利益的关系中机能地得到解释。另一方面，除了那些认为凡事无关紧要的道家主义者和僧侣等少数可能的例外，或许没有人能以一种一致的方式从如此超然的立场来看待道德事件，更不用说象马克思这样热血的，甚至愤激的革命主义者了。难怪马克思将资本主义剥削看作是“抢掠”、“偷窃”和“攫取”等等。既然资本主义剥削在资本主义制度里是合法的，那么马克思必然是在超法律的意义上来谈论这种“抢掠”的。这种意义只能是道德意义。说剥削在道德上是抢掠等于说剥削是非正义的，或者说是一种非常接近不正义的事情。我认为，纳格尔的主观和客观区分的理论恰当地解释了马克思矛盾的立场。 最后我要论述的是，马克思的问题也是我们的问题。我将表明，在社群主义者和道义自由主义者之间的论争可以解释为从不同的途径来审视道德。道义自由主义者采取了“非人格的”或伦理主义的立场，而社群主义者则采取了一种更客观的态度来审视文化、传统以及其它社会形式的意义。
Confucian Teachings and Democratic Citizenship
Li Mei
Institute of Political Science, CASS
There is no doubt that despite the humanistic spirit, defense of people’s interests and emphasis on civic virtue, the maintenance of hierarchical social structure, the rule of men and the extreme emphasis on family value make a Confucian community different from a democratic society. However, differences do not always mean the opposition, or that the Confucian teachings are antidemocratic. If we understand Confucian teachings not literally, but more liberally, and if we understand democratic citizenship more broadly, that is to say, democratic society involves not only democratic political institution but also other institutional arrangements based on family, neighborhood, village and community life, and if citizenship involves not only legal status of individuals, but also capability of association with others to cope with problems in society, to acquire knowledge, to establish communities of common understanding and mutual trust, then Confucian teachings might have something to say to people who live in a democratic society.
The contribution of Confucian teachings to the conceptualization of democratic citizenship may be in three aspects. First, Confucian doctrine presents a viable alternative, and a challenge, to theories in which individual autonomy is overvalued. It implicitly asserts that there are serious defects in an ideology that emphasizes autonomy at the cost of cooperation. It implies that there is, within any society, a delicate balance between individuality on the one hand and communality on the other; that the development of the self can only be meaningfully sought and attained in a context wherein the common good is also emphasized. Second, Confucian articulation of the negatively formulated Golden Rule (do not do to others what you yourself do not like with) its attitudes of epistemological modesty and ethical humility are especially helpful to preserve broader space of moral choice in a democratic society with multicultural accommodation. Lastly, the Confucian disapproval of legal rationality reminds citizens in democratic society the danger of relying on command and control of Supreme Authority and provides another way of crafting democratic citizenship through evolution of public consensus on morality, common knowledge, mutual understanding, trust and accountability, by means of the rules of propriety. Of course, these possible contributions of Confucian teachings to the conceptualization of democratic citizenship does not mean Confucian teachings are perfect. It only means that through freer understanding of Confucian teachings, some of Confucian ideas are helpful for us to achieve a broader conception of democratic citizenship.
儒家学说与民主社会的公民精神
李梅
中国社会科学院政治学所
毫无疑问，尽管孔子心目中的儒家社会提倡仁政，关心老百姓的利益并且强调社会公德，但是这个社会与民主社会仍然有本质的区别，其主要表现是它维护一种等级制的社会结构，主张人治，以及对家庭而不是个人的极端强调。不过，区别并不意味着两者是一种敌对的关系，也不意味着儒家学说本身是反民主的。如果我们不是从字面上，而更多的从精神上理解儒家思想（主要是孔子的思想），如果我们更宽泛地理解民主社会的公民精神，也就是说，民主社会不仅仅在于其政治制度，更重要的在于它基于家庭、邻里、村庄以及社会的制度安排，而公民也不仅仅意味着个人的一种法律上的身份，公民精神更多地指民主社会的公民有能力在社会中联合起来，共同处理面对的问题，获得知识和共识，取得相互信任，解决矛盾和冲突，或许儒家学说（主要是孔子的思想）对于生活在民主社会中的人们还是会有所启发的。
儒家学说对于我们理解民主社会的公民精神的帮助主要体现在三个方面。首先，儒家学说对于过分强调个人自主性的理论提出了挑战，它认为如果过分强调个人而忽视合作，将会对社会造成损害。它隐含着这样一种思想，就是任何时候，保持个人与社会之间的适度平衡都是极其重要的，个人完善只有在社会中，与社会生活联系起来，并且是在同样强调公共利益的基础上，才有可能。其次，孔子所提倡的“恕”，所谓“己所不欲，毋施于人”，以及与此相联系的儒家学说所体现的认识上以及伦理上的谦逊态度，对于生活在多元文化与价值观念的民主社会的人们保持一种道德选择的广泛性，非常富有助益。最后，孔子反对以纯粹的法律理性来统治社会，如果这样做，人们总能找到机会逃避法律的制裁，从而丧失羞耻心。这提醒民主社会中的人们，如果仅仅依赖国家权力的命令与控制，而不是依靠公民自己在与他人的合作过程中对道德、责任、知识、公共利益等问题逐渐形成共识，民主社会的公民精神就会丧失。
An outline of philosophy of the oriental neo-communitarianism
Li Pengcheng
Institute of Philosophy, CASS
This paper will present an idea of the oriental neo-communitarianism in political philosophy. It will be an investigation of fundamental ideas in political philosophy available to construction of socialist market economy.
The conception of the oriental neo-communitarianism represents ethical commitment and ideally political support which will be fit for and pursue socialist market economy.
The conception of the oriental new-communitarianism relies on acknowledge, reflection and reform to traditional Chinese ideology of ethics and politics.
It will argue for the ethical-political significance of massive unconsciousness in Chinese culture which is so-called identity and acknowledge of relatives.
It will describe a method which pursues transformation from traditional family collectivism to modern idea of community. It also involves abandonment of family and construction of the neo-community.
It will research ethical foundation of market economy in general as well as in China.
It will investigate impact of market on ethical ideas of neo-community and concepts of agents in market and of inter-agents.
It will research influence and demand of ethics in market to one in politics. It will also research the transformation of definitions from market agents to political agents. It will bring up the political idea of neo-community.
The conception of neo-community will be an investigation and absorption and abandonment of modern western philosophy of politics.
The conception of neo-community will show a common field and life in China market economy in the future.
“东方新社群”理念哲学论纲
李鹏程
中国社会科学院哲学所
1，本文提出“东方新社群”的政治哲学理念。力图以此理念探索与中国社会主义市场经济的建设和完善过程相适应的政治哲学的基本理念系统的建构。
2，“东方新社群”理念表示一种符合并且促进社会主义市场经济的伦理承诺和政治理念支持。
3，“东方新社群”理念立足于对中国传统伦理-政治思想的承认、反思和改造。
4，论证中国文化“集体无意识”中的伦理-政治内容——“亲情认同”与“亲情认可”。
5，描述促进传统家族集体主义向现代“社群”新理念转型的方法。“家”原型的扬弃与“新社群”的建构过程。
6，探讨一般市场经济的伦理基础和中国市场经济的伦理基础。
7，考察市场经济对“新社群”伦理观念形成的促进。关于市场行为主体的概念。关于主体间性的概念。
8，考察市场伦理对政治伦理的影响和要求。探讨市场主体和主体间性的若干规定向政治行为主体和主体间性的衍化。“新社群”政治理念的产生。
9，“新社群”理念对西方现代政治哲学理念的考察、吸收和扬弃。
10，“新社群”理念未来历史进路的展望。中国市场经济条件下的公共领域和公共生活。
经济转型中的社会正义问题
李 强
北京大学政治系
最近二十多年来，西方政治哲学关于社会正义的讨论一般都集中在分配正义领域，其关注的核心问题是：在权利平等基础上产生的社会收入不平等在多大程度上是可以接受的，应该以何种理论作为评价的基础与判定的标准。罗尔斯的正义理论、诺齐克的权利观念、德沃金基于平等的正义观念、以及经济自由主义在功利主义基础上对社会收入不平等的接受都属于这一类型。这种对分配正义的关注更多地反映了西方发达市场经济国家的社会现实，是针对这些国家的社会政治政策提出的。 对于前苏联、东欧、以及中国等从国家所有制向一定程度的私有制转化、从计划经济向市场经济转化的国家而言，社会正义还有一个、更为重要的层面，即在最初将公共财产转化为私人财产中的社会正义问题。这一问题涉及私有财产的起源、性质、限度及其合法性问题。
本文拟从洛克的财产理论出发，考察西方自由主义传统中的财产理论，从而集中探讨最初将公共财产转化为私人财产中的正义问题。本文试图指出，最初将公共财产转化为私人财产时，最重要的原则应该是平等原则。公共财产应该在私有化过程中尽可能公平地分配给社会全体成员，或以合理的价格在公平竞争的基础上公开出售。 本文试图指出，前苏联与东欧在私有化过程中财富被少数寡头掠夺的情形以及中国目前改革中管理阶层掠夺公共财富的情形从根本上违背了自由主义的社会正义原则。
A Dialogue between Kant and Confucius (and Mencius)
Concerning Human Rights
Lin Yu-sheng
University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA &
Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
This paper explores the Confucian and the Kantian argument for moral autonomy respectively. It then elucidates the reasons as to why the Kantian argument for moral autonomy directly leads to a claim for human rights, whereas the effects of the Confucian argument in terms of benevolence not only does not give rise to a conception of human rights but also, from the Kantian perspective, often nurtures inequality and even servility.
From the Confucian perspective of inward transcendence, however, serious problems arise out of Kant’s rigorous bifurcation of the noumenal and the phenomenal world, upon which he argues for his idea of moral autonomy and human dignity, which inherently give rise to human rights.
During Kant’s advanced years, he came close to a conception of divine immanence in the soul of man. This brings Confucianism and Kantianism much closer. We can thus maintain that human rights do not have to be argued exclusively in terms of Kant’s bifurcation. The rest of the paper argues for the case that, while the main thrust of Confucian intellectual resources did not establish systematically a rigorous conception of human rights in the past, certain implicit notions and practices of rights and human rights are discernible in the Chinese tradition. They can provide, if recognized and accentuated, resources for developing a full-fledged modern Chinese conception of human rights with reference to its Western counterparts.
康德和孔子（和孟子）在人权上的对话
林毓生
美国威斯康星-麦迪森大学
本文先分别考察孔子和康德对道德自律的论述。然后将解释为什么当康德的道德自律的观念直接发展为对人权的肯定的时候，孔子的“仁爱”观念不但没有给出一个人权的概念，而且从康德主义的视角看来，还导致了不平等甚至是奴役。
然而，从儒家的内在超越的视角看来，康德在本体世界和现象世界之间严格的二元划分也导致了严重的问题，而正是这种二元划分才内在地导致人权论述。
在康德晚期，他接近了一种关于人的精神的神圣内在性的观念。这使得儒家学说和康德主义亲近了许多。我们因此可以主张说，人权并不一定非得以康德二元划分的术语来论述。文章然后将论证说：尽管在过去儒家学说的理论资源的主要倾向并没有系统地建立一个严格的权利和人权概念，在中国传统中，一些含蓄的权利和人权概念和实践是可以辨认出来的。如果被肯定和强调的话，它们能够为发展一种成熟的中国式的现代人权概念提供资源，而这种中国式的现代人权概念将关涉到它在西方社会的对应物。
Four Varieties of Ideology
Christopher Lord
Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
(Note: adapted from my book, Politics, Charles University Press, 1999, which is a general theory of politics and which I am teaching as a one-semester philosophical introduction to politics at the Philosophy Faculty of the same university.)
The term 'ideology' was originally a technical term in French philosophy,
referring to a projected science of ideas. Since then, it has acquired a political
meaning, and is generally understood to refer to such bodies of ideas as fascism,
liberalism, feminism and so on: that is, to more or less organized systems
of political ideas.
In my analysis, the term is defined even more generally as representing one
aspect of the political programme. The other aspect analysed is that of institutions.
Politics, in other words, is seen as the intersection of ideology and institutions.
From this it follows that a theory of politics should consist of a theory
of ideology, a theory of institutions, and a theory of their intersection.
The first of these is attempted here.
As a preamble, it is necessary to state some assumptions of the theory. It
is assumed that all human societies have some form of power-structure - that
this is inherent in human society. However, there is no attempt to reduce
this to some fundamental or primitive type of power, since it seems that there
are radically different types of power-structures (theocratic, imperial, capitalistic...)
in different types of society. The concept of a power-structure is used to
construct a logical typology of ideologies, in the following manner.
1. The CRITICAL type of ideology is the simplest. It posits only the existing
configuration of power relations in society. It criticises the existing system,
but proposes no alternative. The example used to illustrate this type is that
of the anti-communist front organizations of Czechoslovakia at the time of
the Velvet Revolution in 1989 - movements which clearly failed to come up
with any alternative model of society to the one they were attacking.
2. The ACTIVE type of ideology posits some future configuration of power relations.
This imports something new, and included in this category would be all revolutionary
movements, ethical movements, etc. The example used is the revolutionary Islam
of Ayatollah Khomeini.
3. The MONOLITHIC type of ideology posits only itself. This is the ideology
if the static society, and the example used is the ideology of the Chinese
Emperors - say of the Han or the Tang.
4. The REACTIVE type of ideology posits the ideological complex in relation
to itself. Examples are found in the Republican and Democratic parties of
the USA.
From no. 4 it is seen that a new term is introduced - the ideological complex.
While the examples given approach logical simplicity, it is argued that all
real political configurations will exhibit features of all four types of ideology,
at least in the modern world. So real ideologies are complex.
The relationship between these types or aspects of ideology is briefly analysed,
and in particular it is seen that a political programme can start off as being
predominantly conditioned by one variety of ideology, and soon be transformed
through the practice of politics into an expression of another variety. The
mechanisms of this process are exposed.
意识形态的四种类型
克利斯托夫 · 洛德
捷克查理士大学
（按：本文源自我的著作《政治学》（查理士大学出版社 1999），那是一个政治学的一般理论，我正在该大学哲学系将之作为一个为期半年的政治哲学导论进行讲授。）
“意识形态”一词最初是法国哲学中的一个专门术语，指研究观念的一门科学。从那时起它就获得一种政治涵义，一般被理解为诸如法西斯主义、自由主义和女权主义等等观念体系：也就是说，或多或少的有系统的政治观念体系。
在我的分析中，该术语被更宽泛地界定为政治架构的一个方面。被分析的另一个方面是政治制度。而政治呢，用别的话说，就是意识形态和政治制度的交叉。因此，一种政治理论应当包括一个意识形态理论，一个政治制度理论和它们的交叉的理论。本文分析了第一部分。
作为导言，有必要陈述该理论的一些公设。一个公设就是，所有的人类社会都有某种形式的权力结构，这是人类社会固有的。然而，本文并没有试图将这些权力结构还原为一些基本的或原初的权力类型，因为在不同的社会类型中，似乎存在完全不同的权力结构类型（如神权主义的，帝国主义的，资本主义的……）。权力结构的概念被用来以如下方式构成意识形态的一个逻辑上的类型学。
1、意识形态的批判类型是最简单的一种。它只论断社会中现存的权力关系的结构。它批判既存体系，然而却不提供替代方案。表现这种类型的例子就是在1989年捷克斯洛伐克革命（the Velvet Revolution）中反社会主义前线组织的意识形态，显然那时的革命运动没有找到任何他们所攻击的社会的任何替代模式。
2、意识形态的主动类型设定了权力关系的一些未来结构。这引进了某些新的因素，而一切的革命运动和伦理运动都可能包括在其中。所使用的例子就是阿雅托拉·霍梅尼（Ayatollah Khomeini）的伊斯兰革命。
3、意识形态的单一类型只设定自身。这是静态社会的意识形态。例子就是中华帝国如汉帝国和唐帝国的意识形态。
4、意识形态的反应类型设定了在其自身关系中的意识形态复合体。这种类型的例子在美国的共和党和民主党中可以找到。
从第四种类型中，意识形态复合体这个新的术语被引入了。虽然列举的例子具有逻辑上的简洁性，本文论述说，至少在现代世界，所有的实际政治结构都表现出四种意识形态类型的特征。所以，实际的意识形态是复杂的。 这些意识形态的类型或方面之间的关系得到了简要的分析，特别地，很明显的是，被一种居于主导地位的意识形态类型所界定的政治架构是能够运作的，而在实际政治实践中，又可能很快转变为另一种类型的意识形态。本文也分析了这种转变过程的机制。
Public Reason And Democracy
Lu Feng
Department of Philosophy
Tsinghua Universtiy, Beijing, China
Kant thinks that all that is needed for Enlightenment is freedom to make public use of one’s reason. John Rawls thinks that reasonable pluralism is a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy, but people in a society must have public reason to reach an unanimity in the political level in order to have a just society. Public reason is public in three ways: it is the reason for public; its subject is the good of the public and matters of fundamental justice; and its nature and content is public. Rawls’ political level can ensure peaceful cooperation to develop economy among citizens who hold profoundly different comprehensive doctrines. But it can not ensure peaceful internal cooperation to deal with the global problems. Rawls claims that his theory about justice is objective, but his objectivity is only impartiality. Even the objectivity in this sense depends on people’s certain virtues such as sincerity. To draw some ideas from Rawls’ political philosophy, I think we must try to cultivate democratic citizenship and foster democratic political culture in order to further democratization in China. To do this we have to finish the task of Enlightenment in China. And the motto of Enlightenment in China can still be summarized as: “Have courage to use your own understanding.”
公共理性与民主
卢 风
清华大学哲学系
康德认为启蒙所需要的自由，就是公开地运用自己理性的自由。个体若有勇气公开地运用自己的理性，即可成为成熟的自主的人。罗尔斯认为，公共理性即民主社会里平等公民们的理性，他们运用公共理性去颁布法律、修正宪法，从而行使最终的政治权力。罗尔斯认为，信仰的多元性并不是暂时的历史现象，而是民主社会的永久现象，是民主政治文化的一部分。在民主社会不可能有统一的综合性信仰。所以在民主社会所能谋求的统一只能是政治层面的统一。公民可运用公共理性而达到政治上的一致，从而保证持不同信仰的、平等的、理性的个人之间的和平协作。罗尔斯的政治哲学既是对现代西方民主政治的理论提炼，又为评价现代政治提出了评价标准。但罗尔斯的理论未能超出人类中心主义的眼界，用罗尔斯的理论无法应对今天的全球性问题，例如，用罗尔斯的理论无法理解非人动物的价值和权利问题，因为非人动物无法进入在“无知之幕”遮蔽之下的“初始位置”。罗尔斯认为他的正义论具有客观性，但他所说的客观性只是无偏私的公正性，即便为达到这样的客观性也离不开人们的德性，例如真诚。我们可借鉴康德和罗尔斯的思想去思考中国的社会改革与文化转型。
An Institutional Analysis of the Relationship between Knowledge and Practice in the process of Political Development in China
Mao Shoulong
Institute of Public Administration, Renmin University of China
It is well argued that it is the time of knowledge economy now. But it is still safe to say that it is not the time of knowledge politics at least in China. It still remains a difficult dilemma that whether the development of political institutions can be rationally designed or only naturally evolve. This paper argues that the possible way to resolve this dilemma is innovative learning from foreign countries' experiences and innovative practice in a open public realm in China. Stating specifically, political development for China is very complicated, it is beyond human capability to understand the whole process, let alone design the whole process for a so big country.
The paper will discuss two typical ways of political development. England is a successful case of institutional evolution, USA is a successful case of institutional design. Both of them succeeded in the development of political knowledge and institutions. It is undesirable for China to copy England model for it will last too long time. It is impossible for China to copy USA model for a lot of experiences in developing countries indicate that American model is untransplantable for other countries. Copy is impossible, but innovative learning and practice are possible.
How to carry on innovative learning in China? There is no best or standard way, because knowledge for political development is complicated and has close relationship with complicated facts in specific location and time. Innovative learning needs an open realm for learning according to respective needs and available human resources and budget constraints. Open and innovative practice based on innovative learning is a possible way for sustainable political development.
The partial success of village democracy development in China is a typical case for the open and innovative practice based on innovative learning. In current China, it is very important for Chinese scholars to enlighten Chinese people for political development. But the more important is that Chinese scholars should know the limited role of scholarship in the process of political development. The most important for China is how to provide an open public realm to productively develop and allocate practical political knowledge for sustainable political development. In this situation, institutions do matter.
从中国政治发展的进程透视知识与实践的制度基础
毛寿龙
中国人民大学行政管理学研究所
一般都认为，现在已经进入了知识经济的时代。但现在我们还不能说人类已经进入了知识政治的时代，至少在中国是如此。对于中国来说，政治制度能够理性设计还是只能自然演进，这依然是一个非常困难的论题。本文认为，解决这一难题的可能途径是创造性地学习他国的经验，并在开放的公共领域进行创造性的实践。具体地说，中国政治发展的进程是非常复杂的，人类的能力不可能完全理解这一进程，更不用说为其设计一个完美的政治发展进程了。 论文将讨论两种政治发展的实例。英国的政治发展是制度演进的事例。美国是制度设计的事例。英国和美国都成功地开发了适当的政治知识，并实现了政治制度的发展。在中国，复制英国，是不可能的。因为它都花费了太长的时间，而且国情也有很大的差异。许多发展中国家的实践也表明，美国的制度是难以复制的。当然，说复制是困难的，并不意味着说创造性的学习和实践是不可能的。 如果在中国进行创造性的学习呢？这显然没有标准的或者最好的方式，因为政治发展的知识是复杂的，与特定时间、特定地点的复杂的事实有密切的关系。创造性的学习需要一个开放的领域，根据不同的需要和能够得到的资源和预算约束来进行学习。以创造性学习为基础的开放的、创造性的实践，是可持续政治发展的可能之路。
在中国，村民自治的部分成功是以创造性学习为基础的开放的和创造性的实践成功的例子。在当前中国，中国学者在政治发展方面启蒙中国人民是非常重要的。但更为重要的是学者应该知道学术在政治发展进程中的作用是优先的。对于中国来说，最为重要的是需要有一个开放的公共领域，来生产性地开发和配置稀缺的政治发展知识，以实现可持续的政治发展。这时，开放性的制度是非常重要的。
Social Justice: Rights, Obligations, and Self-Respect.
Catriona McKinnon
Department of Politics, University of Exeter, U. K.
In contemporary liberal political philosophy, rights-talk dominates. Rights are variously characterised by liberals as permissions, protections, side-constraints, or trumps which attach to individuals, and which constitute the most important social basis of self-respect. An important recent criticism of rights-talk has come from G.A. Cohen, who claims that liberal thinking which makes individual rights prior to obligations of social justice is destructive of an egalitarian ethos, without which egalitarian social justice is impossible. In my paper I show how neo-Kantian emphasis on the priority of obligations to rights in political thinking lends support to Cohen's claim that justice requires an egalitarian ethos fostered and supported from the bottom up, through the way in which members of a liberal society conduct their lives.
The neo-Kantian challenge to rights-based liberalism starts with the reflection that rights are institutional constructs. Rights can only be asserted in contexts containing legal and political procedures which support the assertion of these rights. Given that a right that cannot be asserted is a right that does not exist, no rights exist in contexts lacking this institutional apparatus. Neo-Kantians argue that when rights determine duties, the tail wags the dog. They argue that by taking our obligations to one another as basic, arguments for the construction of rights-supporting liberal institutions can be made in any context.
Making the rights a person has depend on the obligations we owe her makes rights-talk less problematical for left leaning liberals. It allows for an answer to the claim that individual obligations to live in a way supportive of an egalitarian ethos ('the egalitarian obligation') clash with individual rights not to do these things. If obligations determine rights, then when we are subject to the egalitarian obligation we cannot have a right not to meet this obligation.
Nevertheless, it might be objected that another obligation can clash with the egalitarian obligation. But what sort of obligation could this be? Given that fostering an egalitarian ethos does not demand neglecting the duties owed to loved ones, and captures what is owed to strangers, this competing obligation cannot be towards other people. Rather, the only sort of obligation which can clash with the egalitarian obligation is an obligation to oneself. The most important self-regarding obligation from a neo-Kantian perspective is the duty of self-respect. Whether this obligation can clash with the egalitarian obligation depends on how self-respect is characterised. Non-Kantian perspectives which characterise self-respect as a matter of doing better than others will allow room for clashes between obligations of social justice and duties of self-respect. I argue that this conception of self-respect as competitive conflates self-respect and self-esteem. A better conception is closer to the neo-Kantian view that achieving self-respect is a matter of membership of an egalitarian community, and that this membership is cultivated when egalitarian obligations to others are met. On this view, the egalitarian obligation and the duty of self-respect do not clash.
社会正义：权利、义务和自尊
卡特利奥娜·麦金农
英国艾克塞特大学政治学系
在当代自由主义政治哲学中，权利话语居于主导地位。权利被自由主义者们不同地描述为附属于个体的许可、保护、附带约束和助益权，而这些构成了自尊的最重要的社会基础。最近，对权利话语的一个重要批评来自于G. A. 科亨（G. A. Cohen），科亨认为，将个体权利置于对社会公正的义务之上的这种自由主义思想会破坏一种平等主义的道德观念，而缺乏这种道德观念的话，平等主义的社会正义是不可能的。在本文中，我将表明，新康德主义政治思想中对义务优先于权利的强调是如何支持了科亨的观点，科亨认为，（社会）正义要求一种得到无保留鼓励和支持的平等主义道德观念，而一个自由社会的成员就在这种道德观念中指导着自己的生活。
新康德主义对以权利为基础的自由主义的挑战是从这样的思考开始的：权利是一种社会机制的构成物。只有在有法律和政治程序来支持对权利的要求这样一种环境下，权利才能被坚持和断定。一种根本就不能被坚持或断言的权利不是一种现实的权利，在缺乏体制机构的环境下，不存在权利。新康德主义争论说，认为权利规定义务，实际上时顺序颠倒了。他们认为，如果将我们对其他人的义务作为基础的话，对支持权利的自由主义体制的建立问题是在任何环境下都能得到辩护的。
对于自由主义左派来说，使一个人所拥有的权利依赖于被归给他/她的义务这种做法使得权利-话语的问题看起来更少。这种做法也回应了下述论点，这种论点说，个体按照支持一种平等主义道德观念（平等主义的义务）的方式来生活的义务会同个体不如此行为的权利相冲突。如果义务决定权利的话，当我们有平等主义的义务时，我们就不再具有不履行该义务的权利。
不过，仍然可能存在一种反对意见：别的义务或许可能同平等主义的义务相冲突。然而，这可能是什么类型的义务呢？因为鼓励平等主义的道德观念并不要求忽视对那些亲近的人的义务，也不要求忽视对那些属于陌生人的物件的义务，所以，这些竞争的义务不可能是指向他人的。那些可能与平等主义义务相冲突的唯一义务类型是指向自身的义务。从新康德主义的视角看来，最重要的自我指向的义务就是自尊。这种义务是否与平等主义的义务相冲突要取决于自尊是怎么界定的。新康德主义将自尊描述为“比别人做得更好”，而这将为社会公正和个人自尊两种责任之间的冲突留下了余地。我将表明，这种竞争型的自尊概念实际上是混淆了“自尊”与“自负”。一种离新康德主义观念更近的也更好的概念认为，自尊即是一个平等主义的共同体的成员资格，该成员的培养取决于对别人的平等主义的义务之履行。以这种观点看来，平等主义的义务和自尊的责任并不冲突。
The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals
Allan Montefiore
Balliol College, Oxford, &
Centre for European Philosophy, Middlesex University, UK
This is the third time that I have tried to write about the political responsibility of intellectuals. The first was in my contribution to a book of that title, of which, together with the late Peter Winch and Ian MacLean, I was one of the joint editors, and which was the outcome of a long-term project bringing together 'intellectuals' from what was then still known as East and West Europe under the aegis of the Institut für die Wissenschaften von Menschen in Vienna. The second much more recent attempt was that of my contribution to a conference devoted to the work of Peter Winch, which was held in Bristol in September 2000; in that paper I took advantage of the occasion to pick up the threads of a debate which Winch himself had initiated in his Introduction to the 1990 book, in which he criticised one of the arguments central to my own contribution to that book. In the present paper I try to rethink my views on this important and difficult topic from the beginning, as it were, without looking back in any detail to my earlier formulations.
In this paper I take the domain of the political to be that of public policy; and the domain of public policy to be that of such policies as may in principle affect all or any members of the relevant collectivity and which may therefore be said to be of their proper concern. The term 'intellectual' I take to refer to all those who have a committed interest in the truth or validity of ideas.
My first main thesis is that all those who have a committed concern for the truth and/or validity of ideas have a responsibility to see to the maintenance of respect for these norms in the public sphere of whatever the collectivity or collectivities to which they way belong - with the further gloss that this is by definition a political responsibility. The second is that virtually everyone has some sort of committed interest in the maintenance of an overall respect for the norms of truth and validity: that everyone may to that degree be held to have something of the intellectual in them: and that everyone thus has a certain share in the political responsibilities of the intellectual. I seek to support these theses by reference to three types of argument. The first is based on certain typically Kantian considerations, the second on considerations drawn from Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and the third on the writings of Vaclav Havel. Finally, I am brought to recognize that, underlying all this, I have in effect been trying to rehabilitate a version of a normative account of human nature.
知识分子的政治责任
阿兰·蒙特菲尔 英国牛津大学巴利奥学院和米德尔塞克斯大学欧洲哲学研究中心
这是我第三次试图写关于知识分子的政治责任。第一次是为一本同名论著提供的文章，该书是由已故的皮特·温奇（Peter Winch）和伊恩·麦克林（Ian MacLean）与我共同编辑的，它是一个长期项目的结果，与“知识分子”一起构成了当时仍然称做的“东西欧”项目，该项目得到了维也纳的人类学研究所的赞助。第二次是最近的事情，是我对纪念皮特·温奇工作的会议所提交的论文，该会议于2000年9月在布里斯托尔举行。在该论文中，我借此机会重提由温奇本人在他1990年著作的导论中引起的一场争论，他在其中批评了我对该书所提供的文章很关键的一个论证。在本文中，我会从一开始就重新思考我对这个重要而困难的话题的观点，而不去回头再看我原来的论证。
在本文中，我把政治领域看作是公共政策领域；而把公共政策领域又看作是这样一种政策领域，即原则上可能会影响到相关集体的所有成员或任何成员，因而也可以说成是他们的专门兴趣领域。我用“知识分子”这个词，是指那些对观念的真理性或可靠性有着不可推卸责任的兴趣的人。
我的第一个主要论点是，所有那些对观念的真理性或可靠性具有不可推卸责任的人，都有责任处理他们所属的那个或那些集体的公共范围内的主要规范——进一步地说，这就是政治责任的定义。第二个论点是，每个人实际上都对真理性或可靠性的整个规范都有某种不可推卸的责任：每个人都在某种程度上可以被看作是具有某些知识分子的特征；因而每个人都分担着知识分子的政治责任。我试图用三种论证来支持这些论点。第一种是基于某种典型的康德式的思想，第二种是来自维特根斯坦语言哲学的思想，第三种是根据万科拉乌·哈维尔（Vaclav Havel）的论述。最后，我必须承认，在所有这些的背后，我一直努力试图恢复对人性的规范描述。
Equality and Enablement
Jeremy Moss
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics
University of Melbourne, Australia.
Recent debates about equality in political philosophy have typically tried to answer the question "Equality of what?" by reference to one of three distinct positions. These three positions, welfarism, resourcism and Amartya Sen's capability approach all face serious difficulties. My aim in this paper will be to argue that a version of Sen's position offers the most promise, only it must be made to account for the importance of individual preferences if it is to be plausible. In defending my position, which I call equality of enablement, I will also consider recent "prioritarian" objections to equality.
平等与能力授予
杰里米·莫斯
澳大利亚墨尔本大学应用哲学和公共伦理中心
近来哲学中关于平等的论争主要是试图回答“关于什么的平等？”的问题，并求助于下述三种立场之一：福利主义、资源主义和阿马提雅·森（Amartya Sen）主张的能力进路。这三种立场都面临着严重的困难。本文的目的是试图证明，森的立场的一种提法可以提供最好的可能性，然而，这种立场要想完全合理，还必须考虑到个体偏好的重要性。为了辩护我的能力授予平等的立场，我也会考察近来针对平等的来自“强调优先次序派”的挑战
Quality and Equality: the Role of Statesmanship in a Democratic State
Alois Nugroho
Faculty of Administrative Science
"Atma Jaya" Catholic University, Jakarta, Indonesia
To paraphrase Hegel's remark on historicity, Dewey maintains that the task of a philosopher is to solve particular problems that arise in particular situations, very much like that of a lawyer or an engineer. The particular situations to be handled are ones in which the language of the past is in conflict with the needs of the future. Furthermore, Rorty points out that there is an example of such conflicts coming from political experience, that is, the emergence of what he calls "mass democracy". Indeed, democracy has been interpreted as popular sovereignty since John Locke. Such sovereignty has further been delegated and divided into executive, legislative and judicative bodies, following the Trias Politica of Montesquieu and not of Rousseau. The value-assumption of democracy as popular sovereignty is that freedom and equality are good in themselves and that democratic participation in ruling enhances human dignity. Equality really matters in understanding and applying democracy. But, the emphasis on equality could easily neglect another important aspect of democracy, that is, the quality of politicians in general and political leaders in particular. This can happen in a country learning to live in a democratic system as in the case of Indonesia during the recent years. The issue of statesmanship is particularly important due to the fact that the character of "modern democracy" is ever more representational. This amounts to say that the quality of a democracy depends also on the quality of its "human resources", namely, who run the Trias Politica bodies. It is particularly relevant in discussing the issue, Plato's remark that a statesman, if he is to be truly such, must know what the state is and what its life ought to be; otherwise he runs the risk of bringing the state and its citizens to shipwreck and proves himself to be not a statesman but a bungling politician. A truly statesman should not be driven merely by the loyalty to his (or her) own party, ethnicity or religious denomination; instead, he or she should also be driven by the loyalty to the "general will", to the nation as a whole and the human values as well. A truly statesman should not proceed simply on the basis of responsiveness to public opinion. He or she has a responsibility to proceed on the basis of true knowledge (episteme).
品质与平等：民主制国家中政治家的作用
阿罗伊斯·努格罗霍
印度尼西亚阿特玛-甲雅天主教大学管理科学系
为了诠释黑格尔对历史性的论述，杜威主张说，正如法学家或者工程师一样，哲学家的任务就是解决在特定处境中产生的具体问题。在这些所面临的特定处境中，过去的语言与未来的需要彼此处于冲突之中。罗蒂更进一步指出，这些冲突的一个例子就来自政治经验，这种出现的经验他称之为“大众民主制”。实际上，从洛克以来，民主制一直被解释为人民主权。人民主权沿着孟德斯鸠而不是卢梭的“三权分立”模式更进一步被委托和分解为立法机构、行政机构和司法机构。作为人民主权的民主制的价值公设包括：自由和平等本身就是值得追求的；对治理的民主参与能促进人类的尊严。对于理解和实施民主制来说，平等的确至关重要。然而，对民主的强调可能很容易忽视民主制的另外一个重要方面，那就是政治活动家尤其是政治领袖的才能。这对于像近年的印度尼西亚那样正学习在民主体制中生活的国家来说，的确是可能发生的。正因为现代民主制更具有代议制特征，政治家的问题是尤其重要的。也就是说，民主制的品质也同样依赖于它的“人力资源”，也就是那些控制着按三权分立原则建立的政治机构的人。因此讨论柏拉图的下述论点是尤其有现实意义的：一个真正的政治家必须知道国家是什么，国家的生活应当是怎样的；否则他有可能冒险将国家及其公民带入灾难，并证明自己不是一个真正的政治家，而只是一个笨手笨脚的政客。一个真正的政治家不应当仅仅由他对自己的政党、民族或宗教派别的忠诚所驱动；相反，他也应当由他对公意，对作为整体的国家和人类价值的忠诚所驱动。一个真正的政治家不应当仅仅在对公共舆论的反应的基础上行动；他或她有责任依据真正的知识（episteme）来采取行动。
Democracy as a Two-dimensional, Republican Ideal
Philip Pettit
Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, Australia
The state has a coercive power of interference in people’s lives: it imposes taxes, it makes and enforces law, and it punishes law-breakers. How can people be assured that the power of interference which the state possesses is only used, and can only be used, to promote matters of common interest? How can they be assured that the state is there to serve them, not to impose an alien will? The only hope would seem to lie in ensuring that people have an effective power of voice — specifically, a democratic voice — in relation to the state and this paper explores how such a power of voice might be organised. The argument is that it has to be organised on two different dimensions, electoral and contestatory. Electoral democracy is needed to ensure that certain interests get to be identified in a more or less reliable process as matters of truly common concern. And contestatory democracy is needed to guard against the possibility that electoral process, or the process of implementing electoral policy, is manipulated so as to allow sectional or personal interests to be advanced by those in power.
作为二元的、共和理想的民主政体
菲利普·培第特
澳大利亚国立大学社会科学研究院
国家有干涉民众生活的强制性权力：国家强制性地收税，国家制订和实施法律并且惩罚违法者。人们如何保证国家所据有的干涉权力能够且只能被用来促进共同的福利呢？人们如何能保证国家是来为民众服务的，而不是将一种令人憎恶的意志强加于民众之上？唯一的希望存在于确保民众在与国家的关系中有一种有效的发言权力，尤其是一种民主的发言权。本文考察这种发言的权力可能如果构成。本文论点是：发言权必须由两种不同的维度来构成，即选举的和异议的（或争论的）两种维度。需要选举的民主制来保证作为共同的关注点的特定利益在一个或多或少的值得信赖的程序中得到确认。需要异议的民主制来杜绝如下可能性：选举程序或选举政策的实践被当权者操纵从而被用来扩大某些派别或个人的利益。
Normative Individualism and Normative Collectivism
in Political Philosophy and International Ethics
Dietmar von der Pfordten
University Erfurt, Germany
The core question in political philosophy is: What political decisions are justified? In accordance with our weltbild (belief system) we can distinguish four alternatives to answer this question, refering to: god, natural law, communities and individuals. Religious and natural law justifications lost their force to convince on account of their problem in justifying metaphysical foundations and falling prey to the naturalistic fallacy. This holds especially true in international ethics because of the religious and cultural plurality of man and peoples. So I will confine my discussion to the alternatives of normative individualism (e. g. social contract theories) and normative collectivism (e. g. Hegelian theories) and characterise these. We can define
Normative individualism: “All political decisions find their final justification in the agreement, the manifest interests or the concerns of the individuals, i. e. – when one leaves animals to one side – the affected humans, affected by the respective decision.”
Normative Collectivism: “All political decisions find their final justification in the agreement, the manifest interests or the concerns of a political (or at least with political legitimacy conferred) group, i. e. the State, the Nation, the People, the Race, the Society, the City, the Neighbourhood etc.”
To reach ethical ground we have now to find an ethical justification for a decision between normative individualism and normative collectivism. Normative collectivism will e. g. in international ethics more sufficiently back the principles of sovereignty and self-determination and will therefore be hostile to humanitarian intervention and secession, while normative individualism will be hostile to a too rigid principle of sovereignty and self-determination and will back a robust defence of human rights even by humanitarian intervention or secession. The paper will discuss justifications for normative individualism and normative collectivism and present applications according to the decision for normative individualism in international ethics like secession, humanitarian intervention, human rights etc.
政治哲学和全球伦理中规范的个人主义和规范的集体主义
蒂厄特玛尔·冯·普福顿
德国艾尔富特大学
政治哲学的核心问题是：何种政治决议得到辩护？与我们的四种世界图景（信念体系）相应，我们在回答这一问题时能够区分出四种选择，即上帝、自然法、共同体和个人。由于在证明形而上学的基础时所遇到的困难以及为自然主义的谬误所折磨，宗教的和自然法的正当性论证失去了力量。由于人们和民族在宗教和文化上的多元性，这在全球伦理中尤其如此。因此，我会把我的论述局限在两种选择方案内，即规范的个人主义（如社会契约论）和规范的集体主义（如黑格尔的理论），并描述它们的特点。 我们能够将规范的个人主义定义为：“所有的政治决议可以在下述协定中获得其最终的正当性：诸多个体（动物被弃置在一边，指受各自决定影响的人们）清晰的利益和共同的关注。”
规范的集体主义可被定义为：“所有的政治决议可以在下述协定中获得其最终的正当性：即一个政治的（或至少政治上被给予了合法性的）群体，如国家、民族、种族、社会、城邦和社区等等的明显的利益和共同的关注。”
为了获得伦理根基，我们还得为规范的个人主义和规范的集体主义的决定寻求一种伦理上的正当性。在全球伦理中规范的集体主义将足够支持主权和民族自决原则并反对人道主义干涉和人道主义隔离；与此同时，规范的个人主义将反对一种僵化的主权和民族自决原则，并为体现在人道主义干涉和隔离中人权作出了强有力的辩护。本文将考察为规范的个人主义和为规范的集体主义所作的正当性论证，并在全球伦理中为依据规范的个人主义的决议的隔离、人道主义干涉和人权等等提供了申辩。
Economic Justice, National and Global
Thomas Pogge
Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, USA
It is widely thought that citizens, insofar as they have influence on the basic social rules of their society and on the interpretation and application of these rules, ought to use this influence impartially. They should seek to make the social order fair to all citizens, rather than seek to shape it to the advantage of persons of their own social class, gender, ethnicity, religion, native language, or whatever. It follows, in particular, that the more affluent citizens should not use their greater political influence to shift economic institutions in their favor, thereby depriving the poor of the benefits of national economic growth and prosperity. My question is whether a similar duty to impartiality is plausible on the global plane. For example, should the more powerful members of the WTO, now including China, strive for international trading rules that are fair to even the poorest and weakest countries or should they press the interests of their own society without regard to the interests of others? This question is of great significance in our world where, despite enormous progress in China, some 800 million persons worldwide still lack secure access to adequate nutrition.
经济正义：国家的与全球的
托马斯·珀格
美国哥伦比亚大学哲学系
一种广泛地被人们所接受的观点认为：虽然公民对所在社会的基本的社会规则以及对这些规则的解释和应用都产生影响，他们却应当公正地发挥这种影响。公民们应当使得社会秩序对所有的公民都公平，而不是使之仅仅有利于他们自己的社会阶层、性别、民族、宗教、语言或其它。相应地，特别是那些更为富裕的公民们不应当利用其更强有力的政治影响来使经济机制沿着有利于自身的方向改变，从而剥夺了贫困者享受国民经济增长和繁荣所带来的好处。我的问题是：是否在全球的范围内类似的对公正的责任也是合理的？举例来说，世界贸易组织的那些更为强大的成员（现在就要包括中国）是应该为一个纵使对那些最弱小最贫困的国家来说都公平的国际贸易规则而努力呢，还是应当仅仅推进自身社会的利益而不管其它社会的利益？在我们现在的世界，尽管像中国取得了长足的进展，世界范围内仍有约八亿人口缺乏最基本的物质生活保障，所以这个问题是有重要意义的。
The Idea of Democracy in Ancient China
Qian Xun
Humanities College, Tsinghua University
Is there any element of the idea of democracy in the traditional political thoughts in China ? If the answer is affirmative, then ,where is it?
Mo Zi’s theses of the “agreement with the virtuous” and the “agreement with the superiors” cannot be identified with the idea of democracy. Although the doctrine of the “agreement with the virtuous” somewhat contains negative effects to the patriarchal heirachy, it cannot be said to be an idea of democracy. What reflects the essence of Mo Zi’s thought is the doctrine of the “agreement with the superiors”, which requires the unconditional obedience of the whole nation to the ruler, it is indeed a theory which served to an autocratic government. The inner logic of this line of thought was further developed by the Legalists.
The Confucian idea of regarding the people as the foundation of the state (“Min Ben”) cannot also be identified with the idea of democracy. Mencius suggested that people are more precious than the king , Xun Zi proposed a famous analogy with people as the water and the king as the boat floating on it. Both of them had the intention to reinforce the power of the ruler as their starting point and ultimate objective. Huang Zongxi , the famous thinker of the late Ming Dynasty,had criticized and attacked their theses with profound insights.
But all these did not lead to the conclusion that there is not any element of the idea of democracy in traditional China. Shang Yang said that , given that “to rule the world (Tian Xia) in favor of the world ”as a choice, and “to exploit the state and to make use of the power for ones own benefits ”as an alternative to it , the contrast between the two choices (public spirit and selfishness)was just too crucial for the survival of the state.
The chapter “The Tao of Tang and Yu” of the Guodian Findings contends that , it is the core of theTao of Tang and Yu that “to serve the people all over the world without selfish caculations”, which can be said the culmination of benevolence (Ren). This kind of idea that the ruler was appointed to serve the people has some points common to the democratic idea of modern government. It is the quintessence of the idea of democracy in ancient China. But unfortunately ,it was abandoned and forgotten without any development in the later ages.
Two thousands years later, Huang Zongxi restated the idea that the ruler was appointed to serve the people, he also brought to light the essence of the traditional politics which take the whole nation as the private property of the ruler. Confronting with this reality, he suggested that the status of the ruler and the ruled should be changed reciprocally, the ruled should be the host (not guest), and the ruler should be the guest(not host). Huang Zongxi resumed the element of the idea of democracy of the Pre-Qin period , furthermore , his idea that the ruler and the ruled should change their status reciprocally provided a traditional resource with illuminating insights to which we can appeal. We must start (but not retreat) from the position of Huang Zongxi.
关于中国古代民主思想
钱 逊
清华大学人文社会科学院
中国古代传统政治思想中有没有民主思想？如果有，表现在什么地方？
墨子的尚同、尚贤思想不是民主思想。“尚贤”虽有突破宗法等级制，要求政治平等的意义，但并非民主思想。反映墨子政治思想的性质的是“尚同”；尚同的核心是要天下尚同于天子，由天子一同天下之义，本质上是专制主义的。这种思想后来在法家那里得到发展和实行。
儒家的民本思想也不是民主思想。无论孟子的民贵君轻论还是荀子的君民舟水论，都是以巩固君权为其出发点和终极目标。对此黄宗羲早有深刻的批判。
中国古代．不是没有民主思想。商轶曾经提出，是“为天下治天下”还是”擅一国之利，管官之重，以便其私”，这个“公私之交”乃是“存亡之本”。郭店楚简《唐虞之道》也以一“利天下而弗利”释唐虞之道，说“利天下而弗利也，仁之至也。”这种立君为民的思想，与近代政府为民的民主思想是相通的，是古代民主思想的真正所在。只可惜没有得到继承和发展，在以后的发展中被遗忘和抛弃了。
黄宗羲在两千年后重提立君为民的思想，揭露批判了两千年帝国家天下的本质。针对家天下的现实，他还提出君民易位的思想，要求从君为主、民为客，改变为民为主、君为客。他的思想不仅恢复了先秦时期的民主思想，而且其君民易位的思想对于我们今天如何对传统做新的阐释，利用传统资源为民主建设服务，也可以有好的启发。我们应该从黄宗羲的基础上继续前进，而不应该从他那里后退。
Freedom of Expression and the Argument from Truth
Juha Raikka
Department of Philosophy, University of Turku, Finland
The so called argument from truth has dominated the literature of free speech. According to the argument, free speech is particularly valuable because it leads to the discovery of truth. The argument from truth was originally formulated by John Milton and later defended by John Stuart Mill. In recent discussion the argument from truth is discussed for instance by Thomas Scanlon, Kent Greenawalt, Susan J. Brison, Frederick Schauer, Alvin Goldman, C.L. Ten, H.J. McCloskey, Stanley Ingber, J.P. Day, Jonathan Riley and Roger Crisp. In my paper I would like to briefly evaluate some arguments against the argument from truth. In particular, I would like to ask (1) whether the notion of truth in the argument from truth is dependent on an implausible theory of truth, (2) whether the way "free" discussion works in practice contravenes the open market of ideas that the argument from truth assumes, and (3) whether the argument from truth can be rejected simply on the grounds that all consequentalist justifications of free speech are mistaken. The overall aim of my paper is to clarify the discussion around the argument from truth.
言论自由和真理论证
朱哈·赖卡
芬兰图尔库大学哲学系
所谓的真理论证主导着有关言论自由的论述。根据这种论证，自由言论之所以特别有价值是因为言论自由将有助于发现真理。真理论证最初由约翰·密尔顿（John Milton）确切地表述出来，接着又为约翰·斯图亚特·穆勒（John Stuart Mill）所辩护。在最近的论争中，真理论证又被托马斯·斯坎伦（Thomas Scanlon）、肯特·格林瓦尔特（Kent Greenawalt）、苏珊·J·布里森（Susan J.Brison）、弗利德里希·肖勒（Frederick Schauer）、阿里芬·戈德曼（Alvin Goldman）、C.L.腾（C.L.Ten）、H. J.麦罗茨基（H.J.McCloskey）、斯坦雷·英格博（Stanley Ingber）、J.P.德（J.P.Day）、约拿单·瑞里（Jonathan Riley）和罗格尔·克利斯普（Roger Crisp）所谈论。在本文中，我将简要评估那些对真理论证的反对意见。特别地，我将提出下述问题（1）是否在真理论证中的真理概念依赖于一个不那么可靠的真理理论。（2）是否在实践中对“自由”谈论的方式与真理论证所假设的公开言论市场相抵触。（3）是否真理论证能仅仅由下述根据而被拒斥：从结果的角度对言论自由的论证都是错误的。本文的主要目的是澄清围绕真理论证的一系列争论。
From People, Citizen to Voter:
The Connection of Statue of Subjects in Political Affair and Social and Political Situations
Ren Jiantao
College of Politics and Law, Zhong Shan University
People, citizen and voter are key words for modern politics. They are frequently used with high degree in modern Chinese terms of politics. However, unlike the case in the western academic circle, the three words have been not analyzed clearly in Chinese academic circle. They are just used frequently in practical activities in politics. There is no room in researching on their significance, relation and the connection to social and political situations in modern society. However, these words are very key to modern politics and political practice.
1, People as a foundation of validity in politics.
The principle of People’s Sovereignty is one of fundamental principles of modern politics. Rousseau’ theory and early libertarians had both differences and similarities. There has been also a Marxist interpretation of the issue. Thus there have been bipolar trends on the principle of People’s Sovereignty. On the first hand, it is the trend that intends to practice assignments in politics and regards the principle as intelligent guide to those assignments, by laying it on a series of more detailed assignments of political modern systems. On the other, it is the trend that intends to consider the principle to be a non-systematical way of thinking in criticism of existing system of politics and in providing a theory for revolution, and thinks of the principle as a political philosophy of revolution.
The People’s Sovereignty sharpened system and function in two straits of thinking and different arrangements of systems. The concept of people has been out of its significance and fictional with its being descent in capitalism. In contrary, it has been filled with full validity with political activities, i.e. it has been one of the key words in socialist politics, which shows its ascent in politics.
As a whole, people as an abstract concept in politics has two functions: one is the final ground for validity tightly more to modern politics. The other is an appeal for validity of modern politics, especially for validity of criticism of unfair in politics.
The concept of people is used in socialism as following: (1) it is a prior foundation for validity and legitimacy of politics. (2) It is a prior ground for rationality of assignments by the political system without any argument. (3) It is the evident criterion for political practices and policies to be accepted or argued for. (4) It is the natural unity of moral support of political governance and political support of moral embodiment. (5) It is the basic criterion for the effective and ineffective of governance.
2, Citizen as a subject of modern political community.
The problem of confirmation of subjects in modern political community, like the one in ancient time, is a crucial question for possibility of right undertaking of politics. However, the title “citizen” common to the two communities has quite different significance and political goals.
Citizen in the ancient system of political community refers mainly to agents who participate directly in political affair in such a circumstance of uniting ordinary life of politics and political choices. It was the basis where subjects of ancient democracy was born. In such political community, (1) the difference in politics among subjects was neglected, (2) the common was presupposed, (3) the interaction was straight, (4) the social strata was unclear, (5) the self-identity of subjects was out of doubt.
Citizen in modern system of political community was born under different conditions. (1) It is the agent who consists of the distinguished nation-state community. (2) It is products of social divisions and stratum. (3) It is based on differences in politics. (4) It is divergent in self-identity. (5) The interaction among subjects is complicated and the disorder in norms is considered as a normal case.
There are obviously quite differences between ancient and modern self-confirmation and confirmation of political community in citizenship or membership. In the former the confirmation of citizenship was necessary, and it was not difficult to distinguish citizens from slaves. Accordingly, the citizenship was not crucial to shake the political community. However, it is a problem for modern society that the citizenship or membership will effect existence of the political community. Once it is confirmed, it will be in reference to not only trivial arguments in politics but also an amount of legal procedures and changes with which members in different communities bring on self-identity of political community, and the social order with which the changes bring.
With this the ideology of communitarianism and individualism will be more influential on world modern political practice, not only in the priority of subject issue in modern society but also in the future of political practice.
3, Voter as agent of liberal democratic politics.
The debate of priority of a community or an individual in political community between communitarianism and the new liberalism has been involved in a fundamental problem on what expectation in politics will be used for consisting political agents. However there is no difference between them in validity of basic institutions in modern politics. Thus the debate can be transformed into the other one that what statue of agents will be enough to support their political doctrines. In other words, if modern system of liberal democratic politics were presupposed commonly by speakers of politics in the main stream, the problem would be what the supporting agents for this kind of political system should be like.
There might be two alternative ways to the debate. One is from idealism which is respectable, the other from realism which is workable. For the former, idealists would like to argue for moral agents as political agents with stronger feeling of morality, so that it makes political life more energetic with power to lift people up. But idealism is so harm to political practice that it could not work in reality. For the later, realists would like to consider matters in political practice without any stimulation in ideal politics supplied for people. They used to put their political interests in the very issue of how it is possible to consider politics as a relatively fair bargain.
Here was born the problem of voter. A voter is not an independently individual political agent. It is evident that he has some characters such as convergence and dynamic. And it is very significant for liberal democratic politics that the amount of voters is countable. First, in the view of integrality of political agents, it means the normative process in politics from “cut heads” to “press heads” and “count heads”. Second, in the view of structure of political agents, it means disappearance of the agents with energy and appearance of ones with more practice. Third, in the view of interaction of political agents, it means the situation in which a political arrangement with bargain in interests and distribution of powers replaced the simplified connection of interests and powers, and in which the end of political governance and the control of life are unified. Fourth, in the view of expectation in politics of political agents, it means direct connection between the expectation and activities in politics, and transformation from the holy to the worldly in the expectation. Fifth, in the view of attitude of life of political agents, it means that supreme of politics in life is broken through and an agent would like to choose a way of life she likes.
4, Political idea and situation.
No doubt all concepts of people, citizen and voter are fundamental political ideas which grant for modern politics to put into practice without any obstruction. Obviously, these ideas are not just trivial, at least in two ways. Firstly, it is very important for the trend in politics. Secondly, it has more complicated and deep impact on practical way in politics.
It is supported by political ideology formed in twentieth century, in which it is related with political tragedy. The high-key idea of people was married with totalitarism in twentieth century, the acquisition and usurpation of citizenship was related with various debates in politics in the century, and the trend of citizen’s choice and the future of mass politics was connected with evaluation for politics in the century. All these are evidences of closely connection between political idea and situation.
It is of most importance to analyze the fundamental modern political ideas with a long history. And it is also very important to farewell the grand myth of people in the century and to be free from mystery in politics by treating politics as “man”. All these will be crucial to develop politics healthily. Post-myth time will be corresponded internally with a self-determination time.
It is also very important to distinguish citizens as individuation and collectivity of political community, because the nation-states as organs of political practice will united with political trends of individualism and patriotism as well as focus on individual and common virtues with political significance.
The research on citizens as political practical agents should not be a topic in science of politics with more strengthened try in computation. Treatments of voters in the view of normative meaning of political theory will be helpful for us to distinguish formal and material meaning of politics, and to standout brightly differences of qualities in both ancient and modern politics. In doing so, it will be free politics from myth, i.e. from political enchantment to disenchantment. We should consider politicians as professional experts rather than magician with mystery. It also makes politics more active so that every citizen and voter could participate in. By this we can be free from political nightmare which had been based on mystic enchantment in twentieth century.
从人民、公民到选民
——政治活动主体定位与社会政治格局的关联性
任剑涛
中山大学政法学院
人民、公民与选民，均为现代政治学的关键词。在现代汉语政治文化术语中，它们的使用频率也是非常之高的。但是，与西方学术界不同的是，在汉语学术界中，人民、公民与选民这三个现代政治学的关键词，并没有得到很好的学术清理。它们只是在实际运作的政治过程中频繁地使用着。它们的学术蕴涵如何，三者之间的关系怎样，它们与现代社会政治格局之间的关联是否有所不同，都是付诸阙如的学术空白。然而，这些问题却是现代政治与现代政治学不应回避的问题。
一、人民：作为政治正当性的依据
人民主权原则之作为现代政治的基础性原则。卢梭理论与早期自由主义者的趋同与分野。马克思主义的阐释。由此产生人民主权原则的两极走向：倾向于具体的政治化安排，并将该原则作为这种安排的精神导向，而将人民主权原则落实为一系列的现代政治制度安排。倾向于将人民主权原则作为一种批判现成政治制度，并为革命提供理论依据，而将人民主权原则作为一种革命政治哲学的非制度化思绪。 人民主权原则在两种思路制约下形成的、两种不同制度安排条件下的制度及其效用。资本主义条件下人民概念自身蕴涵的虚化以及人民概念的下落走向。社会主义条件下人民蕴涵之填进政治运作的直接正当性内涵的充实：即人民之作为社会主义政治的轴心理念，这一取向表现出的上行特点。
整体而言，人民之作为抽象政治术语的两面功能：一是作为紧贴运行中的现代政治正当性建立的最终依据。二是作为现代政治的正当性诉求、尤其是对于政治不公平进行批判的自我正当化的最终依据。
人民在社会主义情景中的使用：其一，作为政治正当性与合法性的先验性基础。其二，作为政治制度安排合理性不证自明的先验性依据。其三，作为社会政治运作和具体政治举措的获得接受或支持的当然标准。其四，作为政治统治的道义支撑与作为道义化身的政治支撑的自然性统一。其五，作为统治有效与失效的基本判准。
二、公民：现代政治共同体主体的确认
现代政治共同体主体的确认问题，同古典政治共同体的主体确认问题一样，是一个对于政治正当运作如何可能的同等重要的问题。只不过，同样作为两个政治共同体主体称谓的“公民”，则具有相当不同的含义与政治指向。
古典政治共同体意义体系中的公民，主要是指在政治日常生活与政治抉择合一前提条件下，对于政治事务的直接参与者。它是古典民主主体得以诞生的基础。在这样的政治共同体内部，其一，主体间的政治差异性是被忽略的。其二，主体间的共同性是预设着的。其三，主体间的互动性是简单直线的。其四，主体间的社会分层是不清晰的。其五，主体的自我认同问题是没有疑义的。
现代政治共同体意义体系中的公民，则诞生于不同的背景条件。其一，它是界限鲜明的民族——国家共同体的主体构成者。其二，它的社会分工和分层的产物。其三，它是建立在政治差异性基础的。其四，它是具有自我认同歧异性的。其五，主体间的互动是复杂的，规范中的紊乱乃是一种常态。
古典和现代两种状态下的公民资格或成员资格的自我确认与政治共同体的确认之间，是具有重大差异的。前者对于公民资格或成员资格的确认，乃是一个自然而然的问题。在公民与奴隶之间，不存在什么困难的鉴别问题。因此，资格的问题，不是一个足以动摇政治共同体的基础性问题。而对于现代社会来讲，如何成为一个政治共同体的公民，则有一个影响政治共同体存亡的公民资格或成员资格的确认问题。而且这一确认，不仅涉及到烦琐的政治哲学论证，而且涉及到一套烦琐的法律规程、以及不同的政治共同体成员间对于政治共同体认同的变迁和这种变迁带来的社会生活秩序问题。
由此产生的共同体主义（社群主义）与个人主义的意识形态主张，对于当代世界政治生活的影响，绝对不止于面对当代社会应当优先处理的主体问题的先后秩序，而对于政治生活的未来构成，必将产生结构性的影响。 三、选民：自由民主政治的行为主体
社群主义与新自由主义关于政治共同体的社群优先还是个人优先的争论，涉及到一种可行的现代政治，基于什么样的政治期望来设计政治主体的基础性问题。但是，二者对于现代政治的基本制度安排的正当性，是没有绝对分歧的。因此，他们的争论，也就可以转换到什么样的主体状态，足以支持他们的政治论说的问题上来。换言之，假如自由民主的现代政治形式，是一个为主流的政治学言述者所共同承诺的预设的话，那么，问题就是这种政治形式的支持主体，应当是怎么样的问题。
对于这个问题的解答，也有两种思路。一种是理想主义的思路。一种是现实主义的思路。前者可敬。后者可行。可敬是因为理想主义者总是在为具有强烈道德感支持的道德行为主体之作为政治行为主体的底蕴辩护，使得政治生活充满着一种诱引人向上的动力。但是，理想主义对于实际政治是有害的。可行则是因为现实主义者总是在实际政治的运作角度去考虑问题的，它不提供刺激人的政治兴奋剂。它主要将自己的思维兴奋点，落在政治之作为一种相对公平的交易活动如何可能的问题上。
于是，选民问题就诞生了。选民不是一种独立的个体化政治主体，它的趋同性结构特征，它的动态性存在特征，都是显而易见的。至于选民的可以计量性性质，对于自由民主政治来讲，则具有不可小觑的意义。其一，从政治主体的整体特征来讲，它意味着从“砍人头”到“压人头”再到“数人头”的规范政治运动过程。其二，从政治主体的结构特征来讲，则意味着激情性的政治行为主体的退场，务于现实的政治行为主体的诞生。其三，从政治主体间的互动特征上来讲，意味着面对利益交易与权力分配的政治格局取代了权力与利益的简单勾联，以及结束政治支配与性命支配合而为一的局面。其四，从政治主体的政治期望上来讲，则意味着政治期望与政治行为的直接连接，意味着政治期望的神圣品格向世俗品格的转换。其四，从政治主体的生活态势上来讲，意味着政治至上的生活格局被打破，而具有了一种选择自己乐意的生活方式的可能性。
四、政治理念与政治格局
无疑，人民、公民与选民，都是涉及到现代政治顺畅运行的基础性政治理念。显然，这些基础性理念，并不是无关痛痒的。起码在两个方面具有极其重大的影响：其一，对于政治思想的走向影响甚为重大。其二，对于政治的实际运行，产生全面、深刻而持续的制约作用。 二十世纪政治格局形成的政治意识形态背景，可以证明。而二十世纪政治悲剧的出现，也与此连接在一起。高调的人民理念与二十世纪的极权主义的联姻，公民资格的获得与褫夺跟二十世纪的政治纷争的关联，以及选民行为的趋向和大众政治的前途与二十世纪政治所获评价的密切相关，都证明政治理念与政治局面的紧密联系。
对于具有传统渊源的现代基本政治理念的清理具有重大意义。告别二十世纪最伟大的政治神话——人民神话，对于解除政治神秘感，将政治真正放置到“人”的位置上来对待，具有此后政治的健全发展具有关键性的作用。后神时代与自做主宰的时代是具有内在呼应关系的。 对于公民之作为政治共同体的个体化存在状态与集群化存在状态的区分，具有同样重大的意义。因为作为现代政治运作的机体的民族——国家，个人主义与爱国主义的政治走向，与公民个人美德和公共道德的侧重，以及这种侧重具有的内在政治效用，是粘连在一起的。
对于选民之作为现代政治的实际行为主体的研究，不应当是强化计量的政治科学的主题。在规范政治理论的意义上对待选民问题，可以帮助我们区分政治的实质意义与形式意义。可以使得我们将现代政治的特质与传统政治的特质，加以鲜明的凸现。从而，有利于将“巫魅”的政治“祛魅”。将巫魅的政治家放到职业的政治家位置上加以认识。使得政治的实际介入，可以成为公民和选民可以自由介入的活动。从而，真正告别二十世纪建立在巫魅的基础上的政治噩梦。
Some Moral Arguments against Unrestricted Capitalism
Sheng Chin-lai
Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan
In this paper I present some moral arguments against unrestricted capitalism. By unrestricted capitalism I mean the economic system in which entrepreneurs and business people are completely free in dealing with industrial and commercial transactions, with no governmental intervention and regulation at all. This is the ideal society of Robert Nozick, for which he proposed his entitlement theory of distributive justice. I try to argue from a new socialism from a utilitarian theory of distributive justice. And concentrate on criticizing the theory of distributive justice of unrestricted capitalism from moral point of view. In sections following the introduction I examines the issues such as human nature of risk aversion, randomness of the free market, unearned income is unreasonably large, the inadequacy of procedural justice and the necessity of afterward regulation, money can buy power, a properly system conforms to income distribution according to contribution respectively. In conclusion I maintain that unrestricted capitalism is a very bad economic system, at least from the moral point of view. As for how to check, control, or regulate capitalism, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
反对无节制资本主义的若干论证
盛庆琜
台湾淡江大学
我在本文中提出若干反对无节制资本主义的道德论证。无节制资本主义是指这样一种经济制度，企业家和商人在其中可以完全自由地从事工业和商业交易，而根本没有政府的干预和管制。这是罗伯特·诺齐克的理想社会，为此他提出了分配公正的授权理论。我试图从分配公正的效用主义理论来论证一种新的社会主义，我将集中于从道德观点批判无节制资本主义的分配公正理论。在导言后我分别考查了厌恶风险的人性、自由市场的随机性、非工资收入不合理地多、程序公正的不足和事后调控的必要、金钱可购买权力以及按贡献分配收入的正当制度等问题。在结论中我认为至少从道德观点看，无节制资本主义是一个非常坏的经济制度。至于如何节制、控制或调节资本主义，业已超出本文范围。
Liberty vs. Community - A Confucian Perspective on Democracy's Dilemma
Tan Sor Hoon
Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore
Republic of Singapore
The battle cry of the French Revolution, "Liberty”, “Egality”, “Fraternity” was an important inspiration for modern democracies. Liberal democratic theories have emphasized the first two, often at the expense of the third. Communitarian critics of liberalism have often been preoccupied with its neglect of community (which we might say is the contemporary equivalent of, and certainly includes, fraternity. Such criticisms have led to greater awareness of the importance of community among liberals who, however, remain concerned about the potential threat to liberty posed by certain forms of communitarianism.
There is undoubtedly a tension between the values of liberty and community. What is the nature of this tension and how should it be resolved within a democracy? The paper explores these questions from a Confucian perspective.
Many agree that Confucianism is a communitarian philosophy, though there is no consensus on what kind of communitarianism and what are its implications for democracy. Some see Confucianism as inherently anti-democratic because there is no room for individual liberty. I shall argue a different Confucian perspective, focusing on the pre-Qin texts. Although the problematic of liberty vs. community is not germane to pre-Qin philosophical discourse, those texts could still provide a different perspective on this contemporary dilemma of democracy, and perhaps inspire new approaches to deal with the tension between liberty and community.
自由与共同体：从儒家思想视角审视民主制的两难困境
Tan Sor Hoon
新加坡国立大学哲学系
“自由”、“平等”和“博爱”这些法国大革命的战斗口号是现代民主制的一个重要源泉。自由主义的民主制理论常常强调前二者（自由和平等）而忽视了第三者（博爱）。自由主义的来自社群主义的批评经常指责自由主义模式了共同体（我们可以说共同体是博爱在当代的等同物，并且也包括了博爱）。这些批评使得自由主义学者们对共同体的重要性有了更好的认识，当然，这些自由主义学者仍然关注某些社群主义形式对自由造成的潜在威胁。
毫无疑问，在自由和共同体这两种价值之间存在一种张力。这种张力的本质是什么？在民主制系统内这种张力该如何解决？本文将从儒家的视角来考察这些问题。
许多人都同意儒家学说是一种社群主义哲学，然而，在它是什么类型的社群主义以及它对于民主制的含义是什么上并没有达成一致意见。有些人主张儒家思想内在地就是反民主的，因为它没有为个体自由留下空间。通过强调先秦儒家文本，我将论述一种不同的儒家视角。尽管自由-共同体的问题与先秦哲学的论争并不相关，这些先秦文本仍然能够为现代民主制的两难困境提供一种不同的视角，并且可能为解决在自由与共同体之间张力提供新的途径。
Beyond Proceduralism: The Chinese Perspective on Sincerity as Political Virtue
Julia Tao
Centre for Public Policy and Administration
University of City, Hong Kong
Contemporary democratic politics emphasizes voluntary participation by free and equal citizens who make collective decisions on fundamental political questions. This has led to a common concern in contemporary Western democracy theories to derive a standard of procedure to justify the legitimate exercise of political power over citizens of diverse interests and backgrounds. They tend to rely on justification in terms of an ideal procedure of political deliberation as a means to motivate democratic citizens to go beyond private self-interest and to deliberate fundamental questions from the civic standpoint of public interest and public good.
Rawls in particular has argued for an ideal of public reason as a standard of free enquiry and deliberation and also as a moral duty of the democratic citizen. Rawls defines the ideal of public reason as a willingness to listen to what others have to say and being ready to accept reasonable accommodations or alternations in one’s own view. He further argues that a principle of public reason and a conception of political justice are mutually sustaining , and that they constitute the essential foundations for the stability and sustainability of a modern democracy. The former provides the procedure while the latter provides the content which justifies the legitimacy of democratic politics. In Rawls’s views, once the ideal of public reason is firmly established in its citizens’ conduct, it will support a view about voting in the political process as ideally expressing opinions regarding the best alternatives to advance the common good rather than mere personal interests and preferences.
Drawing on resources from ancient Chinese political and philosophical traditions, this paper wants to argue, however, that political justice and public reason are insufficient for justifying legitimacy and grounding a moral duty of civility. Scholars who study the origin, nature and development of the Covenant (Meng) in Ancient China suggest that what actually creates, sustains and legitimates the covenant ( meng) is not so much the content or the procedure of covenant (meng) but the spirit of covenant (meng). In the Chinese Conception, the spirit of covenant (meng) is the spirit of “xin’, faithfulness, or sincerity in following the moral requirements of li (principles) and de (virtue). It is the spirit of ‘xin’, sincerity, which makes it possible for agents to enter into covenant or establish meng, and to integrate individual self-interest with the demands of moral requirement. Covenants are meaningless without sincerity or good faith. In this sense, the root of civility, in the Chinese conception, lies in the virtue of sincerity. What is expressed, established and valued is the mutual trust that others are equally motivated and sustained by the same commitment to good faith or sincerity in the political process.
The value of sincerity as a political virtue also has a central place in the Confucian political philosophical tradition. Sincerity or xin, is the real spirit of democratic deliberation and it is trust in others’ sincerity or xin which makes public reason possible. In fact, Rawls himself has also remarked on the importance of “conceptions of virtue” which make public reason possible. The paper concludes by arguing that the justification of democratic politics is not grounded in the procedure of deliberation but in the possibility of public reason in a democratic polity. What gives deliberation its moral force is not the principle of public reason but the spirit of sincerity which makes the ideal of public reason a possibility.
超越程序主义：中国人对诚实即政治德性的观点
陶黎宝华
公共政策与管理研究中心
香港城市大学
当代民主政治强调自由平等的公民的自愿参与，他们对基本的政治问题做出集体决定。这导致了当代西方理论中的一种共同关注，即用一种程序标准来证明政治权力高于各种公民利益和背景的合法性。他们倾向于去证明，理想的政治审议程序是促使民主公民摆脱个人私利和从公共利益与公共德善的公民立场去思考基本问题的一种手段。 罗尔斯具体论证了公共理性的理想是自由探索和思考的标准，也是民主公民的道德责任。罗尔斯把公共理性的理想定义为倾听他人言说的意愿，准备从自己的观点接受合理的建议或选择。他还认为，公共理性的原则和政治正义的观念是相辅相成的，它们构成了现代民主稳定持久的根本所在。前者提供了程序，而后者则提供了证明民主政治合法性的内容。在罗尔斯看来，一旦公共理性的理想在公民行为中得到稳固确立，这就会支持把政治过程中的选举看作理想地表达意见的观点，而这些意见认为，最好的选择是推进公共德善，而不只是个人的利益和偏好。 然而，根据中国古代政治和哲学传统的资料来源，本文想要论证，政治正义和公共理性并不足以证明合法性和确立礼仪道德责任的基础。研究古代中国盟约的起源、性质及其发展的学者认为，实际提出、维护和使其合法化的盟约并不完全是这个盟约的内容或程序，而是盟约的精神。根据中国的看法，盟约的精神是“信”或诚实的精神，伴随着对“理”（原则）和“德”（德性）的道德要求。正是“信”或诚实的精神使得行为者可能达成盟约或确立盟约，把个人私利和道德要求结合起来。没有诚实或善良信念的盟约是没有意义的。由此，中国人所理解的礼仪之根就在于诚实的德性。所言、所立、所值的东西就是相互信任，而他人同样会由对善良信念或诚实的相同承诺而得到激励和持久。 诚实即政治德性的价值在儒家政治哲学传统中还具有核心地位。诚实或“信”是民主思考的真正精神，正是信任他人的诚实或“信”才使得公共理性成为可能。事实上，罗尔斯本人也指出了使公共理性得以可能的“德性思想”的重要性。本文最后认为，对民主政治的证明并不是基于审议的程序，而是公共理性在民主政治中的可能性。赋予审议以道德力量的不是公共理性的原则，而是使公共理性的理想成为一种可能的诚实精神。
Pragmatism and Politics
Katia Vanhemelryck
K.U.Leuven, Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte Mercierplein, Belgium
What can be the role of pragmatism in contemporary democratic politics? Richard Rorty’s version of pragmatism opens up interesting perspectives on democratic politics. He shows how pragmatism can make ethnocentrism step outside of the limits of the ethnos, without leaving the centrism behind. Rorty's moral and political pragmatism does this not by joining the old and the new, the present and the possible, the soil and the flower, in a theory, but in stories of how our life is and how it could be better.
Pragmatism as a post-metaphysical philosophy roots itself in the ethnos as if it were a soil to dig. Rorty suggests to consider the ethnos as a narrative, as the story one could tell about how things are and how one copes with them. His pragmatism opens up this ethnocentrism by seeing how small narratives of what is give way to small narratives of what could be. The ethnos is opened, but not in favor of neutrality or universality for example. Pragmatism favors an openness conscient of the "centrism".
A narrative of what could be is a reformulation of an existing, meaningful vocabulary. The reformulation doesn’t replace that vocabulary with some completely different one, but uses it as its soil of meaning. After the new way of speaking has become common, a change of purpose can with some completely different one, but uses it as its soil of meaning. After the new way of speaking has become common, a change of purpose can be noticed within this “new” vocabulary. The way a political or a moral community describes itself, can be subject to the same changes in vocabulary. Pragmatism opens up the space for change. The redescription of the political or moral community establishes an outlook, from within a rooted position in a social context, to possible new life forms with new purposes.
The first question I would like to deal with in this issue is how this pragmatism can be of interest to democracy? It is a two way street. New vocabularies and changing ways of speaking need an opportunity to be heard in public. Here is where democracy steps in. We can consider democracy as the best way to promote new ways of speaking in the debate, but also, being open to new ways of speaking is the best way to defend and enlarge democracy. New vocabularies are brought up, discussed, compared, criticized in the public debate. This is the locus of democratic selfcreation. In a Rortyan post-metaphysical culture, the background for the debate consists of no external foundations, nor of democratic selfcreation. In a Rortyan post-metaphysical culture, the background for the debate consists of no external foundations, nor of universal principles, but simply of one more narrative next to others. The pragmatic approach describes democracy not so much as a thing, but more as a constant selfcreating happening by giving space and according importance to new vocabularies.
What are the consequences of this political pragmatism on the institutional level? Rorty puts his trust in the existing democratic institutions as the basis for democratic change, but changed circumstances and the changed narratives of political and moral communities might need new ways of institutional co-operation. So here the second question comes in: how can the pragmatic interpretation of democracy be of interest in times where we have to face the problems of globalisation? Can ethnocentrism, even when it favors openness, have any meaning on a worldscale? In my opinion the way pragmatism assumes an openness to possible new life forms, can be a democratic and feasible political answer to the politics of globalisation.
实用主义与政治
卡佳·范赫梅尔里茨克
比利时鲁汶天主教大学
实用主义在当代民主政治中的作用是什么？理查德·罗蒂（Richard Rorty）的实用主义开创了对于民主政治的一个有趣的视角。他描述出实用主义如何使种族中心主义跨出种族之外，同时又并没有将温和派抛在一边。罗蒂的道德和政治实用主义作到这一点，并不是靠在一个理论中将旧的和新的、现实的和可能的、土壤和花连在一起，而是通过一些关于我们的生活是什么以及如何可能变得更好的故事来实现的。
作为一种后形而上学时代的哲学实用主义就如一块可挖掘的土壤一样，它存在于种族之中。罗蒂建议将种族看作一个描述系列，就如一个故事，在其中人们能够讲述事情是怎样的以及人们可以如何处理事情的。通过辨认出从“事实是什么”的描述系列让位于“能够是什么”的描述系列，他的实用主义为（语言）种族中心主义提供了空间。举例来说，（语言）种族被显明了，然而并不强使之有利于客观化或普遍化。实用主义赞同一种对温和派负责的开放。
对“可能是什么”的描述系列是对现存的、充满意义的语汇的重新陈述。这一重新陈述并不以一些完全不同的语汇来取代原有语汇，而是将原有语汇作为自身的意义土壤。当新的言说方式变得通用起来时，在这种新的语汇中的目标的改变就能被注意到。一个政治或道德共同体描述自身的方式在语汇上也遵循同样的改变。实用主义为变革提供了空间。对政治或道德共同体的重新描述开创了从一个社会处境的固定立场向具有新目标的新的可能生活模式的前瞻性展望。
在本文中我将处理的第一个问题是：这种实用主义如何可能对民主制有好处？这是一条双行道。新的语汇和改变了的言说方式需要在公共领域中被听到的机会。这儿民主制就被牵涉进来。我们能将民主制看作在争论中推动新的言说方式的最好制度，当然，向新的言说方式的开放也是保护和扩大民主制的最好方法。在公开争论中，新的语汇被提交、被讨论、被比较、甚至受到批评；而这正是民主制的自我创造的场所。在罗蒂的后形而上学文化中，争论的背景既不是外在的基础，也不是普遍的规范，而仅仅是另外一种描述系列。实用主义的方法与其说将民主制看作一个事物，倒不如说将之看作一个不断自我创造的事件系列，在其中给予了新语汇以空间和相应的重要性。
在机构层面上这种政治实用主义的结论是什么呢？罗蒂确信现存的民主制的机构是民主制改变的基础，然而政治和道德共同体的改变了的环境和改变了的描述系列需要机构协作的新的途径。因此产生了第二个问题：在我们不得不面对全球化问题的时候民主制的实用主义解释如何可能有所帮助？纵使种族中心主义支持一种开放性，在全球视角中它还有任何意义么？在我看来，实用主义对可能的新生活方式的开放性的设定方式，可以是对全球化政治的一种民主的、可行的政治回应。
The "Reasonable" as a Limit on Pluralism in Liberal Democracies
Daniel Weinstock
Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada
The concept of the "reasonable" occupies a central function in the work of many contemporary political philosophers concerned with justifying liberal democratic political institutions in the context of widespread moral and political pluralism. On the one hand, pluralism renders otiose the kind of monistic foundationalism which had characterized the political philosophy, mainly Kantian in inspiration, of an earlier era (e.g. Gewirth, early Nagel, early Rawls). But on the other hand, the thought is that not just ‘any’ differentialist claim can be accommodated within a liberal democratic political ethos, even one that has opened itself up in important respects to pluralism. The reconciliation of these two desiderata in much contemporary political philosophy has made use of the notion of "reasonableness": only the claims made by cultural groups or adherents of conceptions of the good that are "reasonable" will be accommodated by the theory and practice of liberal democracy.
But a threat of circularity threatens to vitiate the notion of reasonableness, at least as it has been developed in the work of thinkers such as the later Rawls, Larmore and the later Nagel. Indeed, one can show that for these thinkers, reasonableness amounts to the willingnesss to abide by the terms of the theory of justice they propound.
My intention in this paper is to attempt to define a conception of reasonableness which avoids this kind of circularity. The hypothesis I will develop is that a political actor counts as "reasonable" if she places compromise and the cessation of conflict higher in her utility schedule than continued conflict aimed at securing greater gains, as measured by the ability to secure the totality of her group's political claims, or by the ability to have one's conception of the good shielded completely from the norms of the broader society. This view places no a priori limits or restrictions on the ‘content’ of the compromise, and thus avoids the circularity alluded to above in other conceptions.
I will also describe in very simple game-theoretical terms some of the institutional mechanisms which liberal democracies can put into place in order to alter agents' utility calculuses in the direction of greater "reasonableness", as defined above.
在自由主义的民主政治中“理性的”作为多元主义的限度
丹尼尔·维恩斯托克
加拿大蒙特利尔大学哲学系
在普遍存在的道德和政治多元主义处境下，当代许多政治哲学家关注论证自由民主制的政治机制的正当性问题，而“理性的”这一概念在他们的论述中起着核心的作用。一方面，多元主义使一元论的基础主义显得多余，而这些主要受康德主义影响的一元论的基础主义本来是稍早时代政治哲学的基本特征（如格威特（Gewirth）,早期的纳格尔（Nagel）和早期的罗尔斯）。然而，在另一方面，纵使在一个在其重要方面向多元主义保持开放性的自由民主制的政治价值观中，也不是每一种歧义的论点都能得到容纳。在当代许多政治哲学中，这两种理论倾向的调停都使用了“理性”这一概念：只有当那些被文化群体和善的概念的支持者所作出的论述是“理性的”的时候才会被自由民主制的理论和实践所容纳。
然而，循环论证的威胁削弱了理性这一概念，而至少在诸如后期罗尔斯、拉尔默（Larmore）和后期纳格尔等思想家的著述中，循环论证的思想已经发展起来了。实际上，很容易看出，对于这些思想家来说，理性恰恰等同于愿意遵循他们所提出的正义理论的条款。
在本文中我的意图是界定一种可以避免此类循环论证的理性概念。我所提出的假说就是：如果一个政治行为者在他/她的效用表中为确保更大利益将妥协和中止冲突置于维持冲突之上的话，他或她就被算作理性的，而这些效用表是由确保他或她的团体的政治要求的整体的能力来衡量的，或由他或她保护自己的善的概念完全免受更广泛社会影响的能力来衡量的。这种观点并没有对妥协的内容加以任何先验的限定，因而能够避免上述提及的其它概念的循环论证的问题。
我也将用非常简单的博弈论的术语来描述一些机制程序，而自由主义的民主制可以使用这些机制程序来使政治行为者的效用运算沿着更为“理性”的方向改变。
Historical Distance and Human Rights
Xiao Yang
Philosophy Department, Middlebury College, Middlebury, USA
"Time," he said, "is the best Censor:
Secret movements of troops and guns, even,
Becoming historical, cease to concern."
Robert Graves
The standard objection to a historical approach to human rights is driven by the anxiety that historical approach necessarily leads to relativism. When one deals with the issues concerning, for example, population change, or artistic styles, aesthetic taste, a historical approach, as even those who make the objection may acknowledge, is certainly the most adequate. However, so goes the objection, a historical approach to human rights will inevitably lead to a historical relativism, which is that human rights are historically contingent, socially constructed (which implies that they did not exist before being socially constructed), relative to certain historical time and space. If we take what has just been said above as the definition of historical relativism regarding human rights, I believe it is a perspective we cannot escape by simply going back to the ahistorical perspective. I want to say that we are all relativists now. In a review criticizing Thomas Nagel's ahistorical universalism, Bernard Williams says, "The basic idea that we see things as we do because of our historical situation has become over two hundred years so deeply embedded in our outlook that it is rather Nagel's universalistic assumption which may look strange, the idea that, self-evidently, moral judgement must take everyone everywhere as equally its object." We now all agree that it is a historical fact that the idea of human rights has a history. I shall call this "descriptive relativism of human rights." However, unlike relativists, I also want to add that the story does not end here. Many people believe, mistakenly, that, having accepted this relativism, we must lose our confidence in the ideal of universal human rights. I shall use "skepticism of human rights" to mean a lack of confidence in the ideal. It is simply a fallacy to say that the descriptive relativism of human rights implies skepticism of human rights. The relativism to which historians of process are drawn does not condemn them to the corrosion of their own values. Nevertheless, in the literature on relativism, most people confuse the two. This is why I believe that it is a temporary (and unhappy) phenomenon that so far historical approach, has resulted in -- or more accurately, has been misinterpreted as having resulted in -- skepticism of human rights. In this paper, I want to argue for two related claims: 1) the ahistorical approach that is called "philosophy of human rights" is an impossible project; 2) historical approach does not necessarily lead to skepticism of human rights; relativism appears to imply skepticism because "historical distance" is not being taken into account. The anxiety about relativism is caused by a false belief that relativism implies the loss of our confidence in human rights. Historical distance is -- to borrow Robert Graves' phrase -- "the best censor" that will stop us from loosing our confidence. This paper is divided into two parts. Part I is a historical critique of the ahistorical rationalist philosophy of human rights; I also shall also introduce the concept of historical distance and show how it can help us see what goes wrong in MacIntyre's argument against human rights. In Part II, I shall first try to articulate the concept of historical distance in more details on the levels of both individual persons and groups, drawing on some of Derek Parfit's ideas; and then I will give examples of how some Chinese scholars use historical distance to make normative judgments about human rights.
历史间距与人权
肖 阳
美国米德尔伯里学院哲学系
他说：“时间是最好的监察官：甚至军队和武力的秘密动用都将会变成历史而不再有影响。”
——罗伯特·格雷乌斯
在人权理论中，对历史主义方法的经典批评主要源自这样的担心，即历史主义方法必然会导致相对主义。纵使那些反对历史主义方法的人也承认，如果处理的问题涉及到的是诸如人口变迁、艺术风格、审美趣味的时候，历史主义方法当然是最恰当的。然而，这些反对意见进而会说，对于人权，如果使用历史主义方法，毫无疑问将导致历史相对主义，即认为：人权历史地讲是偶然的，是社会构建的（这意味着在在被社会构建起来以前，人权并不存在），是相对于特定的历史时间和空间的。如果我们将上述所说的作为人权的历史相对主义的定义的话，我确信它是一种特定的视角，而这种视角我们是不能仅仅通过回到非历史主义的视角就可以逃避的。我想说的是，今天我们都是相对主义者。在批评托马斯·纳格尔（Thomas Nagel）的非历史主义的普世论的文章中，伯尔纳德·威廉说：“由于我们的历史处境我们正如我们现在这样看待事物这种基本观念在两百多年来已经如此深深地根植在我们的态度中，所以，倒是纳格尔的普世主义的假设看起来显得有些陌生和奇怪，这种普世论认为，自明的道德判断必然是对每一个地方的每一个人都同样地有效。”我们现在都同意这是一个历史事实，即人权的观念有其历史。我将这一事实称为“描述性的人权相对主义”。然而，与相对主义者不同的是，我还得加上一点，即事情并为到此结束。许多人错误地相信，接受了这种相对主义，我们就必须放弃普世人权的观念。我将使用“人权上的怀疑论”来指称这种对普世人权观念的信念缺失的情况。如下想法不过是一种谬见：描述的人权相对主义意味着人权上的怀疑论。方法历史学家所感兴趣的相对主义并不会贬低人权从而损害自己的价值。然而，就相对主义的许多文献而言，绝大多数人将两者混淆在一起了。这就是我为什么相信会出现如下一个暂时的（也是不愉快的）现象：迄今为止，历史主义方法总是导致人权上的怀疑论，或者更确切地说，被错误地解释为会导致人权上的怀疑论。在本文中，我将论述两个相关的论点：1）被称之为“人权哲学”的非历史主义方法是一种不可能的计划。2）历史主义方法并不必然导致人权上的怀疑论；之所以相对主义看起来似乎意味着怀疑论是因为“历史间距”并没有得到考虑。对于相对主义的忧虑主要是由一种错误的观念造成的，这种观念认为相对主义意味着对人权信念的缺失。借用罗伯特·格利乌斯的话“时间是最好的监察官”，历史间距将使我们避免对信念的缺失。本文分为两个部分。第一部分是对人权上非历史主义的理性哲学的一种历史主义批评；我也会引进历史间距的概念并表明它如何能帮助我们看清在麦金泰尔（MacIntyre）反对人权的辩论中哪儿出了错。在第二部分中，我会首先在个体和群体两个层面上更清晰地陈述历史间距这一概念，在这样作的时候会利用特利克·帕菲特（Derek Parfit）的一些思想；然后我会给出一些中国学者利用历史间距概念得出人权上的规范判断的例子。
Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice
Xu Xiangdong
Department of Philosophy, University of Columbia, New York, USA
It has been claimed that any adequate theory of moral demands in general and distributive justice in particular must leave a sufficient degree of latitude for the commitments, relationships and attachments that are of special importance for individuals. Any moral theory that fails to accord a separate consideration to the personal point of view is intrinsically flawed. Rawls’s theory of justice is said to acquire its relative superiority over utilitarian theory because it integrates the insistence on the separateness of persons by insisting on the priority of the right over the good.
The leading purpose of this paper is to show that the prevailing claim, that utilitarianism in particular and consequentialism in general cannot accommodate such important moral notions as autonomy, fairness and justice, is basically mistaken. It is wrong because of the following reasons. In the first place, it gives a mistaken understanding of the separateness thesis, seeing separateness of persons as meaning that no moral sacrifice needs to be made. In the second place, it pays insufficient attention to the complexities of moral motivation. In particular, it ignores the important fact that moral motivation is conditional on social structure and human conditions. In the end, a dynamical analysis of moral rightness is largely lacking in theorists who hold the claim. Having thought of deontological constraints as sui generis, they not only usually fail to justify such constraints, but also lack adequate resources to resolve moral conflicts.
The claim in question, nevertheless, is intelligible with regard to its presence. For it basically draws its origins from a critique of the classical, hedonist version of utilitarianism, which, as I had argued, is completely unacceptable. But rejection of it does not mean that we must also fundamentally give up what are both theoretically plausible and morally significant implicit in utilitarianism as a teleological kind of moral theory. I had primarily shown how we could drawn on Mill’s moral theory to develop a plausible alternative to the classical version of utilitarianism. The moral theory I had been recommending shares the teleological structure of moral reasoning with hedonistic utilitarianism, whereas it is distinctively committed to an objectivist theory of human value. The theory of value permits us to regard certain sorts of the good necessary to the realization of higher capacities as trumping the promotion of lesser intrinsic and extrinsic goods. It can thereby meet the challenges the critics of utilitarianism address to a teleological kind of ethics.
功利主义和分配的正义
徐向东
美国哥伦比亚大学哲学系
如下观点广为人知：任何一种恰当的关于道德要求的理论尤其是关于分配正义的理论必须为对个体有着特殊重要性的承诺、关系和兴趣留下足够的空间。任何对个人立场没有给予特殊考虑的道德理论都是内在地有缺陷的。罗尔斯的正义理论之所以被认为相对优越于功利主义的理论，就是因为他通过坚持权利优先于善而与将个体的差异性的观点融入了自己的理论。
本文的主要目的是要表明一种流行论点从根本上就是错误的，这种论点认为：结果主义尤其是功利主义不能容纳诸如自律、公正和正义等重要的道德概念。这种观点之所以是错误的是由于下列原因。首先，它对差异性论题给予了一种错误的理解，认为个体间的差异性并不意味着要作出道德上的牺牲。其次，它没有对道德动机的复杂性给予足够的关注。特别是，它忽视了这样一个重要的事实：道德动机是受社会结构和人类条件制约的。最后，这种观点的持有者非常缺乏对道德权利的动态分析。他们将道义约束看成一个特殊领域（sui generis），却不单通常没有论证这些道义约束的正当性，而且也缺乏恰当的方法来解决道德冲突。
然而，我们所质疑的这种论点从其存在而言却是可以理解的。因为它基本上源自于对古典的、享乐主义的功利主义的批评，而这种享乐主义的功利主义（正如我所论证的）是完全不可接受的。然而，拒斥享乐主义的功利主义并不意味着我们也应当放弃作为一种目的论类型的道德理论的功利主义中蕴涵的理论上合理的和道德上有重要性的因素。我所推荐的道德理论同享乐主义的功利主义一样在道德推理上具有合目的性的结构，然而，与享乐主义的功利主义不同的是，它却承诺着一种客观主义的人类价值理论。价值理论允许我们认为那些对于我们更高能力的实现所必须的善的类型优于那些非固有的、较外在的善的类型。因此，这种道德理论能够回应功利主义的批评者对目的论类型伦理观的挑战。
A Review of Several Arguments of Equality
Xu Youyu
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
A tense between freedom and equality has existed since modern times. The main challenge liberalism has faced comes from, roughly speaking, .the pressure of demanding equality. In contemporary times, political philosophers such as John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, G. A. Cohen and Will Kymlicka formulate their points of view on the issue and argue with others.
This thesis reviews main theories and arguments of above philosophers, then explores the possibility of construction of a liberal theory of equality based on individual freedom and right.
The thesis discusses first the egalitarian tendency implied in Ralws’ difference principle and the criticism of it by Nozick. The thesis maintains that Rawls’ argument is not sound when he tries to draw an egalitarian conclusion from “original position”, “veil of ignorance” and “maximin rules” by means of rational construction. There is something reasonable in Nozick’s argument refuting it. In addition, Rawls’ point of view that people’s natural talent is social goods and they do not deserve benefits from it is implausible.
On the other hand, Cohen’s arguments are not tenable so far as he debates with Nozick when he tries to refute the idea of self-ownership and defend his egalitarian position.
After examining expositions of Dworkin and Kymlicka on equality, this thesis maintains that the line of thinking of drawing conclusion of equality by means of pure rational argument won’t work. Equality is a problem of practical rationality. The reason why equality has been an eternal appeal of human being is related with people’s perceptual intuition vividly expressed by Chinese traditional conceptions such as “cannot bear to suffering” and “compassion”. That the dimension of rational argument is insufficient and the dimension of natural intuition is necessary indicates the nature of controversy caused by issue of equality.
关于平等的当代思考
徐友渔
中国社会科学院哲学所
在近现代，平等与自由的张力一直存在。自由主义遇到的主要挑战，大致上均来自于平等要求的压力。在当代，John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, G. A. Cohen 和Will Kymlicka 等哲学家都对平等问题提出新的见解，甚至有深刻的争论。
本文考察上述哲学家关于平等的主张和争论。之后探讨能否建构起一种基于自由主义的，即以个人自由和权利为基础的平等观。
首先讨论Rawls在差异原则中隐含的平等观，以及Nozick的批评。 本文意在说明，Rawls企图用纯理性建构的方法，从“原初状态”、“无知之幕”、“最大最小值”方法推导出来的类似平等的结论，是不周全的，Nozick的反驳有一定道理。另外，Rawls关于人的天赋才智应视为公共物品，为个人“不应得”的观点，也是经不起考察的。
另一方面，G. A. Cohen企图反驳“个人所有”的观念，从而导出平等的立场，就其与Nozick论战而言，是站不住脚的。
本文在考察了Dworkin和 Kymlicka关于平等的论述之后认为，用纯粹理性论证的方法推导出平等结论的思路，是不完备的。平等是实践理性的问题。平等之所以是人类一种挥之不去的诉求，与人的感性直观有关，这在中国传统哲学概念“不忍之心”、“恻隐之心”中有生动表达。而理性一维的不充足，感性直观一维的必要，正说明平等理念引起争议的性质。
Incremental Democracy and Good Governance
A Chinese View on Democracy and Governance
Yu Keping
China Center for Comparative Politics & Economics(CCCPE)
The article elaborates the most development of Chinese democracy and governance in theory and practice since the reforms with orientation toward the market economy. It analyses recent development in theory and practice of democracy and governance in China. The article generalizes the practice and theories of democracy and governance in China as the Incremental Democracy, which means that 1)political reform and democratic development should have “enough stock”, that means necessary economic and political foundation. In other words, political reform has to keep its step with social and economic development. 2) the reform and change must show a political progress by breaking through the given political reality more or less. And 3) the process of this reform is gradual and incremental. It is a political development with a breakthrough, but not a political revolution. Meanwhile, the author tries to develop a theory and assessment criteria to explain and evaluate good governance whose elements should include 1) legitimacy; 2)transparency; 3)accountability; 4) the rule of law; 5)responsiveness; 6) effectiveness; 7)order; and 8) stability.
增量民主与善治
――中国人对民主与治理的一种看法
俞可平
中央编译局比较政治与经济研究中心
本文论述了民主与治理的意义，根据中国的经验提出了增量民主与善治（Incremental Democracy and Good Governance）的概念，并且拟定了一套评估民主与善治的具体标准。作者认为，从统治（government）向治理（governance）的转变，是现代民主的一个普遍特征。统治与治理的共同点在于，在正常状态下，两者都是运用权威维持秩序，以最大限度地增进公共利益。但两者有重要的区别，主要有以下两点：１）统治的权力主体只有一个，即政府机关，而治理的权力主体可以有多种，即可以是政府机关，也可以是政府与民间机构的联合，还可以是民间组织。２）权力运行方向不同，统治的权力运行向度以垂直为主，一般总是自上而下的；而治理的权力运行向度以平行为主，一般总是自下而上或横向流动的。作者指出，增量民主的主要意义是：１）民主改革必须有足够的“存量”，必须有现实的政治、经济和法律基础，具备法学意义上的合法性（legality）；２）民主发展必须形成新的增量，对“存量”有所突破，这种突破符合绝大多数人民的愿望，具备政治学意义上的合法性（legitimacy）；３）民主发展是一个渐进的过程，必须依靠“路径依赖”。最后，作者认为，社会的善治应当包括以下几个要素：１合法性）（legitimacy）；２）透明性（transparency）；３）责任性（accountability）；４）法治（the rule of law）；５）回应性（responsiveness）；６）效益（effectiveness）；７）秩序（order）；８稳定（stability）。
Dramaturgical Action:
An Analysis from the Perspective of Political Philosophy
Zhang Boshu
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China
The original sense of the term “dramaturgical action” is “self-directing” and “self-performing” as when an actor presents himself to others. It is a basic character of all kinds of dramaturgical actions to conceal, for some purposes, the internal world of actor himself from the public. Politicized dramaturgical action, on the other hand, might be the unique phenomenon in authoritarian societies.
Two different kinds of politicized dramaturgical action might be distinguished: one occurs in the group of intellectuals who, motivated by evading social taboo, present themselves in a way which is against their own will; another occurs in the group of officials whose actions aim in most cases at the power and the interests in a corrupt circumstances. Both could be imputed to the scarcity of a true democratic system and to the distortion of institutional modernization. From the individual perspective, politicized dramaturgical action makes human beings alienated; and from social perspective, it makes a society based upon pseudo-intersubjectivity, dividing overt and covert systems in an authoritarian condition.
Up to now, the study of politicized dramaturgical action is just at the beginning. We have enough reason, however, to predict that the study would enrich critical theoreticians’ definition on “strategic action” and “communicative action”. At least, it would prove the plurality of action classification and the complexity of interactions between individuals or different groups. We also hope the study could contribute to the exploration of political philosophy on the historicity of individual freedom, human rights as well as the democratization in authoritarian societies. The existence of politicized dramaturgical action proves that freedom is never abstract; the precondition of realizing true democracy would be to reform the social structure and institutions, rooted on which such psychological and social phenomena could become understandable.
剧场行为：从政治哲学的观点看
张博树
中国社会科学院哲学所
剧场意味着表演。当人的行为仅仅是为了做出来给别人看的时候，这种行为就具有表演的性质。出于某种目的而对主体内心世界的有意掩饰与遮蔽，乃是所有剧场行为的共同特征。剧场行为的政治化，则是威权主义社会的特有现象。
出于被压抑的、自我保护需要的剧场行为（以知识人为代表）与出于政治升迁、保位、“避难”需要的剧场行为（以官员为代表）是两种不同形式的剧场行为，但其根源却是相同的：制度现代化进程的扭曲与民主、公民社会的匮乏。从个体角度讲，剧场行为从被迫到自觉的过程，反映了人性的异化与扭曲；从社会建构角度讲，剧场行为则促成反社会的伪互主体关系的泛滥，使公开的制度形式化，隐蔽的制度实在化。 目前对政治性剧场行为的研究还处于极其初步的阶段。但我们有理由期望这项研究将丰富批判理论关于“战略行为”、“交往行为”的传统界定与阐释；至少，它将证明人类行为类型与互动关系的多样性与复杂性。我们还期望这项研究将为威权主义社会中个体自由、人权的历史性及民主化进程的政治哲学探究提供独特的视角，因为政治性剧场行为的存在告诉我们：自由永远不是抽象的；要实现真正的民主与人权，就必须矫正造成心灵扭曲与禁忌的社会结构与制度运行方式。
Confucianism and Constitutionalism: On the Social and Political Functions of Li
Zhang Qianfan
School of Law, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China
Ever since the market reform China has come to realize the central significance of rule of law. A common tendency, however, has been to mistake the traditional Confucian "rule of etiquette" (Lizhi) as rule of man, which is to be wiped out and replaced by "rule of law" (Fazhi). This paper disputes this view and argues, rather, that the Confucian Li had served as a constitution that bound the traditional society together for paper disputes this view and argues, rather, that the Confucian Li had served as a constitution that bound the traditional society together for generations. Specifically the paper will focus on the Confucianist-Legalist lines of arguments about the relevance of basic moral norms to social order and prosperity. By reviewing the dilemmas of narrowly rational society--primarily the Prisoner's Dilemma and the related collective action problem, I seek to provide a partial defense for the crucial functions of traditional social rules and norms as embodied in the Confucian system of Li. Following Mencius, I argue that a cooperative society presupposes a set of basic and widely subscribed rules and norms governing the behavior of its members, which I broadly designate here as the "constitution of society", written or unwritten, and that Li was precisely such a constitution that had held the traditional Chinese society together. The history of both traditional and modern China has refuted the Legalist belief that a narrowly rational state can be sustained solely by laws and punishments tailored to human interests. The social dilemmas revealed by the modern rational choice theory further discredit Legalism as an infeasible political program. Aiming to resolve the pervasive social dilemmas, I argue that the cultivation of personal virtues through the common practice of Li seems to be necessary for holding a society together and bringing about requisite cooperative actions. Indeed, Confucian Li had become such a vital part of the Chinese culture that, by seeking to abolish the entire body of Li, the radical modernization efforts which culminated in the May-Fourth Movement necessarily undermined and eventually destroyed the binding force of the constitution of the traditional Chinese society, and created decades of war and turmoil. The paper is concluded with a discussion on the relevance of Li as a living constitution to our global society today.
儒学与宪政：论礼治的政治与社会功能
张千帆
南京大学法学院
在改革开放和市场经济时代，中国已经充分认识到法治的重要性。然而，一种普遍的倾向是把传统儒家文化的礼治等同于必须被克服与清除的“人治”。本文对此提出不同意见，并认为传统的礼治事实上与宪政有某些共同之处。限于篇幅，笔者只能在其它地方论证礼与宪法在形式上的相似性，而在此仅论证两者在实质上的共性，即它们对社会所发挥的至关重要的整合功能。本文将把焦点集中在儒法两家长期争论的基本道德规范对社会秩序与繁荣的重要性。通过指出在狭隘意义上的“理性社会”中所存在的种种难题——尤其是囚犯困境与集体行动问题，本文试图为儒家礼治中所包含的传统道德规范提供一部分辩护。沿着孟子的思路，本文认为社会合作要求一整套被普遍接受的基本法则，不论成文与否。这套基本法则在此就被定义为社会的“宪章”，而儒家的礼就是这一凝聚传统中国社会的宪章。中国的古代与近代史都否定了法家不切实际的信仰，即仅靠控制人们利益动机的法律及其制裁就能维系一个国家。现代理性选择理论所揭示的社会难题进一步证明，纯粹的“法制主义”是不可行的政治主张。为了解决这些无处不在的社会难题，本文试图论证通过礼的熏陶而形成的个人德性对维系社会并带来合作行为的必要性。文章最后讨论了礼本身变革的可能性，以及礼作为“活的宪法”对于在全球化时代中和平解决文化冲突的重要性。
Negative Liberty and Limits of Reason
-- a Critical Comment on the Agonistic Interpretation of Berlin’s Liberalism
Zheng Yujian
Philosophy Department, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
John Gray, in his forceful philosophical exegesis of Berlin, expounds the deep and conflicting sources of Berlin’s political outlook -- what he calls agonistic liberalism. The crux of such a liberalism, unlike the dominant liberalisms of our time, lies in its vehement denial of the attainable harmony or compatibility of fundamental liberties, rights or claims of justice as well as in its tragic and subversive quality with regard to the optimism or perfectionism of many versions of liberal thought since the Enlightenment. Without disputing Gray’s exegesis part of the argument, I’d like to take issues with some of his defensive points on behalf of the historicist Berlin in asserting that liberal institutions can have no universal authority, and that liberalism can be best conceived as a particular form of life, with no universal claim on reason, foundation in human nature or privileged place in history.
Granted that the agonistic value-pluralism is the bottom line in Berlin’s thought, the crucial issue is then whether there can be any universal justification for some version of liberalism on that ground. Despite Berlin’s well-known stand on negative liberty, Gray tries to demonstrate that the historicist turn of Berlin’s thought is more central to his overall project or concerns. But if such an interpretation is sound, the status of Berlin’s achievement as bona fide liberalist will be in serious doubt. Again, my focus in this paper is not exegetic, but rather on the validity of argument from value-pluralism to (non-)liberalism and/or (non-)universalism.
Apart from raising doubts on Gray/Berlin’s claim that many illiberal ways of life in human history (e.g., Hindu, Shinto, Jewish Orthodox etc.) are equally worthwhile in the sense that there can be no commensurable, rational criteria to discriminate among them, I also advance some positive arguments to the effect that certain universal justification may be found for a type of liberalism mainly based on negative freedom. By appeal to some seminal ideas of Hayek, which are congenial to certain parts of Berlin’s thought, I will in particular argue that from the limits of individual reason (such as inexorable imperfections in individual knowledge) as well as the feasibility (or economic stability) of maintaining a closed and highly authoritarian (or vastly paternalistic) regime under the open (with fast growing information of various kinds) environment, certain minimal liberal establishments, such as certain basic rights guaranteeing some scope of negative freedom for the people to exercise their free choice as they see fit themselves, are inevitable in a universal sense for the long-sustainable human flourishing in any particular culture or form of life.
消极自由和理性的局限
——对伯林自由主义的规避主义诠释的批评性评论
郑宇健
香港岭南大学哲学系
在他对伯林（Berlin）思想令人信服的哲学诠释中，约翰·格林（John Gray）精细地阐述了伯林政治观念中深刻的、彼此冲突的源泉，格林称之为规避的自由主义。与我们时代居于主导地位的自由主义不同的是，这种规避的自由主义的核心在于它对基本的自由、权利和正义要求之间的可协调性或兼容性的强烈否定，也在于它对从启蒙以来的自由主义思想中的乐观主义和至善论的悲剧性的颠覆。本文并不争论格林理论中的诠释部分，我只是想讨论格林站在历史主义者伯林的立场上所辩护的下述观点：自由主义的机制并没有普世性的权威，而自由主义至多只是一种特殊的生活方式，不能对理性提出普遍要求，也并非在人性中有其普遍基础，不能在历史中要求特殊的地位。 如果伯林思想的基础是规避主义的价值多元论，那么关键的问题就是，在这种基础上，对于某些类型的自由主义而言是否存在任何普遍的正当性。虽然有伯林非常著名的消极自由的立场，格林试图证明：在伯林思想中的历史主义倾向对于伯林的总的理论或关注而言是更为中心的。然而如果这种诠释是可靠的，那么伯林作为一个真诚的（bona fide）自由主义者所取得的成就就会陷入严重的危机。在本文中，我的要点不是解释性的，而是关注从价值多元主义论证自由主义（或非自由主义）和普世主义（或非普世主义）的可靠性。
在本文中我将对格林/伯林的下述论点提出质疑：在人类历史中许多非自由主义的生活方式（如印度教、日本神道教、犹太正统教等等）是同等地有价值的，因为没有彼此可还原的、理性的标准来区别它们。我也将提出一些积极的论点，大意是能够为主要奠基于消极自由上的一种自由主义找到一种普遍的正当性。特别地，通过利用哈耶克（Hayek）的一些有重要影响的思想（这些思想与伯林思想中的一些部分非常类似），我将论述下列观点：从个人理性的限度（如个体知识不可避免的非完善性）以及在开放环境（各种类型信息的急剧膨胀）下保持一个相对封闭和高度权威的管理制度的可行性（或经济上的稳定性）而言，不论在什么特殊的文化或生活方式下，为了人类长期的发展，建立一些最低限度的自由主义机制是不可避免的，这些机制包括一些基本的权利以保证人们拥有在某些范围内选择的消极自由。
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
与会者名单
ANGLE, Steve C.
Dr., Assitant Professor
Wesleyan University
350 High Street, Middletown, CT 06459, USA
Tel.: 1 860 685 3654
Fax: 1 860 685 3861
Email: sangle@mail.wesleyan.edu
ARCHARD, David William
Dr., Reader
Department of Moral Philosophy, University of St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland KY16 9AL, UK
Tel.: 44 1334 46280
Fax: 44 1334 462485
Email: dwa@st-andrews.ac.uk
AUDARD, Catherine
Ms., Visiting Fellow
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, Philosophy Department,
London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
Associate Researcher, CREA, 1 rue Descartes, 75 005 PARIS, France
Tel.: 44 207 937 7708
Fax: 44 207 938 4257
Email: c.audard@lse.ac.uk
Bunnin, Nicholas
Dr., Director
Centre for Modern Chinese Studies
University of Oxford, UK
Tel.: 0 1865 28038
Fax: 0 1865 280431
Email: nick.bunnin@chinese-studies.ox.ac.uk
CHAKRABARTI, Milindo
Dr., Director & Senior Lecturer
Centre for Studies in Rural Economy, Appropriate Technology and Environment
Department of Economics, St. Joseph's College, P.O. North Point, Darjeeling, West
Bengal, India, PIN: 734 104
Tel.: 91 354 70340, 91 354 70555.
Fax: 91 354 54330 (attn. Milindo Chakrabarti, ph: 70340).
Email: milindos@hotmail.com
CHAN, Jonathan
Department of Religion & Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University, 224 Waterloo Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Email: klchan@hkbu.edu.hk
CHAN, Joseph C. W.
Dr., Associate Professor
Department of Politics Administration, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam
Road, Hong Kong
Tel.: 852 2859 2393, 2857 8361
Fax: 852 2858 3550
Email: jcwchan@hku.hk.edu
CHEN Junquan
Professor
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6513 6980
CHEN, Wentong
Department of Philosophy, Anhui University, Anqing 230039, China
Tel.: 86 551 510 6146
CHEN, Youhong
Associate Professor
Department of Public Administration, Renmin University of China, Haidian District,
Beijing 100872, China
Tel.: 86 10 8290 1204(H), 6251 1027(O)
Email: youhong@mail.east.net.cn
CHENG, Lian
Ph.D., Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
Tel.: 86 10 6275 9139 (H)
Email: lcheng@phil.pku.edu.cn
CHIEN, Yung-hsiang
Dr., Research Fellow
Academia Sinica, Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy,
History of Thought Divison, Nankang, Taipei, Taiwan 11529
Tel.: 886 2 2782 1693
Fax: 886 2 2785 4160
Email: sechin@gate.sinica.edu.tw
CI, Jiwei
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong
Email: jiweici@hkucc.hku.edu
FREEMAN, Michael Anthony
Dr., Reader
Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK
Tel.: 44 1206 872509
Fax: 44 1206 873598
Email: freema@essex.ac.uk
GAO, Quanxi
Associate Professor
The Graduate School, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100102, China
Tel.: 86 10 6438 1318
Email: gaoquanxi@yahoo.com
GONG, Qun
Professor
Department of Philosophy, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
Tel.: 86 10 6841 2465 (H)
Email: gongqun2001@263.net
GRIFFIN, James
Professor
Centre for Philosophy and Public Affairs, Department of Moral Philosophy,
University of St Andrews, St Andrews KY16 9AL, Scotland; Social And Political
Theory, Research School of Social Sciences, Coombs Building No. 9, Australian
National University, Canberra, ACT 0200 Australia
Tel.: 44 1334 462486
Fax: 44 1334 462485
Email: philosophy@st-andrews.ac.uk
Email: socpolth@coombs.anu.edu.au
GU, Su
Professor
Department of Philosophy, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China
Tel.: 86 25 420 9636
Email: gusun@163.net
HAN, Zhen
Professor
Department of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
Tel.: 86 10 6220 9326
Fax: 86 10 6220 6019
Email: zhen-han@263.net
HEYES, Cressida
Dr., Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T5H
3R5
Tel: 1 780 4929031
Fax: 1 780 492 9160
Email: ns_kaha@alcor.concordia.ca
HINKMANN, Jens
MA in philosophy, MSc in Economy, CPhD, Research Assistant
University of Erfurt, Institute for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Nordh?userstra?e 63, D – 99006 Erfurt, Germany
Tel.: 39 361 737 4040
Fax: 39 361 737 4049
E-mail: jens.hinkmann@uni-erfurt.de
HU, Xinhe
Professor, Chair
Department of Philosophy of Science & Technology, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6726 3301 (H)
Email: huxh@public.fhnet.cn.net
HURLEY, Susan L.
Professor
University of Warwick, UK
Email: s.l.hurley@warwick.ac.uk
JANG, Dong-Jin
Associate Professor of Political Science
Yonsei University, Seoul 120-749, Korea
Tel.: 82 2 361 2950
Fax: 82 2 393 7642
Email: dongjinjang@hotmail.com
JIANG, Yi
Associate Professor, Dr., Chair
Department of Contemporary Foreign Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6472 6571 (H)
Email: 0512@ihw.com.cn or jiangyi0512@sina.com.cn
KAHANE, David
Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G
2E5
Tel.: 1 780 492 8549
Fax: 1 780 492 9160
Email: david.kahane@ualberta.ca
KALDIS, Byron
Dr., Lecturer
The Economic University of Athens & the Greek Open University, Greece
Tel.: 30 1 7219446
Fax: 30 1 3286434
Email: bkald@laverne.edu.gr
KANG, Phee Seng
Dr., Associate Professor
Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University, 224 Waterloo
Road, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
Tel: 852 2339 7295
Fax: 852 2339 7379
Email: kangps@hkbu.edu.hk
KARA, Ahmet
Assistant Professor of Economics
Department of Economics, Fatih University, Hadimkoy 34900, Buyukckemece,
Istanbul, Turkey
Tel.: 90 212 889 1177
Fax: 90 212 889 0901
Email: kara6@superonline.com
KNOWLES, Dudley Ross
Mr., Senior Lecturer
Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK
Tel: 44 141 330 5376, 339 5370 (H)
Fax: 44 141 330 4112
Email: D.Knowles@philosophy.arts.gla.ac.uk
KOFMAN, Daniel
Dr., Lecturer
Lincoln College, Oxford University, Oxford OX1 3DR, UK
Tel.: 44 1865 280509
Fax: 44 1865 279802
Email: daniel.kofman@lincoln.ox.ac.uk
KWAN, Kai-man
Dr., Assistant Professor
Department of Religion & Philosophy, Baptist University, 224 Waterloo Road,
Kowloon, Hong Kong
Tel: 852 2339 7291
Fax: 852 2339 7379
E-mail: kmkwan@hkbu.edu.hk
KYMLICKA, Will
Professor
Department of Philosophy, Queen's Univeristy of Kingston, 99 University Avenue,
Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3N6
Tel.: 1 613 533-6000 (ext 77043)
Email: kymlicka@post.queensu.ca
LANE, Melissa Sharon
Dr., Lecturer
King’s College, Cambridge CB2 1ST, UK
Tel.: 44 1223 331 441
Fax: 44 1223 331 315 to Dr M. Lane
Email: melissa.lane@kings.cam.ac.uk
Ms117@hermes.cam.ac.uk
LI, Deshun
Professor & Acting Director
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6256 1107 (H)
Fax: 86 10 6513 7826
Email: ledeshun@public.bta.net.cn
LI, He
Editor-in-chief & Associate Professor
The Journal of International Philosophy Today, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6404 8491 (H)
Email: iptoday@sina.com
LI, Hon-Lam
Associate Professor,
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong
honlamli@cuhk.edu.hk
LI, Hong
Dr. & Lecturer
Department of Philosophy, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China
Tel.: 86 351 701 9940
Email: lihongmail@sohu.com
LI, Mei
Dr.
Institute of Political Sciences, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 8290 2953
Email: maoshl@ihw.com.cn
LI, Pengcheng
Professor & Deputy Director
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6498 2382 (H)
Fax: 86 10 6513 7826
Email: lipc@public.east.cn.net
LI, Qiang
Professor
Department of Political Science, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
Email: liqiangpku@yahoo.com
LIAO, Shenbai
Professor, Chair
Department of Ethics, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6288 2283 (H)
Email: liaosb@hotmail.com
LIN, Chun
Department of Government, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, UK
Tel.: 44 20 7955 7197
Fax: 44 20 7831 1707
Email: C.LIN@lse.ac.uk
LIN, Yu Sheng
Professor of History
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 455 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706,
USA
Tel.: 1 608 263 1857, 263 1800
Fax: 1 608 263 5312
Email: yslin@facstaff.wisc.edu
LIU, Xin
Lecturer
School of Philosophy & Arts, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610066, China
Tel.: 86 28 541 8962 (H)
Email: philfree@263.net
LU, Feng
Professor
Department of Philosophy, School of the Humanities, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
Tel.: 86 10 6277 1460 (H), 6278 2777 (O)
Email: lufeng@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn
MAO, Shoulong
Dr. & Professor
Institute of Public Administration, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100092, China
Tel.: 86 10 6251 1027 (O), 8290 2953 (H)
Email: maoshl@ihw.com.cn
MCKINNON, Catriona
Dr., Lecturer in Political Theory
Department of Politics
University of York
York YO10 5DD, UK
Email: cm31@york.ac.uk
MONTEFIORE, Alan
Professor; Emeritus Fellow, Balliol College, Oxford; Visiting Professor, Centre for
European Philosophy, Middlesex University.
Home address: 34, Scarsdale Villas, London, W8 6PR, UK
Tel.: 44 20 7937 7708
Fax: 44 20 7938 4257
Email: alanmontefiore@compuserve.com
MOSS, Jeremy
Dr., Research Fellow
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne,
Parkville 3010, Australia.
Tel.: 61 3 844 5091
Email: j.moss@philosophy.unimelb.edu.au
NI, Huifang
Professor, Vice President
Yunnan University, Kunming 650091, China
Tel.: 86 871 518 3540
Mobile: 1918610135
Fax: 86 871 514 7713
Email: nihfyd@public.km.yn.cn
NUGROHO, Agus
Faculty of Administrative Science
"Atma Jaya" Catholic University, PO Box 2639 Jakarta 10001, Indonesia
Tel.: 062/21/5708967
Fax: 062/21/5708967
Email: agusnugroho@fia.atmajaya.ac.id
PETTIT, Pettit
Professor, Australian National University, Research School of Social Sciences,
GPO Box 4, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia
Tel.: 61 2 6249 1012, 6249 2632
Fax: 61 2 6249 0599, 6247 8522
Email: pnp@coombs.anu.edu.au
PFORDTEN, von der, Dietmar
Prof. & Dr.
University Erfurt, Chair for Philosophy of Law- and Social Philosophy, PF 3 07,
D-99089 Erfurt, Germany
Tel.: 49 361 737 4040
Fax: 49 361 737 4049
Email: dietmar.vonderpfordten@uni-erfurt.de
POGGE, Thomas
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy, Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York,
NY 100027, USA
Tel.: 1 212 854 8534
Email: tp6@columbia.edu
QIAN, Xun
Professor
School of the Humanities, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
Tel.: 86 10 6278 6264
Email: qianx@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn
QIAN, Zhenming
Doctor in Philosophy and Medicine
School of Public Administration, Suzhou University, Suzhou 215006, China
Tel.: 86 512 530 3316
QIU Renzong
Professor
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6750 2263
Fax: 86 10 6750 2264
Email: chenqrz@ihw.com/cn or renzongqiu@sohu.com
R?IKKA, Juha
Dr., Head of the Department, Lecturer
Department of Philosophy, University of Turku, FIN-20014 Turku, Finland
Tel.: 35 823336339
Fax: 35 823336270
Email: jraikka@yahoo.com
REN, Jiantao
Professor
School of Law and Political Science, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
Tel.: 86 20 8403 4429 (H), 8411 3193 (O), 8411 0991(O)
Fax: 86 20 8403 6326
Email: lpsrjt@zsu.edu
RU, Xin
Professor
Centre for the Studies on Democracy
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
SHENG, Chin-lai
Professor
Tamkang University
Taipei Campus, 5 Lane, 199, King Hwa Street, Taipei 106, Taiwan
Tel.: 886 2 2391 0195
Fax: 886 2 8631 3214
Email: tmmx@oa.tku.edu.tw
Sun, Jing
Professor, Chief
Office of Scientific Research, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6513 8373
Email: zhexue@sina.com
TAN, Sor-hoon
Dr., Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore, 3 Arts Link, AS3/509,
Singapore 117570, Republic of Singapore
Tel.: 65 874 6290
Fax: 65 777 9514
Email: phitansh@nus.edu.sg
TAO, Julia
Associate Professor
Centre for Comparative Public Management and Social Policy, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Tel.: 852 2788 8903
Fax: 852 2788 8926, 2784 4288
Email: sajulia@cityu.edu.hk
VANHEMELRYCK, Katia
Researcher
K.U.Leuven, Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte Mercierplein 2, B 3000 Leuven, Belgium
Tel.: 32 16 32 32 62
Fax: 32 16 32 30 88
Email: Katia.Vanhemelryck@soc.kuleuven.ac.be
WANG, Shouchang
Professor
Institute of Philosophy, South China Normal University, Guangzhou 510631, China
Tel.: 86 20 8521 3327
Email: wangshch@scnu.edu.cn
WANG, Xiaosheng
Professor & Dean
School of Public Administration, Suzhou University, Suzhou 215006, China
Tel.: 86 512 526 5667
Email: glxy@suda.edu.cn
WANG, Yanguang
Associate Professor
Department of Ethics, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6882 9345 (H)
Email: ameliaw@ihw.com.cn
WEINSTOCK, Daniel
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, CP6128 succursale centre-ville
Tel.: 1 514 343 7345
Fax: 1 514 343 7899
Email: weinstod@poste.umontreal.ca
WU, Liexing
Journalist
“Women Friends” Magazine
Tel.: 86 10 6238 1524
Email: kimzeee@263.net
XIAO, Yang
Assistant Professor
Philosophy Department, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT 05753, USA
Tel.: 1 510 848 4285
Email: yxiao@middlebury.edu
XIA Hong
Lecturer
Department of Law & Political Science, Shaoguan University, Shaoguan 512000, China
Tel.: 86 751 821 8567 (H)
Email: sguxh@163.net
XIE, Dikun
Professor & Deputy Chair
Department of History of Western Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6775 5708 (H)
Email: dkxie88@hotmail.com
XU, Xiangdong
CPh.D.
Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York, USA
Email: xx16@columbia.edu
XU, Youyu
Professor
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6775 5677
Email: capmdspy@public.bta.net.cn
YANG, Xuan
Correspondent
Chinese Education Newspaper, Beijing 100088, China
Tel.: 86 10 6223 6795, 10 6225 7722-426
Email: yangxxxx@sina.com
YAO Dazhi
Professor & Dean
School of Philosophy and Sociology, Jilin University, Changchun 130012, China
Tel.: 86 431 892 2331-2930
YU, Keping
Professor
Centre for Comparative Studies in Politics and Economy, Central Bureau of Editing and Translation, Beijing 100036, China
Tel.: 86 10 6612 0874
Fax: 86 10 6612 0847
Email: yukp@pku.edu.cn
ZHAI, Xiaomei
Associate Professor
Capital University of Medical Sciences, Beijing 100054, China
Tel.: 86 10 6305 1165 (O), 10 6026 5351 (H)
Email: zhaixm@cpums.edu.cn
ZHANG, Boshu
Dr. & Associate Professor
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Mobile: 13011865097
ZHANG, Jiangang
Professor
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6435 9087 (H)
Email: zhangjg@public.gb.com.cn
ZHANG, Qianfan
Mr., Professor
School of Law, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
Tel.: 86 25 359 5845
Email: qfzhang@nju.edu.cn
ZHANG, Xiaoming
Professor, Chair
Department of Cultural Studies, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China
Tel.: 86 10 6487 9208 (H)
Email: zhangxm@a-1.net.cn
ZHANG, Xingjiu
Department of Politics & Public Administration, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
Tel.: 86 27 8768 2876 (O)
ZHENG, Yujian
Dr., Assistant Professor
Philosophy Department, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, N.T., Hong Kong
Tel.: 852 2616 7481
Fax: 852 2496 2091
Email: zhengyj@ln.edu.hk